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ABSTRACT
Community Mental Health Centers and the Problems
of Self-Sufficiency: An Application of Theories
of Organizational Adaptation to the Environment
(February 1981)
Joseph P. Gabbert, B.A., Purdue University
M.S., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor David M. Todd
The Community Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) Program was established
in the early 1960's as a major innovation in mental health care. The
program has developed over the years, but has been jeopardized recently
by problems in the CMHC seed-funding concept. Many centers have diffi-
culty surviving financially and protecting the CMHC ideology when they
lose their initial federal funds.
This project explores these problems in CMHCs, and provides as-
sistance to CMHC directors. First of all, a conceptual framework is
developed to help center directors orient their survival efforts over
time. Principles are drawn from the management literature on organiza-
tional adaptation to the environment, and are developed into a manage-
ment orientation for CMHCs. Secondly, the project provides examples of
successful survival strategies falling within this orientation that cen-
ter directors can apply in their own situations. These examples are
drawn from the experiences of four outstanding CMHCs in New England.
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Intensive case studies (including interviews and reviews of agency data)
are used to explore CMHC survival techniques and the usefulness of prin-
ciples adapted from the management literature. Although the study is
limited in scope, it does clarify and enrich the conceptual framework
developed here, and it provides initial validation of its usefulness in
the field.
The study confirms that there are major limitations on CMHCs' sur-
vival capabilities, but nevertheless, there are strategies that center
directors can use which may improve their agencies' positions. It ap-
pears that a key to success involves the CMHC becoming proactive in re-
lation to its external environment. Mechanisms are needed to scan the
environment for opportunities and threats, and understand the complex
interdependencies that affect resource acquisition and organizational
performance. Long-range contingency plans based on CMHC priorities and
environmental realities should be developed to guide the organization on
as self-directed a course as possiole. Short-range opportunities and
crises should be managed within the context of such long-range plans.
Over time, the organization should develop organizational structures and
processes that are adaptive to its evolving situation. It is suggested
that center directors develop skills in organization design, financial
management, and group development to help in this regard. In addition,
center directors should use a variety of long-range adaptive strategies
found in the management literature. The most important ones identified
here include the use of buffering (e.g. diversification), marketing, ad-
vi i i
vertising, coalition-building, boards of directors, and lobbying. It is
argued that such efforts should be geared to the developmental needs of
the CMHC at various points in its funding cycle. A developmental model,
based on the experiences of the centers in this study, is presented for
assistance
.
The report concludes with suggestions for center directors, policy
makers, and organizational theorists. It is recommended that center
directors receive training and consultation in the management areas dis-
cussed above. Research is needed to explore the limitations of CMHCs'
survival capabilities given current environmental constraints, and to
examine further the usefulness of the management techniques discussed in
this initial project. Recommendations are made for policy development
that will stabilize CMHCs and increase the flexibility of their funding
arrangements. Finally, it is requested that organizational theorists
explore further the subtle aspects of adaptation in CMHCs, and incor-
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INTRODUCTION
In 1963, President Kennedy signed the Community Mental Health Cen-
ters Act, landmark legislation that called for the creation of a nation-
al system of comprehensive mental health care. Since then, the legisla-
tion has been amended several times, but the basics of the national plan
remain. Under the system, local communities in partnership with the
state receive federal funds to develop community mental health centers
(CMHC's). CMHC's offer a wide range of services to all ages and socio-
economic groups as an alternative and deterent to institutional care.
They are intended to be innovative organizations, adaptable to the vary-
ing needs and resources of their community. The bulk of CMHC resources
are provided under a federal "seed-funding" program. As the federal
money is gradually phased out, CMHC's are expected to become increasing-
ly self-sufficient, relying on income from a variety of other sources
(e.g., state and local money, third-party payments, and client fees).
Over the years a number of CMHC's have been created, and many are
graduating into self-sufficiency. As of late 1979, over 400 federally
funded CMHC's have completed their initial funding cycle. While the
federal program has expanded rapidly and achieved significant national
status, individual centers often experience considerable difficulty.
Organizationally they are complex, providing a vast array of services,
usually through a highly decentralized structure. Their external envir-
onment of funding sources, regulatory bodies, and community groups is
1
2exceedingly complex, uncertain, and challenging (Baker, 1972; Schulberg
& Baker, 1970). Adapting to and surviving in such an environment is
often quite difficult. Several recent articles have outlined the prob-
lems of centers achieving self-sufficiency (Naierman et_ al_.
, 1978;
Beigel, 1977; Morrison, 1977; Silber, 1974; Sharfstein, 1978; Silber &
Burton, 1971, Whittington, 1975). The problem received national atten-
tion recently when an award-winning center of the early 1970's went
bankrupt (Herbert, 1978). Even if centers manage to survive the loss of
federal funds, there is evidence that services and the community mental
health ideology are compromised in the shift to other resources (Landes-
berg & Hammer, 1977; Naierman et_ al_.
,
1978).
The difficulty of centers achieving self-sufficiency is usually ex-
acerbated by poor leadership. Mental health administrators are notori-
ously untrained and inexperienced in management, having usually been
promoted from the ranks of clinicians. While some of the essential
skills are the same, the tasks to be performed in managing a large or-
ganization are quite different from clinical work, and demand a special
expertise (Feldman, 1972; Mehr, 1973). As centers continue to graduate
from federal funding and struggle to survive, administrators will in-
creasingly need technical assistance in this area. Recent articles by
Sharfstein and Wolfe (1978) and Mazade (1978), all leaders in the feder-
al program, have stressed the need for creative management approaches to
deal with the complex environmental problems of CMHC's. Unfortunately,
very little has been written in the mental health/human services litera-
ture that is useful.
Scanning the fields of management and organization theory for help,
3one finds a developing body of literature on organizational adaptation
to the environment. Through examination of business organizations for
the most part, writers in this area have explored the various ways mana-
gers keep pace with rapidly changing conditions in their external envir-
onments (including other organizations, regulating bodies, personnel
pools, and market segments). Theoretically, the organization is viewed
in interaction with its environment, responding to changing demands and
opportunities, and actively trying to improve external conditions so as
to improve its functioning and survival capabilities. Beginning re-
search has explored the adaptive strategies and mechanisms used by or-
ganizations to improve their situations, as well as models for the gen-
eral adaptation process. Work in the area is generally traced to the
early efforts of organizational theorists Chandler (1962) and March and
Simon (1958), and systems theorists such as Bertalanffy (e.g., 1968).
Contributing efforts have come from the areas of organizational ecology
(e.g., Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Hannon & Freeman, 1977), organizational
growth (e.g., Haire, 1959; Starbuck, 1965), organizational learning
(e.g. Cangelosi & Dill, 1965), organizational cybernetics (e.g., Ashby,
1960), environmental uncertainty (e.g., Duncan, 1972), and the work of
Lawrence and Lorsch (e.g., 1969). The most complete work to date has
been done by Miles and Snow (1978) and Pfeffer and Salanick (1978).
While the literature on organizational adaptation to the environ-
ment is based primarily on work with business organizations, much of it
is useful in approaching the problems of CMHC survival. This project is
an attempt to explore the relevant literature in this area and apply it
to the problems CMHC's have when they graduate into self-sufficiency.
4The first chapter contains a brief overview of the development of CMHC's
and the problem of survival. The historical perspective gained here is
invaluable for understanding the present-day constraints on CMHC's.
This chapter is followed by a review of the relevant management litera-
ture on organizational adaptation. A model of adaptation is presented
and suggestions are made for executives in the field to improve their
organizations' survival positions. The third chapter takes this work
and applies it to the problems of CMHC's. A theoretical approach is
suggested which center directors can use to help manage their organiza-
tions toward successful self-sufficiency in line with the ideals of the
CMHC philosophy. The remaining chapters discuss an exploratory study
which was conducted to build on this conceptual approach and provide
examples of successful survival strategies to center directors in the
field. The study explores how a sample of outstanding centers in New
England have attempted to engineer their survival and adhere to the
basics of the CMHC philosophy after their initial federal funding is
exhausted. While the research is limited in scope, it does clarify and
enrich the management approach developed here, and generates questions
for future research on CMHC adaptation. The project concludes with a
discussion of the implications of this work for center directors in the
field, NIMH officials who work with CMHC's, and organizational theorists
studying organizational adaptation. Training and other technical as-
sistance alternatives are discussed, as are suggestions for future re-
search
.
The work which follows is intended primarily for CMHC and other hu-
man service administrators. It is hoped they will be able to make use
of the conceptual approach and strategy options discussed. Human serv-
ice administration is a young field in need of much work, and few writ-
ings in the area are based on solid, up-to-date management theory. This
project is intended to have a firm base in the rapidly growing manage-
ment area of organizational adaptation. The project should benefit
those with theoretical interests as well, since the area of organiza-
tional adaptation is also in need of work. As evidenced by the review
of Darran, Miles, and Snow (1975), more work is needed to explore the
process of adaptation in a variety of organizations. Very little of
this nature has been done in human services, and CMHC's are excellent
organizations to study. They are similar in overall purpose, design,
and external boundary issues, and have developed during the same time
period. They have also had much freedom to adapt uniquely to the forces
of their particular environment, and thus contain some diversity of
style and operation.
CHAPTER I
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE PROBLEMS OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY
The following is a brief overview of the development of community
mental health centers and a discussion of the problems of self-suffi-
ciency facing them today. Several individuals have discussed the his-
tory and development of community mental health centers (CMHCs). Those
with particular interest are encouraged to read further for a more com-
plete picture than will be presented here.
A good beginning is the collection of articles assembled by Harvey
H. Barten and Leopold Bellak in their three editions of Progress in Com-
munity Mental Health (Barten & Bellak, 1972; Bellak & Barten, 1971,
1975). A variety of perspectives and issues are discussed, giving the
reader a fairly complete picture of the emerging national program.
Other useful overviews include the works of Allan Beigel (1970a, 1970b)
and Beigel and Levinson (1972), Raymond Glasscote (1975), Lucy Ozarin
et al_. (1971), M. Brewster Smith and Nicholas Hobbs (1966), and Stanley
Yolles (1966, 1970).
Henry Foley, an active participant in the development of CMHCs,
provides a fascinating picture of the "behind the scenes" political ac-
tivity which made the CMHC legislation possible in his book Community
Mental Health Legislation : The Formative Process (1975). His work is
one of the few which shows how and why the CMHC movement developed as it
did, and what political compromises made the program a reality. A use-
6
7ful complement to Foley's work is The Madness Establishment by Franklin
Chu and Sharland Trotter (1974), members of the Ralph Nader organiza-
tion. They also provide insight into the political process of CMHC de-
velopment, but take a more critical approach. Together, these books
provide an invaluable perspective on the political-legislative issues
which continue to affect CMHC's.
Early development . While the roots of community-based treatment in this
country can be traced to at least the 1920's, most look to the 1950 's as
the true beginning of the community mental health movement. By the mid-
1950's, institutional care was increasingly under attack. State mental
hospitals had grown to massive proportions, and many questioned the qual
-
ity of care they provided. In 1955, Congress called for the creation of
the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health to look into the mat-
ter (Mental Health Study Act, Public Law 182, July 28, 1955). Their
report, published in 1961 as Action for Mental Health , was greeted as a
landmark volume, and provided the impetus for enactment of the initial
CMHC legislation in 1963.
Action for Mental Health argued for the phasing-out of state mental
hospitals and the development of more accessible alternatives for the
treatment and prevention of mental illness. The report called for in-
creased numbers of outpatient services based in the local community,
more research and manpower, further development of general hospital psy-
chiatry (to develop shorter-term hospitalization), and increased work on
the prevention of mental illness. Pointing out the inadequacies of
state operations and funding, the authors requested increased federal
8involvement in the delivery of mental health services. This was signi-
ficant action in that mental health care had been previously a state
responsibility. Prior federal involvement had been mainly for manpower
development and research, with service support limited to pilot and dem-
onstration programs.
Early in his administration. President Kennedy assembled an Inter-
agency Task Force on Mental Health and Illness to examine the Joint Com-
mission's report and develop a "bold new approach" to mental health
care. Through much hard work and a series of compromises, the Community
Mental Health Center Act was passed in 1963 (Title II of Public Law
88-164, October 31, 1963), and the national program was born. The ini-
tial legislation provided federal funds for the construction of CMHC's.
In 1965, the legislation was amended to provide grants to help local
communities with the initial costs of staffing.
The federal grants were to be used as "seed-funding" by local com-
munities. Construction grants were available for one year, and staffing
grants were available for 51 months. The staffing money provided a max-
imum of 75 percent of the center's costs initially, phased down over the
grant's duration to 30 percent. Upon expiration of the federal money,
centers were expected to become self-sufficient, acquiring funds from a
variety of sources. Those anticipated included state and local funds,
private insurance, Medicaire and Medicaid, national health insurance,
and client fees.
Unfortunately, the anticipated sources of revenue were uncertain.
State funds were tied up for the most part in the hospital systems, and
local funds were virtually non-existent. Third-party payments were very
9limited for mental health care at the time, and would have to be liber-
alized considerably to cover the operating costs of centers. It was
hoped that the national program would stimulate interest in mental
health issues, however, and lead to greater funding possibilities. Al-
so, if centers did their jobs, the state hospital census would decline,
leading to a flow of money and personnel into the community.
According to Foley (1975), the high uncertainty of such funding was
recognized by the program's designers who felt that continued federal
support would probably be necessary to maintain centers. However, fund-
ing direct services had been a state responsibility in the past, and
many were against the federal government becoming too involved. It was
feared that proposing ongoing federal support would prohibit passage of
any legislation. The seed-funding approach seemed to be a good compro-
mise in that it allowed at least some federal involvement, and paved the
way for future legislative action if necessary. Once begun, no one ex-
pected Congress to abandon CMHC's if they ran into trouble.
In spite of apparent weaknesses in the seed-funding concept, enthu-
siasm for the program was high, and several states sought federal money
to add to their resources. Money appropriated to states was contingent
on the development of a state plan outlining policy and procedures for
implementing and maintaining CMHC's statewide. Once the state plan was
approved, local communities who were in compliance could request con-
struction and staffing grants from NIMH (the federal agency given re-
sponsibility for implementing and monitoring the program). The result-
ing arrangement was designed to be a partnership among federal, state,
and local representatives. Through federal initiative and monitoring.
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and with help from the state, local communities were stimulated to de-
velop CMHC programs tailored to their needs. Over time, the state and
local community would pick up the initiative to maintain and improve
upon the services created with federal help.
Basic concepts . In order to qualify for federal funds, communities were
required to develop programs based on certain principles central to the
community mental health ideology. These included the following major
areas: 1) comprehensive services, 2) continuity of care and coordina-
tion of services, 3) service to those most in need, 4) prevention, 5)
localization and community involvement, 6) innovation and flexibility,
7) research and evaluation, and 8) training.
1. Comprehensive services . Centers were initially required to
provide at least five essential services to all clients regardless of
their ability to pay. These included: 1) inpatient care for people
needing intensive treatment around the clock, 2) outpatient care for
adults, children, and families, 3) partial hospitalization including
daycare for individuals who can go home at night, or night care for
those who can work, yet need a structured living situation, 4) emergency
care 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and 5) consultation and educa-
tion to the community and professional personnel. The first four serv-
ices included direct care to clients with an emphasis on short-term,
community-based treatment to prevent long-term hospitalization. The
last included indirect service and educational activity, designed to in-
crease the skills of other caregivers, and reach people before serious
problems developed.
nFive additional services were recommended for centers interested in
becoming truly "comprehensive." These included: 1) diagnostic service
,
2) rehabilitation care (social and vocational rehabilitation), 3) pre-
care and aftercare including screening of clients prior to state hospit-
al admission, and case management and half-way houses after hospitaliza-
tion, 4) training , and 5) research and evaluation . The additional serv-
ices completed a comprehensive package designed to improve the variety
and quality of care available to those in need, regardless of age, sex,
socioeconomic class or ability to pay.
2. Continuity of care and coordination of services . An important
part of the CMHC movement was an emphasis on "client-based" care. Cli-
ents with multiple needs were to have them met throughout the treatment
process in a smooth, efficient manner. Within the center, provisions
were to be made to easily transfer clients from one service to another
with as much continuity as possible in treatment personnel. Services
within the center were also to be coordinated with other human service
and medical personnel to insure that non-mental health needs were also
met. Historically, there had been many barriers among community care-
givers, leading to large gaps in service responsibility. Agencies work-
ing with similar or comnon clients were often ignorant of each other's
programs or were working at cross purposes. CMHC's were to reduce these
barriers and the ensuing confusion for clients. They were to become a
"hub" for the delivery services to the mentally ill, and an active par-
ticipant in the community's human service system. Consultation to and
joint programming with other related services was strongly encouraged.
3. Service to those most in need . In the early 1960's, it was
12
recognized that many individuals in great need of services did not re-
ceive them. These included people, usually from the lower class or
minority groups, who were too poor to afford treatment, were reluctant
to attend traditional mental health settings, or were "unpopular" and
unwanted, and thus easily fell in the gaps between service agencies. A
major goal of the CMHC movement was to develop services to reach these
groups. CMHC's were required to provide services to all who requested
them regardless of ability to pay. Furthermore, centers were encouraged
to seek out those most in need of service and develop treatment ap-
proaches to reach them. In order to reduce cultural barriers, it was
suggested that centers hire minority staff, and use paraprofessionals
indigenous to the community.
4. Prevention . Central to the community mental health notion was
the goal of prevention, a concept borrowed from the public health field.
CMHC's were to provide services preventing mental illness in all its de-
bilitating forms. Such services were usually classified into three
groups, those aimed at primary prevention, secondary prevention, or ter-
tiary prevention (Cowen, 1973). Primary prevention was prevention in
its purest form. It included educational and other activities directed
to people who were not yet having difficulties. Programs were stressed
which dealt with "high risk" populations, and children and families.
Consultation to schools, the police, and other caregivers who often see
high risk individuals was also emphasized. Secondary prevention in-
cluded work with individuals who were just beginning to experience prob-
lems. By providing short-term, intensive treatment early in the onset
of a disorder, it was hoped that people's coping skills could be
13
strengthened, thus preventing future difficulties and need for treat-
ment. The center's emergency service was a cornerstone of intervention
in this area. Tertiary prevention was directed to individuals already
in trouble, including the chronically hospitalized. Centers would pro-
vide them a variety of community-based services so as to prevent future
illness and possible hospitalizations.
5. Localization and community involvement . The state hospital
system of the 1950's was known for its isolation and impersonal charac-
ter. Historically, society had wanted its mentally ill out of sight and
mind, until, if lucky, they were returned to normal functioning. Commu-
nity mental health ideology attacked this notion, and proposed a new
strategy for dealing with mental problems. People were to be kept in
the community where others who were a part of their lives could stay in-
volved, whether they wanted to or not. Mental illness was different
from physical illness in that social factors were seen to play an impor-
tant part in its cause and treatment. The individual was embedded in a
social system of family, friends, fellow workers, etc. that could serve
as an important curative source of support during times of stress. Re-
moval from one's support system was often seen to increase stress, exa-
cerbate interpersonal difficulties and prolong recovery.
It was also recognized that corrmunities varied widely in their com-
position and character. Services were needed which conformed to the
specific nature of the community for which they were intended. Urban
areas were different from rural ones, and even neighborhoods varied de-
pending upon people's socioeconomic class, ethnic background, age, and
interests. Different environments contained different cultures, which
14
in turn led to different mental health needs. As needs varied from com-
munity to community, so did the resources available to meet them. Some
areas were rich with existing services while others were more limited.
It was important to build upon the existing resources as much as possi-
ble, and augment them with federal money only where necessary.
In response to these ideas, CMHC's were to be localized in clearly
defined "catchment areas" of 75,000 to 200,000 people. Catchment areas
(a concept borrowed from England) were established in the state plans to
conform as closely as possible to naturally occurring lines of community
demarcation. Each center was required to have a board of directors from
the catchment area to be responsible for its operations. Careful plan-
ning based on cormiunity characteristics and needs was emphasized and
centers were encouraged to build upon the current service delivery sys-
tem wherever possible. As stated earlier, centers were also encouraged
to coordinate closely with other community caregivers, and to hire staff
representative of the population to be served.
6. Innovation and flexibility . The CMHC program represented a
major shift in our nation's approach to mental health care. At the
time, people were unhappy with established modes of treatment and the
slow moving, tangled bureaucracies of most state mental health systems.
New and innovative techniques were needed to meet the diverse and volum-
inous needs of people across the country. Also, organizational systems
were needed which could maintain flexibility to support a variety of
treatment approaches and accommodate inevitable changes in them over
time.
The CMHC program was intended to be such an innovative system.
15
Centers were asked to develop new treatment approaches based largely on
the newer "social systems" approaches to mental health and illness. Or-
ganizationally, a variety of models were supported, and over time cen-
ters have been encouraged to become private non-profit groups with mul-
tiple funding sources. In these ways it has been hoped they could main-
tain distance from the state systems, and maximize flexibility and open-
ness to new and improved treatment approaches. In order to maintain
this innovative stance, centers have been instructed to make provisions
for flexibility and change in programs, including periodic review of
policies and operations.
7. Research and evaluation . The CMHC emphasis on innovation and
experimentation mandated substantial investment in research and evalua-
tion. Only by carefully examining the effects of new programs could ef-
fective ones be retained and refined, and ineffective ones be dropped.
NIMH, since its beginning in the late 1940 's, had been founded on the
principles of research and evaluation (Feldman & Windle, 1973). The
CMHC movement highlighted the need to expand this orientation to the
community as well. Centers were encouraged to devote a portion of their
budget to research and evaluation and base future planning on their
findings. Evaluation could take a number of forms, but It was hoped
that such efforts would eventually include cost-benefit analyses. For
too long, mental health professionals had been prone to use methods
which they had found most satisfying personally, rather than those which
were best for the community and its limited resources.
8. Training . The CMHC movement also created a need for increased
manpower, particularly in the new community specialty areas. Most men-
16
tal health professionals had only traditional experience, and were ill-
equipped to work in the community. Efforts were needed to develop
trained personnel in a variety of areas, and to reallocate existing
staff into the new roles which were needed. At a national level, con-
siderable money was made available for manpower development. Non-psy-
chiatric roles were given particular emphasis, increasing training op-
portunities in psychology, social work, nursing, and community service.
At a community level, individual centers were encouraged to develop ima-
ginative training programs to help reallocated personnel gain competence
in their new roles. Training was also emphasized for the development of
paraprofessional and volunteer programs, and for the ongoing development
of staff (in-service training). It was hoped that training activities
would promote a desirable atmosphere of self-examination and openness to
new ideas, in addition to simply increasing the numbers of available
staff. Such an outlook was important for maintaining the high quality,
innovative care which served as a cornerstone of the CMHC program.
Legislative changes . Over the years the CMHC program just outlined has
been amended several times. Its basic intent has remained intact, how-
ever, and the above points still serve as general guidelines in centers
across the country.
In 1967 and 1968 the original act was expanded. Federal funds were
appropriated for continued construction and staffing of CMHC's through
1970 and money became available for the provision of services to alco-
holics and narcotic addicts. The CMHC's Amendments of 1970 extended the
basic centers program and those for the treatment of alcoholism and nar-
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cotics addiction through 1973. Pointing out inadequacies in the origin-
al funding mechanisms, that legislation also extended eligibility for
staffing grants from 51 months to eight years, and allowed for payment
of a higher federal share of costs for centers in urban or rural poverty
areas. Other related legislation in 1970 and 1972 broadened the nature
of drug treatment services to include all kinds of drug abuse, and ex-
panded the funding for such services and those for alcoholism. After
1972, all centers were required to make treatment available to drug
abusers
.
In the early 1970's resistance to the CMHC's program was strong
within the Nixon administration. In the name of federal conservatism
many programs were gutted, and alternative resources were neglected in
the plans for mental health. During this time, congressional efforts to
continue and expand the CMHC program were fought, appropriated funds
were impounded, and the mental health bureaucracy accountable for super-
vision was drastically reorganized and reduced. In 1973 Congress was
only able to get a one-year extension of the program. In 1974, the Alco-
hol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADMHA) was created
within DHEW to supervise NIMH and other related federal programs. Also
during this time, the mental health constituency began to form a strong
alliance in opposition to the Nixon austerity moves. For example, the
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers was formed, increas-
ing the lobbying power of local centers in the field.
The preceding action led to a major battle between federal offici-
als in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and Congress over proposed
legislation in 1974. With the support of a strong mental health lobby,
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Congress eventually overcame two Presidential vetoes, and enacted a ma-
jor extension and revision of the CMHC Act. The resulting CMHC's Amend-
ments of 1975 (Title III of Public Law 94-63, July 29, 1975) extended
the program through 1977 and rewrote many of the initial requirements
(for an overview see National Institute of Mental Health, 1977a; and
Ochberg, 1976).
The 1975 Amendments were significant in many respects. First of
all, centers were required to provide twelve essential services instead
of the original five. These included: 1) inpatient services, 2) out-
patient services, 3) partial hospitalization, 4) emergency care, 5) con-
sultation and education, 6) services for children, 7) services for the
elderly, 8) screening services (pre-hospitalization) , 9) follow-up care
(post-hospitalization)
,
10) transitional services (including half-way
houses), 11) alcohol abuse services, and 12) drug abuse services. Cen-
ters already in existence were given two years in which to expand their
programs, otherwise they would lose all federal support. To ease in the
transition, a new category of funding, "conversion grants," was made
available to centers for up to three years.
The 1975 Amendments also created other new funding mechanisms for
centers and adjusted the requirements of earlier ones. "Financial dis-
tress grants" were established for centers who had exhausted their eight
years of federal support, and were facing serious financial difficulty.
Also, one-year "planning grants" were created for communities to more
carefully plan the development of new CMHC's in their area. Recognizing
the need for special support of the often misunderstood and neglected
consultation and education services, a separate funding mechanism, "con-
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sultation and education grants," was established for them. Finally,
both the original construction and staffing grants were renamed and made
more flexible. Construction grants were renamed "facilities grants,"
emphasizing that they could be used not just for new construction, but
to buy or lease and renovate existing buildings. (Unfortunately, there
have never been any funds appropriated under this category.) Staffing
grants were renamed "operations grants" and could be used to cover the
costs of administrative expenses as well as those for personnel. This
was particularly helpful for rural and poverty centers who had difficul-
ty gaining enough local support to cover administrative costs.
Other changes resulted in further refinements in the CMHC regula-
tions. For example, governing boards of new centers were required to be
"non-provider" dominated and have the power to hire and fire the execu-
tive director, and approve the budget. Centers were also required to
have an ongoing quality assurance program, an integrated medical records
system, a professional advisory board, and an identifiable administra-
tive unit to provide consultation and education services. Where non-
English speaking clients were served, bilingual staff had to be avail-
able. Also, two percent of each . center 's budget had to be devoted to
evaluation of its programs and services. The intent of these new provi-
sions was to increase the accountability of center staff to the commu-
nity and insure the provision of higher quality care.
The most recent amendments to the CMHC legislation were enacted in
1978. The new act extended the program developed in 1975, and made only
minor changes in a few areas. Of some importance were two changes in
the financial regulations. First of all, the eligibility for financial
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distress grants was increased so that centers could receive up to five
grants rather than the previous two. Secondly, arrangements were made
for centers to keep a portion of surplus funds generated one year for
use in the next to improve their operations, or establish a financial
reserve for the purpose of offsetting upcoming decreases in federal mon-
ey. Previously, centers were required to return all surplus funds to
NIMH. Although the new provision allowed the retention of only a small
percentage of extra income, it did improve the incentives for centers to
generate non-federal funds and improve their self-sufficiency capabil-
ities .
At the time of this paper, plans are underway once again for changes
in the national program. In response to the recent "Report to the Pre-
sident" from the President's Commission on Mental Health (1978), the ad-
ministration has proposed legislation which, if enacted in its latest
form, will have significant impact on individual centers. The recently
proposed "Mental Health Systems Act" contains several changes in the
program created through the CMHC Amendments of 1975. Most importantly,
the Act 1) places increased emphasis on deinstitutionalization, 2) gives
more power to the states over CMHC funding and evaluation, 3) relaxes
the notion of comprehensive services to allow funding of single high
priority services, and 4) authorizes grants for non-revenue producing
activities such as consultation and education and evaluation.
The proposed legislation has come under heavy criticism, particu-
larly from the leaders of CMHC's. Major critics contend that the new
legislation downplays CMHC's and will lead to the elimination of the im-
portant concepts of comprehensive, coordinated services and prevention
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of mental illness. Most are particularly concerned with provisions
which give increased power to the states. Historically, the states have
shown only minimal commitment to CMHC's and prevention (fJaierman et al
.
,
1978), and CMHC leaders fear they will not manage the national program
as intended if they are given the power to do so.
Another major criticism concerns the authorization of funds for
services which do not generate their own revenues (e.g., third-party
payments). While the provision is basically supported, critics feel
that the amount of funds to be appropriated (one dollar per capita has
been discussed) will be too small to cover all of the services which are
combined in this category (including consultation and education, evalua-
tion, case management, etc.). Most expect consultation and education to
suffer the most, as they have been the most often misunderstood and ne-
glected services in the past. Supporters of such services favor reten-
tion of separate consultation and education grants as was provided for
in the 1975 amendments.
As a result of such criticism. Congress is debating the Act and
considering a variety of amendments to it. Several battles are expected
over a number of provisions, and it is unclear what form the Act will
take when it is eventually passed. (For an overview of the proposal and
CMHC commentary see: 79-5 "Briefing Memo" and 3-3 "Capital Notes"
columns in the National Council News , May, 1979, a publication of the
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, 2233 Wisconsin Ave-
nue, N.W., Washington, D.C; and Testimony of John Wolfe, President of
the National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, before the
Senate Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, May 24, 1979.)
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The problems of self-sufficiency
. As CMHC's have developed over the
years it has become increasingly apparent that the original legislative
goal of center self-sufficiency is highly problematic. Anticipated
sources of revenue have not become as accessible as hoped, and centers
have not taken full advantage of available funding options. As increas-
ing numbers of centers graduate from federal funding, the problem grows
in importance, and thus raises serious questions about the future of the
CMHC program. Dr. Stephen Sharfstein, Director of Mental Health Service
Programs at NIMH, has suggested that the national program will become




The problems of self-sufficiency are not new, and as stated earli-
er, have been recognized since the development of the original CMHC leg-
islation (see Foley, 1975). Widespread recognition has only come in the
last few years as increasing numbers of centers have exhausted their
federal funding and flirted with financial distress. During the past
decade, several studies have documented and explored the problems of the
"seed-funding" concept.
One of the first studies of CMHC self-sufficiency was conducted by
the Stanford Research Institute in 1970. The resulting report (Harvey,
1970) examined sixteen centers and showed that their financial alterna-
tives were extremely limited, indicating considerable dependence on fed-
eral grants for continued financial operation. State support was highly
variable from area to area. Only seven centers received more than 20
percent of their revenues from this source. Local governments were con-
strained because of their limited tax-base and did not contribute much
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either. Third-party payments were in short supply and usually available
for only inpatient services. Client fees, other federal grants, and
private philanthropy were basically insignificant.
A 1973 study by Macro Systems, Inc., reconfirmed the Stanford find-
ings (Macro Systems, Inc., 1973). Centers varied widely in their abil-
ity to capture alternative funding and reliance on federal support was
high. A very important finding was that center administrators had done
little specific planning in anticipation of the impending termination of
staffing grants. This was related to two apparent factors. First of
all, unclear messages and a lack of commitment from funding sources made
specific long-range planning very difficult. Secondly, no one expected
the federal government to abandon centers if they got into serious trou-
ble. The 1970 CMHC amendments had extended funding for centers beyond
the government's original intentions, and there were hints at the time
that future legislation would provide even longer-term support.
The following year these findings were reconfirmed by a study of
the General Accounting Office (1974). The GAO review of twelve centers
again pointed out the inadequacies of alternative funding sources such
as third-party payments (too limited in coverage and reduced by deduc-
tibles and coinsurance) and fees-for-servi ce (reduced by center's empha-
sis on serving the indigent). Current management practices of centers
were also criticized heavily. In addition to poor planning, centers
were shown to have inadequate financial operations (including account-
ing, billing, and collecting). This led to a loss of many potential re-
venues and the poor allocation of most funds already acquired. The
authors concluded that current funding alternatives could not realistic-
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ally replace federal funds in total, but that liberalized insurance cov-
erage and improved management practices would help considerably towards
this goal.
In 1975, the National Council of Community Mental Health Centers
conducted a survey of its membership which showed that 60 percent of the
centers losing staffing grant support that year would be forced to cut
back services, often drastically, unless alternative funds were found
(National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, 1975). To enhance
their survival capabilities, centers planned to alter service priorities
so as to maximize available sources of revenue. For example, they ex-
pected to see higher numbers of fee-paying clients in order to increase
fees-for-service, and emphasize physician-directed and inpatient care
because of their better coverage by third-party payers. Although they
felt it unfortunate, certain aspects of the community mental health ide-
ology might have to be sacrificed so that financial stability could be
maintained.
The effects of funding constraints on community mental health serv-
ices were also shown in a study by Landesberg and Hammer (1977). In
their study, increasing numbers of third-party eligible, recidivist cli-
ents were seen on inpatient units so that beds could be kept filled and
third-party revenues could be maximized. In other words, client recidi-
vism was inadvertantly encouraged rather than corrected in the attempt
to increase the center's chances for survival. The authors pointed out
that such a system runs contrary to the basics of community mental
health, and threatens to transform the CMHC into a "community-based re-
volving door state hospital." the type of facility it was designed to
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eliminate.
The most comprehensive and probing study of CMHC's to date was con-
ducted by Abt Associates, Inc. (Naierman et_ al. , 1978). Their report
was based on a statistical analysis of secondary data on all 99 centers
graduating from the initial staffing grant period at the time, and a
case study analysis based on in-depth interviews in 28 sample centers.
Their work explored the effects of federal grant termination on the cen-
ters, assessing whether alternative funds were eventually obtained and
whether the service requirements of the CMHC program were affected.
Results of the study showed that between the fifth and eighth years
of the staffing grant, centers were able to obtain third-party revenues
and patient fees which substituted for the declining federal dollar.
During these years, the shift in funds did not affect service priori-
ties, the availability of services, or other aspects of the CMHC ideol-
ogy. Serious effects were observed by the tenth year, however. After
the eighth year and termination of the staffing grant, third-party re-
venues stabilized in growth while state and local funds became more cru-
cial to the replacement of lost federal funds. Because state and local
funds often came with service requirements and state priorities which
conflicted with the CMHC objectives, centers were forced to retrench
their programs and compromise the CMHC ideology. Consultation and edu-
cation services and satellite clinics were significantly diminished, and
there were observable shifts away from outpatient services to the more
profitable inpatient services. Reductions in partial hospitalizations
and emergency services were also visible in some centers. Thus, within
a year or two after defunding the CMHC ideology was in jeopardy among
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graduate centers, despite their continued financial viability.
The most recent studies of CMHC self-sufficiency have been con-
ducted by staff at .NIMH. The first of these was conducted by Weiner,
Woy, Sharfstein, and Bass (1979). Their investigation included analysis
of secondary data on a cohort of 29 centers that had completed their
eight years of staffing grants by March, 1975. One sub-group of 11 cen-
ters were true "graduates" in that they had not received further NIMH
funds since the end of their eight years of staffing grants. The other
subgroup of 18 centers were "quasi -graduates" because while their eight
years of staffing grants had ended, they subsequently sought and re-
ceived additional federal money under provisions of the 1975 CMHC Amend-
ments
.
Results indicated that true graduates were much more aggressive in
garnering third-party reimbursements and state funds than were quasi-
graduates. Yet, as was pointed out in the Abt Associates study, it ap-
peared likely they were also moving further away from the CMHC model.
Centers in the other subgroup, by virtue of their reliance on federal
distress funds, appeared to be in compliance with the CMHC model. How-
ever, .they were in much more financial difficulty and it was unclear
what would happen to them if and when the federal grants ended. The
authors concluded that the premises of the seed-money approach need re-
thinking, and that some form of "floor funding" may be needed to help
preserve the CMHC ideology and program. They also suggested that fur-
ther work is needed to understand the differences between graduates and
quasi
-graduates which can lead to successful financial viability without
loss of the program's basic principles.
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Wasserman, Woy, and Weiner-Pomerantz (1980) have recently followed
up on the study of Weiner et £1. (1979) by looking further at the sample
of "graduates" and "quasi
-graduates" examined earlier. The overall pur-
pose of their effort was to explore the programmatic changes which ac-
company the decline and end of federal funding for CMHC's, noting in
particular changes in the nature and type of services provided to cli-
ents. Their findings indicated that the divergent funding patterns of
"true graduates" and "quasi
-graduates " did have different patterns of
service associated with them, although the specific prograrmiati c differ-
ences between the two groups varied from those expected based on the Abt
Associates, Inc., study. In addition, the study suggested that it ap-
pears extremely difficult, given current funding structures, for CMHC's
to remain true to the CMHC model and maintain their fiscal viability.
The authors argued strongly for the development of improved funding sys-
tems to better support the financial and philosophical needs of the CMHC
program. They also called for the federal government to provide on-
going support in the short-run for important, yet currently non-reim-
bursible services until such long-range funding systems can be devel-
oped.
The most recent examination of the problems of CMHC self-suffici-
ency was conducted at the NIMH-sponsored "National Conference on Gradu-
ate Community Mental Health Centers" held April 14-17, 1980, at Fripp
Island, South Carolina.^ The conference of invited participants, in-
For information contact J. Richard Woy, Ph.D., Acting Chief, Pro-
gram Analysis and Evaluation Branch, OPDA, NIMH, Room 17C-05, Parklawn
Building, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, Maryland 20857.
28
eluding a cross -section of individuals associated with CMHCs across the
country, were asked to discuss two major questions: 1) What happens to
federally funded CMHCs as the federal grants decline and end?; and 2)
What additional actions, if any, are needed to assure the continued
growth and improvement of graduate CMHCs? Results of the conference
further documented the problems of self-sufficiency and called for sev-
eral needed changes in organization, policy, and administration at a
federal level. A committee of conference participants was organized to
work with NIMH and ADAMHA officials to follow up on their various
recommendations
.
Barriers to self-sufficiency . There are several reasons why self-suffi-
ciency has been so difficult for centers to achieve. The previous dis-
cussion outlined some of the most important issues involving the acces-
sibility of alternative funds and inadequacy of center management. A
number of other barriers to self-sufficiency exist which can also be
proposed. This section includes a review of some of the most important
of these that centers face in their struggle to survive. These include
the following: 1) problems in the federal role, 2) problems in the
state role, 3) inadequacy of third-party coverage, 4) obstacles in the
federal regulations, 5) unrealistic expectations and demands of the pub-
lic, and 6) poor center management.
1. Problems in the federal role . The role of NIMH project offi-
cers with respect to CMHCs includes monitoring center program develop-
ment and financial planning, providing consultation and technical asr
sistance when needed, and coordinating program planning with state men-
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tal health authorities. Because the CMHC program is decentralized and
administered primiarly by the regions, the extent to which these func-
tions are performed varies from region to region, and among individuals
within a given region. Data suggest that there have been several prob-
lems in how this role has been operationalized (Naierman et_ al_.
,
1978;
Sharfstein & Wolfe, 1978). Often, federal representatives have not been
as accessible as centers would like, and have not been trained in man-
agement and fundraising skills so desperately needed by centers ap-
proaching the end of their federal grants (also see Morrison, 1977).
Also, i^lIMH data requirements have been burdensome and inappropriate for
meeting centers' data needs. Thus, centers have needed one data system
to satisfy NIMH, and another to help them plan for survival. Finally,
some centers have suffered from a lack of coordination between NIMH and
state mental health authorities (also see Foley, 1975; and Hall, 1970).
There has been confusion over such issues as catchment area designation
and the funding of CMHC and state facilities in the same area. Differ-
ences of opinion, particularly over funding issues, have left centers
caught in the middle. If they side with federal officials, they risk
losing support from the state, and if they side with the state, they
risk losing federal support.
2. Problems in the state role . Such lack of coordination between
federal and state officials has been related to unclear expectations
about the state roles in the delivery of mental health services. As
mentioned earlier, the states had been responsible historically for the
delivery of mental health services. Because of overwhelming problems
with state hospitals and unwieldly state mental health bureaucracies in
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the niid-1950's, the federal government stepped in to take a larger role.
It was hoped that with initial federal involvement and seed-funding as
the impetus, states would increasingly adopt the CMHC ideology and sup-
port such services. Unfortunately, the federal stance has felt condes-
cending to some states, and they have resented federal involvement in
their work. Plus, historically, the federal government has not included
the states in CMHC planning as it has promised to do so (Foley, 1975;
Whittington, 1975). Thus, a negative relationship has developed between
some states and NIMH, resulting in a mixed commitment from the states to
CMHC's. State officials have performed well enough to honor their state
plans so that they could keep federal money but have not provided the
kind of support envisioned by NIMH or CMHC's.
The lack of state support has also been related to pure and simple
economics. No one expected the seventies to develop as they did, with
increasing economic difficulties, long delays in the implementation of a
national health insurance program, and increasing public conservatism
and reluctance to support human service endeavors (e.g., California's
Proposition 13). As the CMHC program matured and centers' needs for
state dollars grew, the states were in a worsening position to provide
assistance (Hall, 1970; Naierman et aT_. , 1978; Okin, 1978).
State resources for CMHC services have been further limited by the
fact that money tied up in institutions has not been transferred to the
community as expected. Robert Okin, Commissioner of the Massachusetts
Department of Mental Health, outlines several reasons for this in a re-
cent article (Okin, 1978). He notes that early deinstitutionalization
efforts led to the initial removal of the least disabled patients to the
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community. These patients had traditionally worked at the hospital
without pay and represented a significant part of its labor force. This
removal necessitated the hiring of additional paid staff to care for the
more needy patients who were left. At the same time, pressure was being
placed on institutions to change their orientation from mere custody to
active treatment, creating further needs for state resources. The hos-
pital was thus placed in the embarrassing position of requiring more
staff at the same time its patient census was decreasing. Also, efforts
to close hospitals and layoff staff have been fought by employee unions
and local communities who depend on the hospital for a source of reve-
nue, and fear the release of mental patients into local neighborhoods.
In addition to being limited, state funds have also been quite re-
strictive. Because their resources for community-based services have
been scarce, states have had to prioritize their use. For the most part
they have placed their emphasis on work with the chronic population, the
group for which historically they have felt most responsible. Preven-
tive services such as consultation and education and emergency services
have been largely neglected. Thus, centers have not been able to depend
on state funds to support the diversity of services which they were in-
tended to provide.
Use of state funds has contributed to other problems as well. Some
states are slow in reimbursing centers, and thus contribute to problems
in cash flow. Also, centers working with decentralized state mental
health systems have found the multiplicity of governmental layers con-
fusing and full of red tape. Because of this confusion, decision-making
is open to considerable personal influence and centers can find them-
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selves in politically charged environments. Such environments can be
extremely frustrating, and, because of this, several centers have
avoided state funds wherever possible (Naierman et^ al_.
, 1978).
Thus, state support has been inadequate and problematic for most
centers, providing them a major obstacle to self-sufficiency. State re-
sources have been limited, and for the most part, highly restrictive.
Also, for historical reasons, states have not shown a commitment to the
CMHC ideology, and their longstanding arguments with federal officials
have caught some centers in the middle. Lastly, the bureaucratic and
political tangles of state governments continue to be a reality, and
lead to considerable frustration at a local level.
3. Inadequacy of third-party coverage
. As stated earlier, propon-
ents of the seed-funding concept anticipated the development of in-
creased mental health coverage under third-party payment systems (e.g.
Medicaid/Medicaire, private insurance, and national health insurance).
Unfortunately this has not happened to the extent hoped, even though
graduate centers do depend on third-party sources for a major part of
their revenue. The problems of such funding are varied, and several in-
dividuals have discussed them (Beigel, 1977; Hall, 1966, 1970; Morrison,
1977; Naierman et^ al_.
,
1978; Sharfstein, 1977). The following is a sum-
mary of their most important findings.
Currently, third-party systems pay primarily for physician-directed
inpatient and outpatient services, although in some states only inpa-
tient services are covered. A few states are developing systems to cov-
er day treatment programming as well and are trying to persuade insur-
ance companies to follow with them. Usually there are strict regula-
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tions which must be met to receive funds. Generally these control 1)
the type of organization delivering services, 2) the credentials of
staff involved, 3) the type of services being provided, and 4) the eli-
gibility of the clients covered by the payment program in question.
These restrictions have been difficult particularly for free-standing
centers not oriented towards a medical model of service delivery. Also,
most payment plans have a ceiling which further restricts the amount of
income a center can generate. As noted in the study by Abt Associates,
Inc. (Naierman et^ al_.
,
1978), most centers learn how to maximize income
from third-party sources by their eighth year, but then approach this
ceiling and can get little more. Another problem is that reimbursement
rates are often not equal to actual center costs for services, and that
billing procedures are complicated and time-consuming. Thus, even if
centers maximize their reimbursements, they may not receive enough mon-
ey, or enough money in time, to pay for their operations.
There are several reasons for these limitations and problems.
First of all, third-party payment programs have been difficult to devel-
op because of the unstructured quality of most mental health services.
Reasonable and reliable cost rates have been difficult to concretize,
particularly for preventive services. Plus, historically, third-party
payment systems have grown from the health industry. Mental illness has
not been seen or understood in the same way as physical illness, and
people have been reluctant to support it equally. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that those services most similar to health services (e.g., inpa-
tient) have received recognition first, while others have been ignored.
As a final point, the medical model has also been the most respected and
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nationally recognized. With it, psychiatrists and the American Psychi-
atric Association have become a powerful national lobby. Their influ-
ence has significantly affected the standards and regulations of third-
party payment systems, keeping them restricted to physician-directed
services.
The prospects for major changes in third-party systems are not op-
timistic at the present time, and national health insurance which would
cover mental health services is still thought to be ten years away. Ef-
forts continue at a national and state level to improve mental health
coverage, however. In the meantime, it appears that centers do have
some room to improve their collection procedures and increase third-
party revenue (Weiner et an_.
,
1979).
4. Obstacles in the federal regulations . Over the years, the
federal CMHC regulations have been amended several times to improve cen-
ters' viability and readjust principles of the CMHC ideology. Unfor-
tunately, problems still exist which hinder self-sufficiency, some of
which have been created rather than corrected by the amendments. For
example, Steven Sharfstein notes in a recent article (Sharfstein, 1978)
that the 1975 CMHC amendments have created many problems for centers in
the process of trying to improve service provision. Most notable of
these was the expansion of the comprehensive concept from five essential
services to twelve essential services. Along with this were require-
ments to make centers more accessible and accountable to the community,
and to increase reporting requirements to NIMH. While these have all
had good intentions with respect to service delivery, they have imposed





Another example is that the 1975 CMHC amendments prohibit centers
from carrying a surplus of funds from one year to the next. A surplus
generated one year results in a dollar for dollar reduction in the next
year's grant. If a center has a bad year and their expenses exceed all
sources of revenue, they must somehow fund the deficit from existing
resources. The law does not allow these deficits to be recouped in a
succeeding fiscal year. Given no clear mechanism to recoup the loss, a
CMHC with small reserves is in jeopardy of bankruptcy. Such regulations
provide a negative incentive for centers to increase their third-party
payments and build financial self-sufficiency. Also, they contribute
to problems of cash flow, particularly when center receipts are late or
service delivery becomes suddenly low.
The 1977 CMHC amendments attempted to correct some of this problem
by allowing centers to keep a portion of surplus funds generated one
year for use in the next to improve their operations or establish a fi-
nancial reserve for offsetting upcoming decreases in federal money.
However, the retainable portion is very small (only 5%) and does not
signifi cantly. improve the situation for CMHC's.
5. Unrealistic expectations and demands of the ^ublj^. Over the
years CMHC's have been billed as all things to all people. Emerging
from the problems of mental health care in the 1950 's to the global op-
timism of the 1960 's, many have expected CMHC's to be a "savior" in the
local community. As we move through the 1970 's and our problems of men-
tal illness and hospitalization still persist, CMHC's have come increas-
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ingly under attack. Criticism has come from conservatives such as the
Nixon administration who are unhappy with continued federal government
involvement in mental health, from the medical community who are unhappy
with CMHC movement away from psychiatric treatment, from local townspeo-
ple who are still afraid of the mentally ill, and from liberals who feel
CMHC's have not lived up to their promises. The CMHC ideology has not
been universally agreed upon and there is still disagreement as to which
parts should be emphasized and how services should be delivered. Such
debate continues to plague CMHC's as they can never live up to every-
one's expectations. Whether the criticism is valid or the result of in-
appropriate expectations, CMHC's are increasingly threatened by its neg-
ative effects on the federal, state, and local funding upon which they
depend to survive.
6. Poor center management . As documented in the studies discussed
earlier, some of the largest barriers to self-sufficiency for CMHC's are
their own management practices. Problems in planning, fund-raising,
financial management, and organization development have made it diffi-
cult for many local communities to develop smoothly functioning, finan-
cially solvent operations. The reasons for these problems are varied,
and it is only in the last few years that they have been addressed.
According to Feldman (1972) the problem is twofold. Managing such
organizations is a difficult job, perhaps more difficult than most in
the field have realized. Centers are large, diverse organizations with
a complex heterogeneous staff funded through a variety of sources.
Managers are faced with a highly politicized and changing community to
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which they must continually be on guard. Also, the task of agency coor-
dination is a difficult one requiring sensitive and sophisticated
skills. This problem is coupled with the unfortunate fact that most
center directors are clinicians with little experience and training in
management and community politics. Furthermore, little has been written
for their use, and there has been little in-service training or techni-
cal assistance available.
Freedman (1972) reiterates Feldman's basic argument in his discus-
sion of the administrative role of CMHC directors. He also mentions
that CMHC directors have had trouble avoiding the management trap of
sacrificing long-range planning to "put out the brush fires" of their
constantly changing environment. He stresses the need for center direc-
tors to do anticipatory planning to head off future difficulties. Un-
fortunately, he does not explore ways this can or should be done.
Mazade (1978) presents a more up-to-date version of the administra-
tive issues facing CMHC directors in a discussion resulting from a re-
cent staff college workshop co-sponsored by NIMH and the National Coun-
cil of Community Mental Health Centers. According to the CMHC directors
involved in the workshop, fund-raising was an increasingly problematic
area for them. As the funding picture becomes more complex and limit-
ing, they felt they will need increasing technical assistance to combat
it. In particular, they wanted help in developing skills in negotiat-
ing, bargaining, community organization, arbitration and mediation, co-
alition building, priority setting, marketing, planning, lobbying, pub-
lic relations, and advocacy. Also, they needed help in facing the con-
tinuing reality of decision-making under conditions of high uncertainty.
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As discussed in the studies of center self-sufficiency presented
earlier, financial management is a particular problem. In most cases
the problem of poor financial management is due to center administra-
tors' lack of experience in this area. Also, the financial operations
of non-profit organizations are quite complex, particularly when the
federal regulations prohibit carrying a surplus. There are a number of
funding source regulations to satisfy, with sometimes conflicting reim-
bursement schedules to juggle when paying bills. This is an area in
which many centers need help.
Technical assistance for CMHC administrators
. As the problems of CMHC
self-sufficiency have grown in importance in recent years, center ad-
ministrators have increasingly needed technical assistance in this area.
Unfortunately, most writings have either 1) simply addressed and out-
lined the problem to increase people's awareness of it, or 2) focused on
legislative changes needed at a national level. Only a few articles
have offered practical help for managers in the field.
Stanley Silber, former Chief of the Community Support Section of
the Division of I'tental Health Service Programs at NIMH, provided consid-
erable assistance in the early 1970's. His 1971 article (Silber & Bur-
ton, 1971) reviewed research into the leadership patterns of successful-
ly funded CMHC's. Essentially he found that strong, effective leader-
ship was the most important element in a successful CMHC program. The
most crucial aspects of this leadership included the following:
1) Planning for service programs was closely integrated with fi-
nancial planning so that a joint commitment was made to maxi-
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mize the center's response to the community's mental health
needs and maximize its development and use of available fiscal
resources.
2) Lines of communication were kept open between the center and
the total area it served.
3) Communication was kept open between the board and staff.
4) Third-party payments were captured aggressively. Generally,
staff were required to spend at least 50% of their time in in-
come-producing activity.
5) The center was coordinated closely with other community agen-
cies .
6) A "business-like" order was maintained in the center, but with-
out staff feeling dehumanized.
In two later articles, Mr. Silber outlined how centers could 1) se-
cure funds from private philanthropy (Silber, 1972), and 2) develop mul-
ti source funding programs (Silber, 1974). In the second article, he
made several significant points. Most importantly, he noted that the
complexity of multi source funding today requires a highly sophisticated,
centralized approach. No one center has all the expertise required to
do the job, nor can it afford the cost of technical assistance required.
As competition for scarce resources becomes keener, the only means of
survival for centers will be the aggressive pursuit of funds in colla-
borative action with state and federal representatives.
As an example, he discussed the early 1970' s CMHC system in Kentuc-
ky where federal and state representatives worked closely together to
stay informed about funding possibilities and provide support to indi-
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vidua! centers. Buttressed with this kind of coordinated support, Ken-
tucky centers were in a fairly secure position. Aggressive and effec-
tive management was still needed at the local CMHC level, however. Mr.
Silber provided the following suggestions for CMHC administrators based
on his experience with Kentucky CMHC's:
1) Third-party payments should be pursued aggressively and efforts
should be made to determine how different services can be made
eligible for reimbursement.
2) Interesting, innovative, and low-cost demonstration programs
should be developed that can be shown to private insurers as
they will be looking in the future for facilities that can pro-
vide quality services more economically than traditional insti-
tutions.
3) Demonstration of the capability to receive third-party reim-
bursements can be used to attract seed money from states or
private banking support.
4) Partnerships should be developed with other health and human
services for multisource funding of particular programs.
5) Programs, and sound management practices should be made visible
and used to establish credibility in the aggressive pursuit of
dollars.
6) Private philanthropy should be explored as a major untapped
source of money for training, research, and demonstration pro-
jects.
7) CMHC's need to develop an organizational structure specifically
designed to cope with an ever-accelerating rate of change in
the delivery and financing of health services. Part of knowing
the game is that it is changing continually, and that today's
plays may not win tomorrow.
8) Aggressive leadership is needed which can tie together the com-
munity, the legislative process, and the program, and that is
prepared to protect and defend the program.
9) Centers need a current and growing base of knowledge about po-
litical, legal, professional, and program developments on the
local, state, regional, and national scene. This knowledge
base should be continuously analyzed so as to constantly devel-
op, modify, and prepare alternative strategies for changing po-
litical and legislative conditions. An administrative struc-
ture and information system should be developed to assist in
the building of this knowledge base, the preparation of program
strategies, and the implementation of strategies.
10) Centers should develop an overall plan for the delivery of
services that involves people at all levels in its determina-
tion and delineation and is flexible enough to be updated as
.
necessary.
During the early 1970' s, a few others offered their own brand of
advice to CMHC administrators. Some were geared towards helping centers
identify potential funding sources (National Institute of Mental Health,
1973a; Reff, 1972), and improve their financial management systems (e.g.
National Institute of Mental Health, 1972, 1973b, 1974). Others, pick-
ing up on recent developments in organizational systems theory, began to
offer advice from a theoretically-grounded perspective (Baker, 1972;
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Franklin & Kittredge, 1975).
Frank Baker borrowed concepts from open-systems theory and used
them to help center administrators develop an improved approach to plan-
ning. According to Baker, centers must learn to adapt their planning to
the environmental systems in which they are embedded if they are to sur-
vive over time. In the dynamic, uncertain environments of CMHC's, ad-
ministrators must be flexible to develop short-range plans that act as a
guide for implementing operating tactics. However, these short-range
plans must be related to long-range objectives and strategies. At times
the center must take a reactive stance with regard to the environment,
responding to task demands generated from without. At other times, a
proactive stance is needed in which internally generated demands initi-
ate activity which attempts to modify environmental demands and improve
the organization's overall position with regard to resource acquisition.
He noted that centers with poor planning units are forced to operate
only from a reactive stance. In such cases, the director is often in a
state of intermittent crisis attempting to meet one unanticipated envir-
onmental problem after another.
Franklin and Kittredge followed a similar but more limited approach
in their attempt to help Cf^lC's become more effective in the local care
giving system. They discuss the need for centers to develop an offen-
sive rather than defensive posture wherever possible. They suggest the
use of strategies that emphasize positive qualities of CMHC's to the
community, and induce credible community members to support the CMHC to
local funding sources and other agencies.
H. G. Whittington (1975) provided assistance to CMHC administrators
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in his discussion of a 1973 conference on center survival strategies.
He stated that centers need to become more cost-effective through im-
proved management techniques. Unproductive staff members must be remo-
tivated or eliminated; cost-ineffective treatment methods must be iden-
tified and eliminated; low-cost personnel must be used within an effec-
tive management system of control to guarantee minimum standards of
service; and Management Information Systems (MIS) must be instituted to
chart utilization of center resources against resource acquisition suc-
cess.
More recent efforts to help center directors have come from the Abt
Associates, Inc., study discussed earlier (Naierman et aj_.
, 1978), and
an exploration of administrative issues in rural CMHC's by Brian Flynn
(1979).
The Abt Associates, Inc., study found several factors which led to
more successful CMHC operations. From these, the following suggestions
can be gleaned:
1) A cornerstone of effective CMHC management is comprehensive,
anticipatory financial planning, solid financial management,
and aggressive billing for services. Centers need to be very
strong in these areas and develop an effective MIS for assist-
ance .
2) Center directors need to develop skills in traditional manage-
ment areas such as finance, but also in areas related to inter-
facing with community groups, and local and state funding agen-
cies. These include among others skills in community organiz-
ing, contract negotiating, and political maneuvering.
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3) Centers should explore as much as possible untapped sources of
income such as industry contracts for consultation and educa-
tion services.
4) Centers should attempt to develop financial "buffers" which can
help absorb the shock of losing federal support. Abt Associ-
ates, Inc., found that centers which were part of a state sys-
tem, part of a general hospital, or part of a local coalition
of free-standing centers were able to use these groups to help
share losses of funds. In most cases, services still had to be
cut back, but cutbacks occurred equally throughout the system
and the financial solvency of the individual center was not
jeopardized in the process. Free-standing centers experienced
much more difficulties when their federal funds (which had pre-
viously served as a buffer) expired.
The study by Brian Flynn explored the particular problems of center
directors in rural CMHC's. He noted that in rural comnunities the most
important sources of support which led directly or indirectly to finan-
cial survival were the local and county governments. Others included
the board of directors, state legislators, local advocacy groups, school
personnel, clergy, local business leaders, service clubs, the local med-
ical communities, and the United Way. Effective linking to these groups
was facilitated by personalized relationships characteristic of small
communities. Dr. Flynn also discussed three innovative strategies used
by centers to improve their survival position. These included the fol-
lowing:
1. Long-range financial planning . One center had developed a
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careful process of monitoring program efficiency and income-generating
ability. This was then used to develop long-range plans for making in-
dividual programs maximally efficient and effective. Available grant
mechanisms that would help or hinder the center's ability to survive
several years down the road were explored vigorously. A major lobbying
effort was also directed toward the state legislature for support of
several specific programs which were in jeopardy. Extensive use was
made of data generated from internal program monitoring and long-range
planning efforts. In this way, the legislature knew that the center's
requests were legitimate and based on careful planning.
2. Obtaining town funding
. Another center used the tactic of
"demonstrated success" to gain financial support from towns in their
catchment area. The first year they sought funding only from towns
where they had high visibility and a good chance of getting support.
This was successful and they received money from everyone asked. The
second year they approached additional towns where they had an active
board member, and added twenty towns to their initial eight. The third
year they approached all towns saying that they had never been turned
down, and got support from all but one. If they had approached all
towns initially, they felt their success rate would have been much low-
er. This strategy improved their chances for appearing credible to com-
munities that did not know them well. They also noted that use of board
members as spokespersons at town meetings, rather than staff, personal-
ized their contacts and improved their success rate.
3. Minimizing community resistance . Another center had experi-
enced debilitating resistance from the local community to its supposed
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"empire building." In response, the staff attempted not to be defensive
about the magnitude of their programs, but rather to be realistic about
their federal mandates which had been agreed upon by the state and local
comnunity. Also, they tried to maintain close relationships with other
agencies in the community affected by their services and organization.
Most recently, three other publications have become available to
assist center directors. The first is an annotated bibliography on men-
tal health administration by NIMH (National Institute of Mental Health,
1978). Several useful articles and books are referenced. On a bleaker
note, Jane Patrick (1979) offered suggestions to CMHC administrators
faced with the unfortunate necessity of closing a CMHC. Using a crisis
theory framework, she examined staff reactions to the crisis, and pro-
posed an intervention model in which a consultant is employed to help
staff identify and avoid maladaptive coping behavior. The last is a re-
port by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (1979) which studied the effects of or-
ganizational structure on CMHC operations. Based on their findings,
they recommended that centers improve several process aspects of their
operations. Included were the following issues:
1) Centers should develop a clearly articulated organizational
concept to guide their activities and shape their role in the
community.
2) Centers should develop a clear relationship with their sponsors
that encourages center autonomy and growth.
3) Staff should have a clear understanding of the CMHC's overall
process and mission.
4) There should be multiple means of identifying, tracking and
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serving a wide variety of clients, with more emphasis on the
community than on professional status and hierarchy.
5) The center should have an identified leadership that articu-
lates the CMHC's organizational concept and encourages staff
participation in decision-making.
6) Centers should maintain an anticipatory and interactive ap-
proach to change (i.e. a non-defensive posture).
7) Centers should develop and use measures of organizational ef-
fectiveness and efficiency to evaluate their own operations.
The need for further assistance . The works just discussed have been
helpful to CMHC administrators struggling with the problems of self-suf-
ficiency. However, they represent only a beginning. More is needed
which both gives center directors a theoretical perspective to concep-
tualize and approach the problem of survival, and explores the variety
of strategy options available to them given their particular situations.
The theoretical perspective and strategy options must be ones which bal-
ance the needs for financial solvency and the needs for maintaining
quality services and the CMHC ideology. Given this, center directors
will be in a much better position to proactively shape their organiza-
tion and direct it to a position of secure effectiveness.
The work by Frank Baker (1972) is a useful beginning in the devel-
opment of a theoretical perspective for approaching center survival.
His organizational systems perspective which views the CMHC as embedded
in a highly turbulent environment struggling to adapt and survive is ex-
tremely appropriate. This basic perspective has been discussed in much
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greater detail in the business management and organizational theory lit-
erature, and it is there that we now turn for help. Much of the busi-
ness literature is highly applicable to the problems of CMHC's. The
following chapter includes a brief review of that literature and a dis-
cussion of some of the strategy options formulated and used by business
managers. Later, this will be used to develop a theoretical perspective
useful to center directors, which can also be used to ground an explora-
tion of center survival strategy options.
Summary . This chapter has included a brief overview of the basic con-
cepts and historical development of CMHC's. Centers were created in the
early 1960's as part of an innovative national program to improve the
delivery of mental health services in our country. A cornerstone of the
national program was the concept of self-sufficiency. CMHC's were
created with federal seed-funding which they were expected to gradually
replace over time. As the program has matured it has become increasing-
ly apparent that achieving self-sufficiency is very difficult, particu-
larly if the CMHC ideology is not to be compromised. Center directors
are increasingly in need of technical assistance which can help them
work within the system in which their organizations are embedded to
achieve financial solvency without sacrificing the goals of the CMHC
ideology. Previous approaches to the problem have been limited. The
remainder of this paper attempts to build on previous work by giving
center directors 1) a theoretical perspective to conceptualize and ap-
proach the problem of survival, and 2) a variety of strategy options
available within this framework to use in their particular situations.
49
The business management literature on organizational adaptation to the
environment is highly applicable to the problems of CMHC's, and it is
there that we now turn for help. The next chapter includes a review of
that literature, and the development of a potentially useful management
approach that can be applied to the problems of CMHC's.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THEORY AND USE
Many theorists have attempted to conceptualize organizational
functioning in ways that are helpful to executives. In the past, such
conceptualizations emphasized internal operations such as leadership
and communication processes. It was thought that the key to continued
organizational survival and success was the proper management of such
internal functions. More recently, theorists have placed increased
emphasis on the organization's external environment and its impact on
effectiveness and survival. Writers contend that today's organiza-
tions exist in a much more complex and changing environment than did
those in the past. Resources and demands have shifted and continue to
do so at an ever increasing rate. Government regulation is much more
influential than in the past, as are the pressures of outside interest
groups such as labor unions. Organizations can no longer take their re-
sources for granted and operate in relative isolation from other organi-
zations and groups. Continued survival and success depend upon the pro-
per management of external demands. Organizations need to adapt to
their environments, adjusting their structures and processes to conform
to outside constraints, while to the best of their ability, trying to
alter their environments so as to make them more controllable and muni-
ficent. While such adaptation often requires a reactive stance, long-
range success and survival necessitate management's working proactively
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to at least anticipate and hopefully alter environmental contingencies.
Central here is the development and implementation of appropriate stra-
tegies for working with the environment.
Early efforts . Work in the area of organizational adaptation to the en-
vironment is generally traced to the early efforts of organizational
theorists such as Chandler (1962) and March and Simon (1958), and sys-
tems thinkers such as Bertalanffy (e.g., 1968) and Miller (e.g., 1972).
The Chandler and March and Simon works look at organizations as
problem-solving and strategizing entities. They note that key manage-
ment functions include long-term planning, as well as the handling of
iimiediate problems and crises. In carrying out these functions, organi-
zations naturally search their environment for information needed for
decision-making. Based upon this information, organizations then devel-
op strategies for approaching their world. In order to carry out these
strategies, the organization develops structures and processes tailored
to their goals and the environment in which they are embedded.
Closely related to this thinking is the early work of Cyert and
March (1963) who discuss the adaptive, learning features of organiza-
tions. According to their perspective, the firm seeks to avoid uncer-
tainty in its environment, and thus strives to make external events more
controllable. The organization reacts to its environment through obser-
vations and interpretations, and develops objectives, decision strate-
gies, and implementation plans to improve its position with respect to
others. Over time, the firm learns from experience, and goals are
changed, attention is shifted, and search procedures are revised. Or-
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ganizations learn what to strive for in their environment, and to what
events they should give attention. In seeking preferred states, shocks
and disturbances always occur which cannot be reliably forecasted and
prevented. Cyert and March contend that successful organizations devel-
op "organizational slack" to protect against such problems. Excess re-
sources are absorbed in the organization during the good times to be
used as needed during the bad.
The early systems thinkers such as Bertallanffy (e.g., 1968) and
Miller (e.g., 1972) (also see collection of articles by Litterer, 1963,
1969) stress that organizations, as all natural (open) systems, exist
within the context of a larger environment with which they must interact
to survive. Survival depends upon an adequate flow of resources into
the organization which can be processed and used to support its activi-
ties. To maintain this flow of resources, the organization must develop
a relatively stable relationship with different components of its envir-
onment which control important inputs. Adjustments are made as needed
to respond to environmental changes and to continually work towards the
goals of the organization. Adjustments are made based upon feedback and
other information collected from outside the system's boundaries. Ef-
fective organizations devote considerable effort to information process-
ing, and over time, learn the least expensive ways to defend against ex-
ternal stress. Such organizations also input more energy than is re-
quired to maintain themselves so as to build reserves which can be used
during times of stress ("organizational slack"). While effective organi-
zations strive to become more efficient in reaching their preferred
states of existence, the same final states can be reached from different
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initial conditions through a variety of paths. This quality of "equi-
finality" provides flexibility for managers and allows them to use vari-
ous strategies in different situations depending upon their style and
preferences
.
These problem-solving and open-systems perspectives were picked up,
popularized, and expanded upon by several writers in the 1960's (e.g.,
Litterer, 1965; Katz & Kahn, 1966). A notable contribution came from
Thompson (1967), who stresses the searching and learning qualities of
organizations in their attempts to manage interdependence and decrease
environmental uncertainty. He delineates several of the strategies used
in different situations by organizations to gain increased control over
their environment. These include, among others, the following important
points
:
1) Organizations will attempt to "buffer" environmental influences so
that changes do not have sudden, major impact on their functioning,
and so that they do not have to respond to all demands placed upon
them.
2) Organizations will manage interdependence by gaining power in the
systems of which they are a part. Power is gained by increasing
others' dependence on them as a source or controller of needed re-
sources.
3) Organizations will seek to lessen the power of other organizations
over them by maintaining alternative sources of needed inputs.
4) Organizations will seek to improve their positions by improving
their prestige in the systems of which they are apart. They will
emphasize scoring well on criteria most visible to important ele-
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merits of the environment.
5) Organizations will also use cooperative strategies to decrease en-
vironmental control. These include contracts and informal agree-
ments with other organizations, joint ventures, and cooptation.
6) Organizations will expand their domains vertically (e.g., purchas-
ing sources of material for their production processes) or horizon-
tally (e.g., purchasing competitors) to gain more control over
their environments,
7) Organizations structure themselves to deal with the complexities of
their environment. They differentiate, specialize, and form clus-
ters to deal with important environmental constituents.
8) Organizational survival rests on the successful co-al li gnment of
the technological and task environment with the selection of a via-
ble domain and organizational structure by top management. Over
time, management must find strategic variables to manipulate in
such a way that interaction with other elements will result in a
viable co-allignment. This includes a dual search for certainty in
the short-run and flexibility in the long-run.
9) Successful organizations seek out information about the environment
to use in developing and implementing strategies. Such searching
must include looking for information relevant to developing oppor-
tunities as well as solving problems.
During the last several years, many other contributions have been
made to the field of organizational adaptation. These have come from
writers in a variety of related areas such as organizational cybernetics,
organizational learning, organizational growth, contingency theory.
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business policy and environmental scanning, organization design, and or-
ganizational ecology. Writers in these areas have all made important
theoretical points which can be useful to executives in the field.
Organizational cybernetics
.
Cybernetics is a field which has grown as a
subspecialty within the field of general systems theory. It is con-
cerned with the transmission, collection, and control of information
within systems. Of particular concern is the use of feedback as a self-
regulating device to maintain system stability in the midst of changing
environmental conditions. Some of the most important work in the area
has come from Ashby (1956, 1960). Other interesting applications may be
found in a collection of articles by Litterer (1969).
From this perspective, the organization is seen as a system of in-
formation receptors, communication networks, and decision points in-
volved in a process of information exchange and transformation. For the
organization to survive and be effective this communication system must
keep the organization in tune with changing environmental conditions.
When the organization deviates from its goals or becomes out of balance
with the environment, it must be able to receive appropriate feedback
and use it to correct its actions. Organizations also need to develop
what are called second and third order feedback systems. Such mechan-
isms involve the development of organizational memory and learning. The
organization needs to store feedback and other information from previous
adaptive situations so that it can use it to develop more appropriate
responses in the future. Information stored in the organization's mem-
ory can be used to anticipate and predict future environmental activity.
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thus increasing manager's control over it. The better the memory, the
faster the recall, and the more feedback can be used to work proactive-
ly, the more autonomous and successful the organization is likely to be.
As the organization becomes increasingly sophisticated, it will be able
to reflect on the quality of its feedback and memory system, and inter-
vene to make it more effective. For example the organization may notice
that it has developed a self-perpetuating dysfunctional feedback loop
with an important outside group. By reflecting on the dynamics of this
situation and attempting to correct it, the organization can improve its
information collection procedures, and enhance its future adaptive capa-
bi 1 i ties
.
While the area of organizational cybernetics is highly theoretical,
there is some useful advice to be gained for the practicing executive.
Cybernetics suggests that information systems are crucial to organiza-
tional survival and effectiveness. Great care must be taken to develop
ways of collecting, storing, and using accurate feedback and information
from the environment. Feedback systems must also be examined periodic-
ally to determine if dysfunctional patterns have developed which main-
tain problematic environmental relationships. Any problems noticed
should be corrected.
Organizational learning . The ways organizations store information from
the past for use in future situations have also been explored in the
area of organizational learning. Important contributions can be found
in the works of Cangelosi and Dill (1965), Jellinek (1977), Post and
Mellis (1978), and Argyris and Schon (1978).
I
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This area suggests that over time, through processes of trial and
error and cognitive reallignment, organizations learn more effective
ways to approach their environment. This learning is not necessarily
explicit to organizational members at the time, and is in many ways a
piecemeal process which involves experimentation. At a simple level,
members learn which organizational responses are most acceptable under
various environmental circumstances, and how much commitment is needed
to satisfy a relevant public without having to undergo major organiza-
tional changes. As the organization matures, learning becomes progres-
sively more abstract. Members develop ways to use their experience in
past situations to develop rules for approaching new ones. As discussed
above, organizations thus become more able to interact with their envir-
onment in effective, economical ways. They also learn to anticipate and
prevent problems before they get out of hand. At some point, organiza-
tions even learn about their own learning styles, thus improving the way
they conceptualize and structure their adaptive behavior. The rules
governing action, learning, and even learning about learning become
passed down from generation to generation. New employees benefit from
the experience of old ones., and new blood can be infused into the or-
ganization to improve its learning capabilities.
The area of organizational learning is helpful to executives in a
variety of ways. The literature suggests that organizational leaders
need to be aware of: 1) what they have learned about the environment
and their adaptive responses to it, 2) how they can use this information
to work as proactively as possible, 3) how they have learned and con-
tinue to learn about the environment and adaptation (i.e., their learn-
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ing style), and 4) how information of this nature is communicated among
critical decision-makers of the organization and handed down from gener-
ation to generation of employees. Wherever possible, executives should
strive for higher organizational learning levels. The more they are in
a position to know how their learning style affects the adaptive capa-
bilities of the organization, the better off they will be.
Organizational growth
.
Other contributions to the field of organiza-
tional adaptation have come from writers interested in organizational
growth. Most notable of these are Starbuck (1965, 1971) and Haire
(1959). Other writers such as Filley et_ al. (1969), Greiner (1972), and
Perrow (1961), who have discussed stages of corporate growth, provide
some useful information as well.
The growth of organizations has many effects on their adaptive pro-
cesses and capabilities. At a basic level, growth itself is usually a
highly adaptive response. Larger organizations have greater visibility,
larger relevant publics which depend upon them in one way or another,
and longer successful histories of learning how to deal with their en-
vironment. Thus, they usually have more leverage and control over out-
side contingencies.
While growth is generally positive for organizations, it can lead
to problems. Growth expands and complicates the demands placed upon or-
ganizations, necessitating more sophisticated ways of processing and
balancing demands, and structuring the organization. As size increases,
organizational structures must be adjusted qualitatively to accommodate
the increased load. Also, growth and restructuring can be difficult for
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members of the organization (as are most such organizational changes).
Growth which is not done carefully or slowly enough can lead to many in-
ternal problems.
Organizations grow and mature through several relatively discrete
stages. During earlier, more entrepreneurial ones, firms must be ag-
gressive in their procurement of resources and careful in their external
relationship building. Close attention must be paid to detail and quick
adjustments must be made to uncertain circumstances. As the organiza-
tion matures and grows in size, internal structuring control, and infor-
mation processing become more crucial. The firm must be able to approach
the environment in a clear, coordinated way. As the organization becomes
larger and more stable, it becomes easier for members to deal with the
environment. The organization has greater experience in handling simi-
lar situations (improved learning at all levels), greater leverage in
impacting the environment proactively, and a less frantic, more relaxed
and stable way of approaching environmental changes. Not only does the
environment become relatively more stable over time, but it is increas-
ingly percei ved as being more stable because of organizational members'
increased experience and confidence.
As organizations mature through different stages, Perrow (1961)
notes that new groups of organizational members move into promi nance to
handle the particular problems which arise. He uses hospitals as an ex-
ample. In a hospital, the early, entrepreneurial stage is characterized
by the dominance of trustees, who are active in the community and able
to help the organization acquire needed resources and support. Once the
hospital is established, physicians and other technical staff gain power
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as the organization struggles to develop quality services. Following
this stage, problems of internal efficiency become important and the or-
ganization looks to professional administrators for help. Efforts are
made to fine tune operations and improve the ways in which technical and
human resources are utilized. Perrow notes that in the advanced stages
of organization, various coalitions of internal members come to the fore
depending upon the organizational problems at hand. Internal skills and
resources are used flexibly depending upon environmental demands and or-
ganizational needs.
It is important for executives to understand the impact of growth
on organizational adaptation. As organizations grow and mature, their
adaptive capabilities are enhanced as outlined above. However, the pro-
cess of growth necessitates many internal changes. Internal operations
must be adjusted accordingly or the firm can run into serious trouble.
Executives need to be aware of their organization's relative stage of
growth, the types of problems most associated with it, and ways to move
to greater maturity in tune with their environment.
Contingency theory . A number of writers have examined the characteris-
tics of organizational environments along different dimensions to deter-
mine their effect on organizational functioning. Such work is usually
used within a contingency approach to management whereby organizations
determine the characteristics of their environment and develop appropri-
ate strategies and structures to match them. A variety of dimensions
have been used to describe environments, including, among others, com-
plexity, uncertainty, hostility, variability, stability, and diversity
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(see reviews of Darran, Miles, and Snow, 1975). Examples may be found
in the works of Carlisle (1973), Demerath and Thiessen (1971), Duncan
(1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1974), Hall (1972), Jurkovich (1974), and Osborn
and Hunt (1974).
Much of the work in environmental contingency theory can be traced
to the work of Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch in their classic book. Or -
ganization and Environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969). They postulated
that the environment is best divided up into subsections that are impor-
tant to the organization (e.g., customers, technology, labor). The or-
ganization must then differentiate into subunits that mesh with each
particular aspect of the environment. Some environmental sections will
be changing and others will be stable. Because of such factors, the
various subunits will need different strategies and structures to be
most effective. Also, they will need different sets of knowledge and
skills related to the unique characteristics of their environmental sub-
section. Organizational success is dependent upon a successful process
of differentiation to the environment and integration of the various
subunits which are formed. (See the Organization Design section for
additional discussion of Lawrence and Lorsch.)
Recent work in this area has taken a variety of paths. Some
authors such as Duncan have chosen to work with a particular environ-
mental dimension exploring its impact on organizational structures and
decision-making. Others such as Jurkovich have attempted to examine the
interplay of several dimensions on organizational functioning, develop-
ing matrices to help managers sort through the complexity of contingen-
cies and response alternatives. The findings of such studies generally
note that as environments become more complex, uncertain, and changing,
the manager's job is made more difficult. Operations, tactics, and de-
cision-making must be flexible to keep pace with changing demands. Ex-
ceptions become the rule, and organizations must be designed to accommo-
date and structure such ambiguity.
There are disagreements in the literature, however, as to what
strategies and structures are best to employ in given environmental
situations. For example, in some uncertain situations people would ar-
gue that it is best for the organization to develop stable structures
and "ride out the storm" of changing environmental conditions. Others
might argue that it is better to operate flexibly and change as needed
to meet outside demands. Even though further research might clarify
such difficulties, many have felt that it is impossible to develop a
contingency model with hard and fast rules. While it is important to
understand different features of organizational environments and their
potential effects on organizational functioning, it is impossible to
make broad generalizations from these as to how organizations should al-
ways respond. Rather, it is important to understand how particular or-
ganizations with particular styles of operating can best respond to im-
prove their positions in particular environments, under specific situa-
tions. The key for executives is to become more adept at understanding
1) the environmental conditions and situations in which they become in-
volved, 2) the strategy and structure options available to approach
them, and 3) the ways they can continue to improve situations even if
their initial adaptive responses have not been the best.
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Business policy and environmental scanning
. Work in the business policy
and environmental scanning literature has been somewhat helpful in this
regard. These areas have focused on the role of top management in
searching their environment for opportunities and threats, and formulat-
ing and implementing strategies to successfully exploit or avoid them.
Much that has been written offers practical advice to managers in the
field. Conceptual models and specific techniques are discussed. Useful
information can be found in the works of people such as Aguilar (1967),
Hofer (1976), Mintzberg (1973), Neubauer and Solomon (1977), Organ
(1971), Segev (1977), Thomas (1974), and Vancil (1976).
All of these writings emphasize the importance of searching the en-
vironment for data to use in strategic planning. Of particular concern
are data which will help management control the variables which affect
the long-run success of the organization. Data are needed about events
of current and immediate concern, those likely to impinge in the near
future, and those which are more speculative and should be monitored to
see if they will grow in importance. Organizations must keep abreast of
the general context in which they operate, including such matters as so-
cial, political, and economic conditions, and technological advance-
ments. Also, they must be aware of their immediate environment, includ-
ing such elements as customers, competitors, suppliers, markets, regula-
tors, labor pools, and other groups which directly or indirectly affect
their incoming flow of resources. Surveillance of these groups should
include a search of both threats and opportunities. Wherever possible,
the organization should strive to develop an understanding of the com-
plexity of interrelationships between itself and different environment
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components, and among the components themselves. Past, current, and fu-
ture trends should be considered in these relationships. For example,
it can be helpful to anticipate the reactions of various environmental
groups to the implementation of a specific endeavor such as a contract
with another agency. Alii gnment with this agency may be perceived posi-
tively by some and negatively by others. Interactions among the organi-
zations may result in the development of significant coalitions for or
against the focal organization.
Environmental data can be collected in a number of ways by various
people in the organization. It can be done formally as in market sur-
veys, demand forecasts, and research studies, or informally by organiza-
tional members during their everyday interactions with people. Surveil-
lance can be directed toward answering specific questions, or be undi-
rected and opportunistic. The choice of mode depends upon 1) the scope
or magnitude of the issues involved, 2) the urgency or timeliness of the
issues, 3) the extent to which a problem exists, 4) the extent to which
information needs are readily definable, and 5) the relationship of the
issues to long-range planning. The choice of mode also depends upon the
adequacy of existing information, the availability and predictability of
additional data, and the time and energy which can be devoted to scan-
ning. In general, personal sources of data exceed impersonal sources in
their importance and are used more in crucial situations. Such sources
are important because of 1) the opportunity to interact with the source
and thereby to focus the source message upon a specific information
need, 2) the possibility of validating the reliability of human sources,
and 3) the off-the-record nature of talk as contrasted with print (Kee-
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gan, 1967).
Critical to the collection of personal sources of data are "gate-
keepers" or "boundary spanners" of the organization. These are people
who frequently interact with envi ronrr^ntal constituents, communicating
important information outward in the implementation of organizational
objectives, and collecting important evaluative and informational data
for future internal planning. Boundary spanning roles are difficult and
stressful, and require people with particular personalities. Generally
such individuals need to be highly verbal, bright, retentive, extravert-
ed, flexible, and politically sensitive (see Katz and Kahn, 1966; Organ,
1971).
Perhaps the most important part of the strategic planning process
is how environmental data are used by the organization to develop plans
and strategies for impacting the environment. While no one best way has
been determined, the business policy literature does offer some useful
suggestions. First and foremost, the literature suggests that the sup-
port of top management is crucial to the successful use of environmental
scanning data. Top managers must facilitate a process for integrating
such information into the organization's decision-making and decision-
implementing apparatus. Such organizational decision-making must fall
within a system of long-range planning and objective-setting. Plans for
short-range objectives and crisis management should be consistent with
long-range, overall plans. To accomplish this, organizations often
adopt a modified "management by objectives" approach (see Ordiorne.
1965). Environmental data are included at key points in the process of
formulating and reformulating objectives which fall within the organi-
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tion's basic strategic posture. Plans and actions are based on a bal-
ancing of internal and external demands.
For environmental data to be truly useful at this point they must
have relevance to the plans and decisions being made. Thus, a variety
of formal and informal sources should be used wherever possible, and the
resulting data should be presented flexibly to those who are to use it.
Sophisticated analyses and formal reports are only useful if they have
relevance to the decision-making group and situation.
As implied earlier, the organization should strive to develop an
understanding of the complexity of its environmental context. In for-
mulating plans and actions, management should strive to understand how
such moves will affect key external groups that influence its resource
acquisition. In doing so, it is helpful to understand the forces and
pressures of other groups on those key organizations. In this way, the
focal organization will be better able to predict the outcome of its
actions, and thus develop more effective strategies. A few writers have
developed structural methods for helping managers plot the impact of
strategies on their environmental constituents (e.g., Neubauer and Solo-
mon, 1977). The use of grids and weighted ratings of strategies and
environmental groups can be useful in sorting through the systemic com-
plexity surrounding important decisions.
The business policy literature also suggests that the strategic
planning process take into consideration the uncertainty and changing
quality of today's organizational environment. Planning is needed for
potentially devastating events, so that problems can be anticipated and
recognized quickly, and contingency plans can be implemented as needed.
Also, the organization must realize that plans and actions may have to
be modified to adapt to the changing environment. It is helpful, then,
to develop planning options based on anticipation of changing environ-
mental conditions. The best option can be taken at the crucial time,
depending upon how external contingencies have developed in the meantime
As a final note, the strategic planning process should also conside
internal organizational matters. The resulting strategies will be most
effective when they provide operational guidance to the organization and
foster the personal commitment of those who must carry them out. The
process should thus fit within a well-thought-out internal management
system of supervision and controls that fosters the appropriate inclu-
sion of decision-implementors in the decision-making process.
Organization design
. Work in the area of organization design has also
been helpful to executives. Such work has examined the different types
of organizational structures which are best suited to different types of
environments. It should be noted, however, that as was discussed in the
section on contingency theory, there are no hard and fast rules which
managers can follow. Every mix of environmental factors, technologies,
leadership, and personnel are different, and thus necessitates its own
structural arrangement. Also, a number of structures can usually be
adaptive in the same environment, depending upon how they are imple-
mented by their respective top executives.
An excellent review of basi c. organization design principles can be
found in a recent book by Galbraith (1977) (also see Litterer, 1973).
According to the author, organization design involves a continuous moni-
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toring and assessing of the fit among the organization's goals, division
of labor, interunit coordination, and people. Achieving the most appro-
priate fit involves a process of strategic-choice whereby executives de-
termine 1) the most appropriate strategy for working in the environment
(a choice of domain and goals), 2) the optimal structure for dividing
and coordinating subtasks to achieve established goals, and 3) the best
methods for integrating individuals into the system (including how best
to select, train, control and reward individuals of various backgrounds
and styles). Because of each organization's unique attributes, there is
no one best way to organize. Several arrangements can be adaptive so
long as basic design principles are used in their development.
Much of Galbraith's work is based on concepts developed in the
"classical" school of management theory. Here, structural features of
the organization are emphasized such as the way work is divided (e.g.
specialist or generalist role configurations) and the ways hierarchies
of authority are designed to coordinate and control work. Galbraith
notes that in hierarchical structures it is important to clarify the
nature and authority of manager and worker roles, and to examine such
issues as chains of commands and managers' spans of control (i.e. the
number of their supervisees). As organizations grow, variations on the
basic hierarchy should be considered such as line-staff arrangements
(where "staff" specialists outside the chain of command are used to as-
sist staff in "line" production positions), and decentralized structures
incorporating departmentalization (where power and responsibility are
delegated to units, departments, or divisions).
Galbraith also incorporates important principles from the "people-
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oriented" schools of management theory. This school recognizes that an
effective organization needs competent personnel who fit the organiza-
tion and its goals. Thus, provisions must be made to properly select,
train, promote, and transfer personnel according to the organization's
needs. Of at least equal importance, however, are the needs of employ-
ees themselves and the quality of their personal interactions. Thus,
attention must also be given to issues such as leadership style, work
group development, employee satisfaction and motivation, and troubled
employee assistance (e.g. alcohol abuse).
The most important aspects of Galbraith's work concern organization-
al information and decision processes. He notes that most organizations
today exist in uncertain and changing environments, and carry out compli-
cated and diverse tasks. Because of such uncertainty, large amounts of
information must be shared among organizational rr^mbers so that work can
be coordinated and effective decisions can be made. Thus, the organiza-
tion needs to design adaptive structures and mechanisms which insure that
accurate and timely information is available to those who need it.
For handling routine, predictable matters, standardized policies and
procedures should be developed which delineate the use of regular hierar-
chical organizational channels. With such procedures written down, rou-
tine matters can be handled with little difficulty at appropriately lower
levels of the organization. As environmental and task uncertainty in-
creases and larger numbers of situations need individual attention, other
devices must be employed as well. Othenvise, too many decisions get
pushed upward in the organization overloading top decision
-makers and de-
laying decision making. Galbraith discusses a variety of design alterna-
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tives for such situations which either 1) l^rove the organization's ca-
pacity to process Information, or 2) ,.duce the need for info^ation pro-
cessing itself, included are the following: 1, l^„,,„g
tion's planning and goal-setting so that individual effort can be ™ax1-
.ized on priority Issues. 2) decreasing managers' spans of control so
that each supervisor has fewer issues to coordinate. 3) improving lateral
relations so that subordinates can process Information anong themselves
4) investing in a better information system (e.g. computerized MIS) so
that better information can be delivered to those who need It guickly. 5)
reducing required organizational performance and developing slack re-
sources so that individuals have fewer complex Issues to manage. 6) edi-
fying the externa, environment to lessen and/or clarify demands which
create uncertainty In the first place. 7} adopting a new organizational
structure better suited to a complex and changing environment (such as
the matrix design discussed later In this section), and 8) moving Into a
new. more stable market domain with Inherently fewer information process-
ing demands
.
Other important design issues are discussed by Lawrence and Lorsch
(1969). As mentioned earLier, they postulated that effective organiza-
tions
"differentiate" themselves into subgroups, with each subgroup con-
centrating on one aspect of the organization's task and environment.
Over time subgroups develop differing cognitive points of view that re-
flect their adaptations to different parts of the environment. For the
organization to function effectively, the different functional units must
be coordinated in a process known as "integration." Every organization
must determine its optimum degree of differentiation and integration in
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terms of the degree of turbulence in the different portions of its envir-
onment, and in terms of a diagnosis of which functional area gives it a
particular competitive advantage. For example, some companies must put
effort into new development and therefore concentrate on properties of
the technological environment. Others gain advantage in sales and mar-
keting and thus must put effort into a diagnosis of the market situation.
Lawrence and Lorsch found that in diverse, turbulent environments,
more effective organizations attained higher states of both differentia-
tion and integration among subgroups than did less effective ones.
Greater differentiation is needed to deal with the diversity of demands
from the total environment, while a high level of integration is needed
to bring together these differentiated groups. Such integration is dif-
ficult to achieve and highly dependent on the effectiveness of managers
in key integrative roles. People in such roles are generally more suc-
cessful if they 1) have high influence with which to facilitate integra-
tion (functional influence rather than position influence), 2) use open
and confrontati ve conflict-resolving behavior, and 3) resolve conflicts
at lower hierarchical levels rather than by pushing them up. Lawrence
and Lorsch also found that organizations in more diverse environments
develop a number of integrative devices such as cross-functional teams
and integrative departments which have as their purpose the achievement
of collaboration and integration of effort among subgroups. These func-
tion in addition to the basic integrating devices of all organizations
such as rules, procedures, and the "paper" system.
In response to issues such as those raised by Galbraith and Law-
rence and Lorsch, attempts have been made to develop more generally
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adaptive organization designs. One of the more popular of these has
been the "matrix organization" (e.g. Kingdon, 1973; Sayles, 1976). The
matrix design is intended to allow flexibility within structure so that
organizations can carry out temporary projects to adapt to changing en-
vironmental contingencies, while maintaining on-going production in more
stable areas. Within this system, project teams are developed cutting
across relevant organizational subunits to carry out specific time-lim-
ited functions. A leader is selected for the project, and is instructed
to report to someone in top management who is in an integrative role.
Members of the project teams have two supervisors, one who is the func-
tional boss of the subunit from which s/he is drawn, and the other who
is the boss of the current work team. When the project is completed,
organizational members return full-time to their home-base sub-units, or
join other special project teams. Such an organizational design or var-
iation offers interesting possibilities for executives attempting to
build adaptive yet stable organizations. It must be considered, how-
ever, as only one of many alternatives available to them within their
specific environmental systems.
Organizational ecology (the natural selection model ) . Thus far, the or-
ganization has been conceptualized as active in relation to its environ-
ment, capable of changing it, as well as responding to its demands. It
must also be recognized that there are limitations to the ability of or-
ganizations to alter their environment, particularly in the long-run.
Writers in the area of organizational ecology have stressed this point
in their exploration of a natural selection model of organizational
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adaptation (e.g., Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Hannon and Freeman, 1977).
The natural selection model looks at populations of organizations
over time to see what forms come and go. In the long-run only those or-
ganizations which fit the environment survive. Organizations fail to
flourish in certain environments because other "forms", which are more
adaptive, successfully out-perform them for essential resources. In the
short run organizational leaders formulate strategies, and try to make
their environments more munificent. Over time, however, the environment
exercises its ultimate dominance, and organizations must conform to fill
a comfortable "niche", or they will perish. Larger organizations defi-
nitely have a competitive advantage, and collectively exercise strong
dominance over most other organizations that compose their environments.
But, it must be recognized that even the largest and most powerful or-
ganizations fail to survive over long periods.
The natural selection model stresses that executives look longi-
tudinally at their organizations as members of an evolving population.
By examining how their population or similar ones have fared and will
fare over time, they will be better able to understand the environmental
contingencies that maintain and shape their particular forms. Also,
they will be better able to adjust their activities to survive in the
long run. Large size is an advantage which gives the organization more
power over its environment for a longer period of time. Smaller organi-
zations must monitor their environment more carefully, and respond
quicker from a reactive position. However, in the long run, even large
organizations must bow to the powers of environmental selection.
As organizations mature and evolve, "structural inertia" develop
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which limit their self-directed adaptive flexibility. Capital becomes
invested in certain facilities, machinery, and personnel which are dif-
ficult to alter in the face of changing environmental pressures. Also,
often there are legal and fiscal restrictions to entering and leaving
various market segments. Managers need to be aware of the limits im-
posed on their organizations when they choose to operate in certain ways
within such markets. This knowledge, coupled with an assessment of the
long-range viability of their population, will help them operate more
realistically, and consequently more effectively in the long run.
Thus far, several different perspectives on organizational adapta-
tion to the environment have been presented. Recently, two significant
books have been written to coalesce and extend this thinking. To date,
they represent the most complete work in the area of organizational
adaptation. Included are a book by Raymond Miles and Charles Snow, en-
titled Organizational Strategy
.
Structure , and Process (Miles & Snow,
1978), and a book by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik, entitled The
External Control of Organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Both
adopt the perspective of the organization being in a cyclical relation-
ship with the environment, whereby it is controlled by and in a position
to control external contingencies. The following is a brief summary of
their work, and some suggestions for organizational leaders based on
their findings.
Miles and Snow : A strategic-choice approach . Miles and Snow develop
what has been called a "strategic-choice" approach to organizational
adaptation. Their effort builds on the writings of people such as Child
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(1972). Thompson (1967),, Weick (1969), and Perrow (1967), and extends
much of the previous work of Miles and Snow (e.g., Darran, Miles, &
Snow, 1975; Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974; Snow, 1976). The approach is
founded on the belief that organizations "create" their environments
through the perceptions of top managers. While a truly objective envir-
onment may indeed exist, management only responds to contingencies it
perceives. The environment is created through a series of choices re-
garding markets, products, technologies, desired scales of operations,
and so forth. Such perceptions and choices influence the development of
strategies for approaching the environment, which in turn influence the
development of organizational structures and processes for carrying them
out. Miles and Snow contend that managers attempt to make rational
choices in response to a believed objective environment, but that their
perceptions are usually imperfect. Their perceptions and resulting
strategies are influenced by their styles of operation, and by the or-
ganization's past and current strategy, structure, and performance.
In arguing that organizational structure is only partially preor-
dained by environmental conditions. Miles and Snow place heavy emphasis
on the role of top decision-makers who serve as the primary links be-
tween the organization and its environment. Such individuals are in a
position not only to adjust organizational structure and process when
necessary, but also to attempt to manipulate the environment itself in
order to bring it into conformity with what the organization is already
doing or wants to do. Organizational survival and success rest on the
quality of fit which management can achieve among such major variables
as 1) the organization's product-market domain, 2) its technology for
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serving that domain, and 3) the organizational structures and processes
developed to coordinate and control the technology.
Miles and Snow view organizational adaptation as a cyclical process
having three identifiable phases. These include: 1) an entrepreneurial
Rhase that includes a set of activities initially aimed at identifying
problems (opportunities and threats) in the environment, and subsequent-
ly used as a basis for defining (or re-defining) a specific organiza-
tional domain; 2) an organizing phase that focuses on the development of
a technology or process for acquiring needed inputs, transforming them
into goods and services, and distributing these to the environment; and
3) an administrative phase_ that not only attempts to coordinate and con-
trol the technological process but also those entrepreneurial activities
perceived as necessary for maintaining the organization's continuity in
the future. The three phases are most visible in new, rapidly growing,
or crisis-oriented organizations where dramatic strategy changes neces-
sitate significant revisions in the organization's structure and pro-
cesses. In more stable organizations, the administrative phase plays a
larger role. Managers in such organizations are most concerned with on-
going work and efficiency. However, they need to protect against becom-
ing too involved in day-to-day operations to appreciate or understand
the longer-range needs of their organizations. If new administrative
demands are not planned for and met, the organization will become in-
creasingly ineffective and inefficient.
An important part of Miles and Snow's work involves the impact of
different organizational styles on the adaptation process. They deline-
ate four styles, each with its own strategies for responding to the en-
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vironment, and each with its own particular configuration of technology,
structure, and process consistent with its strategies. These include






Defenders are characterized by narrow product-market domains, and
by managers who are highly expert in their organization's limited areas
of operation, but who do not tend to search outside their domains for
new opportunities. These organizations seldom make major structural ad-
justments. Their strength comes from an in-depth understanding of their
operational area, and an ability to work efficiently.
Prospectors , on the other hand, almost continually search for mar-
ket opportunities, and regularly experiment with potential responses to
emerging environmental trends. They are usually not completely effici-
ent, but build competitive advantage from innovations and their ability
to exploit new market areas. They also create change to which their
competitors must respond.
Analyzers fit somewhere between the other two styles, operating in
two types of domains, one stable and the other changing. In stable
areas, they operate routinely, striving for efficiency. In more turbu-
lent ones, they try to keep pace with competitors by quickly adopting
innovative ideas which appear most promising. While they are not inno-
vators themselves, they are competitive by maintaining flexibility to
new ideas. They also maintain increased safety by operating in some
stable areas, and by investing in less risky new ideas.
Reactors are organizations with the least effective adaptive style.
They perceive change and uncertainty in the environment, but are unable
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to respond as quickly or effectively as needed. They generally lack a
consistent strategy-structure relationship, and because of this, seldom
make adjustments unless forced by environmental pressures. This incon-
sistency and resulting instability is generally due to: 1) management
failing to articulate a viable organizational strategy, 2) a strategy
being articulated, but technology, structure, and process not being
linked to it in an appropriate manner, or 3) management adhering to a
particular strategy-structure relationship even though it is no longer
relevant to environmental conditions.
Miles and Snow note that organizations with the first three styles
can be equally effective in similar environments if they capitalize on
the strengths and protect against the weaknesses of their particular
style. The organization must develop a set of "distinctive competen-
cies" that allows it to maintain itself and compete aggressively in its
industry. Strengths are bolstered by placing certain specialists in key
executive slots, and by shaping the organization's structures and pro-
cesses to enhance strengths and minimize weaknesses related to its
style. In order to prevent problems, organizations need to: 1) know
their style in comparison to other organizations in- their industry or
group, 2) understand the strengths and weaknesses usually associated
with that style at different points in the adaptive cycle, 3) set appro-
priate learning targets for capitalizing on their strengths and reducing
the impact of their weaknesses, and 4) periodically examine the conse-
quences of their adaptive patterns and strategies. Examination of this
nature is facilitated by an openness to outside information through such
sources as external consultants and outside board members.
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Organizations which operate as reactors generally have serious
problems which jeopardize their continued viability. They must careful-
ly reexamine their approach, and develop a style which allows for a bet-
ter mix of strategy, structure, and process within their given environ-
ment. Generally, this requires at least an outside consultative inter-
vention, and often necessitates a change in leadership and staffing.
In sum, the Miles and Snow work is significant in that it explores
the impact of different organizational styles on the adaptation process,
and shows how similar environmental contexts can be handled effectively
by different types of organizations. The authors impress upon leaders
the need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of their organiza-
tions' styles in the environments in which they are situated. In their
book. Miles and Snow provide examples of such strengths and weaknesses
and explore how dysfunctional i ties associated with the various styles
can be improved.
While Miles and Snow concentrate on the impact of organizational
style on the overall adaptation process, Pfeffer and Salancik emphasize
the adaptive strategies and mechanisms available to all organizations
regardless of their style. Implied is that organizations can choose
those options which are best suited to their environmental context and
stylistic preferences. Their work, which will be discussed below, is
very helpful in providing concrete examples of ways that executives can
manage their organizational environments.
Pfeffer and Salancik : A resource dependence perspective . According to
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the key to organizational survival is the
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organization's ability to acquire and maintain needed resources from its
environment. Thus the effective organization is one which satisfies the
demands of groups in its environment which directly or indirectly con-
trol its resource acquisition. Unfortunately, the density and intercon-
nectedness of today's interorganizational fields make it difficult for
organizations to respond effectively to all necessary demands. Demands
are often complex, diverse, and conflicting such that compliance can
lead to problems which constrain future adaptive flexibility. Paradox-
ically, as the organization tries to manage its interconnectedness with
other groups, it often increases its interconnectedness with and depend-
ence upon them. For example, the organization may enter into a long-
term contract with one firm to assure a steadier flow of revenue. While
this act increases the certainty of funding, it also necessitates in-
creased involvement with the firm, and stronger weighting of its inter-
ests in future decision-making. Also, depending upon the firm's values
and reputation, allegiance with it may influence the acquisition of fu-
ture contracts with other firms. Thus the organization's decision-mak-
ing world is made more complex.
Pfeffer and Salancik suggest that wherever possible, within the
limits imposed by environmental contingencies, organizations should at-
tempt to manage the environment in ways which loosen dependencies rather
than increase and tighten them. Direct compliance with demands may or
may not be in the long-term interests of the organization. Rather, it
may be more advantageous to manage demands without necessarily satisfy-
ing them, thereby providing the organization with the discretion it
needs to attend to those demands which cannot be ignored. For example,
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with less important groups, it may be possible to avoid processing their
demands until over time they diminish. Also, nondisclosure of what each
group is actually getting can be a strategy employed to lessen the de-
mands of other groups. A group is satisfied relative to what it expects
to get, and by keeping everyone uninformed of other negotiations it may
be possible to make them all feel they are getting relatively the best
deal available. Pfeffer and Salancik note that conflicting demands are
particularly difficult with which to comply directly. In response, or-
ganizations can attend to the demands sequentially so as to lessen their
conflicting nature, or they can try to play the groups off one another
explicitly, removing themselves from a battle which more appropriately
belongs to the external groups alone.
While managing and balancing demands as they occur will forestall
some problems, the most effective way of avoiding the constraints of ex-
ternal demands is to avoid the conditions which demand compliance in the
first place. Pfeffer and Salancik note that organizations use a variety
of tactics to this end. These include: 1) controlling demands (i.e.,
manipulating environmental factors which make it easy or not for demands
to be expressed, or setting up situations for demands to be expressed
when and how the organization wants them to be), 2) controlling the
definition of satisfaction (i.e., defining themselves when the out-
sider's request has been satisfied), 3) controlling the formation of de-
mands (i.e., involving themselves with other groups who set standards or
regulations, or using advertising and promotion to shape beliefs and de-
mands regarding the organization's products), 4) using discretion in de-
fining the organization's capabilities of meeting demands (i.e., avoid-
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ing certain demands by stating that it is impossible legally, technolog-
ically, or fiscally to comply with the demands being made), and 5) con-
trolling the nm^^
^^^.^g .^^
havior difficult to observe, thus putting it in the pnm position to
interpret its activities to various potentially disgruntled groups).
Pfeffer and Salancik continue in their book to describe a number of
other ways that organizations attempt to manage and avoid dependencies.
These include the following strategies:
1. Marketing. Through this strategy, the organization assesses
the needs of the marketplace, and then adapts its products and activi-
ties to fill some of these needs. The organization can adapt its struc-
ture, its information system, its pattern of management and human rela-
tions, its technology, its product, its values and norms, or its defini-
tion of the environment.
2. Buffering the organization agains^ possible instability
. As
discussed earlier, organizations need "slack" to guard against the in-
stability of rough economic times. Organizations develop this in vari-
ous ways such as: 1) developing inventories and cash reserves suffici-
ently large to permit operation during scarce times, 2) developing long-
term contracts for input and output transactions, 3) joining larger,
more stable organizations, and 4) diversifying their resource dependence
from one exchange to several possible ones. Diversification is particu-
larly useful even though it leads to more interest groups and potential-
ly more conflicting demands on the organization. Because the demands
are dispersed, their individual importance is diminished. Furthermore,
by differentiating the organization into loosely coupled subunits, each
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of which deals with special environmental concerns, and each of which is
only slightly interdependent with other organizational subunits, the or-
ganization can further lessen the importance of individual demands.
Thus, while the organization is still highly dependent upon the environ-
ment, the interdependence is altered so that it becomes more manageable.
3. Growth ( through merger and direct capital investment ). As dis-
cussed earlier, growth can have adaptive advantages for organizations.
Growth can occur by organizations acquiring other firms (i.e., merger),
or through direct capital investment. Merger is inspired by the need to
coordinate environmental factors and reduce environmental uncertainty.
Mergers can take place verti cally (backwards or forwards in the produc-
tion process), horizontal ly (in order to acquire competitors and reduce
competition), or by diversification (in order to increase domains in
which the organization can operate, acquire unrelated yet profitable
firms, or reduce dependence on a single resource exchange). Growth
through direct capital investment is done to increase the organization's
market power, to increase its stability and certainty, to develop in-
creased and more important relations in the community, and to create
cushions against organization failure.
4. Interorganizational coordination . While growth through merger
or direct capital investment provides greater absolute control over the
environment, it involves substantial organizational commitment. Inter-
organizational coordination, on the other hand, provides less control,
but offers more flexibility because of the voluntary nature of linkages.
Such linkages provide the organization with several benefits, including
the following: 1) they provide channels for the collection and trans-
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mission of important communication about activities which affect the fo-
cal organization; 2) a linkage and the exposure it provides is an impor-
tant first step in obtaining commitments of support from important ele-
ments of the environment; 3) the interorganizational link can help legi-
timate, and add prestige to the organization; and 4) linkages facilitate
the development of social bonds which lead to more trusting, stable, and
predictable interorganizational relationships.
Interorganizational linkages can range in their degree of formal-
ity, including everything from informal agreements to contractual agree-
ments to highly formalized coalitions with centralized structures of
authority and information such as trade associations (e.g., American
Psychological Association), cartels (e.g., United Fund, OPEC) and joint
ventures. Generally, all are based upon and maintained by some form of
perceived mutual need. Mechanisms for facilitating such linkages vary,
and include among others, interorganizational meetings, director inter-
locks, and proscribed policies.
5. Cooptati on
. Another method of gaining control over the envir-
onment involves placing representatives from key environmental groups on
advisory committees, boards of directors, or even to positions within
the organization itself. Such action allows the organization to access
resources, exchange information, develop interfirm commitments, and es-
tablish legitimacy. For example, boards of directors may be selected to
provide added management talent, or because of their links to potential
sources of support. Also, members of antagonistic outsiders may be
brought in to win them over and increase the support of other outsiders
with similar beliefs. Because management controls so much information
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that gets to the board, they can see to it that board members (who are
only associated with the organization on a part-time basis) have little
real decision-making power. However, to the outside and even to them-
selves, board members have the appearance of making or influencing deci-
sions. Thus, they can serve as valuable figureheads and supporters of
the organization, while essentially, they are kept out of the way by top
management.
6. Legitimation
. Legitimation is the process by which an organi-
zation justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist,
and its worthiness of receiving resources. Legitimacy is a conferred
status highly bound up with social norms and values, and closely related
to economic viability. If objections are raised by groups regarding the
acceptability of an organization, the problem of legitimacy will be a
function of how widely the objections are dispersed and whether suffici-
ent interest is generated to support the opposition. If objections are
too strong, the firm's economic viability will be jeopardized.
As with other social norms, legitimacy is highly ambiguous and open
to considerable influence. Pfeffer and Salancik suggest that organiza-
tions need to be aware of how legitimacy is manipulated both, for and
against their advantage.
Social support can be maintained only if the organization is able
to argue convincingly that what it is doing is just and worthy. The
problem is very similar to that of advertising where the buyer must be
convinced that the product will provide the experiences desired. The
organizational strategist needs to convince outsiders that the organiza-
tion and its actions are related to socially acceptable values.
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7. Government regulation
. When faced with otherwise unmanageable
interdependence, organizations seek to use the greater power of the
larger social system to eliminate difficulties or provide for their
needs. In addition to manipulating social legitimacy, organizations of-
ten get involved in the political arena of government. Organizations or
groups of organizations with similar problems can call on government to
provide 1) direct cash subsidies, 2) actions affecting the restriction
of entry by rivals, 3) actions that will affect substitutes or comple-
ments, and 4) management of competition by legally fixing prices. Gov-
ernment regulation can have large impact on systems initially, and is
thus quite attractive in difficult times. Later, however, its impact is
usually lessened and the oftentimes cumbersome procedures which accompa-
ny governmental action are difficult to change if the environmental sit-
uation which necessitated them changes. Also, political activity is
time-consuming and risky. Efforts can backfire if opposition is stirred
up before support can be mobilized. Thus, government regulation is gen-
erally used more as a last resort in environmental manipulation.
8. Executive succession . Pfeffer and Salancik (as do Miles and
Snow) place considerable emphasis on the role of top executives in or-
ganizations. Because of their critical linking role to the environment
and coordinating role internally, executives are in a key position to
influence and be influenced by organizational adaptation. Environmental
contingencies affect internal power distribution, internal power affects
changes in top executives, and changes in executives, through their ef-
fects on training, frames of reference, and information, come to affect
organizational behavior. Executive succession thus is an important pro-
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cess by which organizations become alligned with their environments.
For the organization to be effective, executive succession must occur as
needed to allow the organization to alter its adaptive stance. Power
cannot be institutionalized around a particular leader's style, if it
has outlived its usefulness. Also, a change in leadership can serve as
an important symbolic gesture to the environment that needed internal
changes are indeed taking place.
In sum, Pfeffer and Salancik present a graphic picture of the ways
organizations attempt to manipulate their environments so as to increase
their control and improve their chances for survival. While many of
these fall outside the limits of what might be considered ethical behav-
ior, they are all strategies of which the organizational leader should
be aware. If nothing else, they represent examples of survival behavior
the organization is likely to face from other firms in its environment.
Pfeffer and Salancik suggest that it is important for the executive
to understand the system in which the organization is embedded, paying
particular attention to those groups which significantly impact resource
acquisition. Furthermore, it is important to understand the context of
those actors, so that forces can be brought to bear on them which will
make them respond more favorably to the organization. Given this per-
spective, there are a variety of mechanisms available to organizations
to lessen their dependencies and make their environments more manageable
in the long-run. These range from methods of compliance or noncompli-
ance with immediate demands, to the proactive shaping of environmental
forces so as to lessen demands in the future.
As do Miles and Snow and others discussed earlier, Pfeffer and
88
Salancik place considerable emphasis on the organization's attentional
and information processes. The organization adapts to the environment
it perceives, and thus must develop a scanning system which serves its
best interests and provides as accurate information as possible. The
organization must be careful not to: 1) misread interdependence (i.e.,
the complexity of their environment), 2) misread demands, 3) become too
invested in adaptive responses of the past which have outlived their
usefulness, and 4) ignore the complexity of conflicting demands. To
avoid such problems the authors suggest a scanning and decision-making
structure which: 1) ascertains what resources are critical to the or-
ganization and what groups affect their acquisition, 2) weighs the im-
portance of these different interest groups, 3) determines the belief by
which each group evaluates the organization (and I would add the forces
which affect the group's beliefs and behavior toward the organization),
and 4) assesses the impact of different actions on the network of inter-
est groups in the environment. With such a system in place, the organi-
zation will be better able to plan activities and manage its environment
in an effective manner.
Organizational adaptation : Suggestions for the executive . In the pre-
ceding pages, several different perspectives on organizational adapta-
tion to the environment have been presented. While much of the litera-
ture explored is theoretical in nature, it does offer useful information
to executives who are concerned with the effectiveness and survival of
their organizations. The central thesis of this work is that today's
organizations must adjust to the complex and turbulent nature of their
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external environments if they are going to survive. Organizations are
embedded in an environment of other organizations and groups which place
demands on them in exchange for needed resources. The organization must
develop (and adjust as necessary over time) structures and processes
which will allow it to successfully manage external demands and acquire
needed resources. While such adaptation often requires a reactive
stance, long-range success and survival necessitate management's working
proactively to at least anticipate and hopefully alter environmental
contingencies. Wherever possible, within the limits of external con-
straints, managers should try to act on their environments to make them
more controllable and munificent.
The first step to successful adaptation involves management under-
standing the complexity of the environment in which the organization is
embedded. The organization responds only to the environment that it
perceives, and thus it is important that attentional processes be devel-
oped that yield an accurate and timely picture of the environment. Data
are needed about both opportunities and threats, to be used in current
activities and future planning. Particular attention should be given to
groups which directly or indirectly control key organizational re-
sources. Wherever possible, the organization should strive to develop
an understanding of the complexity of interrelationships between itself
and different environmental groups and among the groups themselves. It
is important to understand the forces operating on outsiders which
influ-
ence their attitudes and behavior toward the organization. This will
not only help management respond more appropriately to their demands,
but will help the organization develop strategies for altering the
en-
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vironment to make it more munificent. A longitudinal or historical per-
spective can be very helpful in such an analysis, where the impact of
past or anticipated organizational actions on the environment is ana-
lyzed over time.
Environmental data can be collected in a number of formal and in-
formal ways by various people in the organization. While formal studies
such as market surveys and demand forecasts can be helpful, the most im-
portant data are usually collected from personal sources by individual
gatekeepers in the organization. It is important that such information
be collected carefully within the framework of ongoing organizational
strategies. It is also important for data collection to be integrated
closely into the organization's decision-making and decision-implement-
ing processes. Some organizations have found a modified "management by
objectives" approach to be particularly helpful here. Under such a sys-
tem, long-range organizational objectives are established, based upon
knowledge of the environment. Short-range objectives, crisis responses,
and further data collection are carried out from within the framework of
this overall plan. As environmental contingencies are reassessed over
time, plans are evaluated and adjusted as necessary. In more turbulent
environments, it is usually helpful to develop planning options based on
anticipated environmental changes. Options can be rank-ordered in the
plan and the most attractive alternative can be carried out at the cru-
cial time, depending upon how external contingencies have developed
since the plan was created.
Once the environment is known, executives have a number of strategy
and structure responses available, depending upon their styles, the na-
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ture of their operations, and the environmental situations in which they
find themselves. They have much room to work proactively to improve
their situations as long as they understand 1) the strengths and weak-
nesses of their adaptive style, 2) the limitations imposed by environ-
mental constraints, and 3) the ongoing impact of their adaptive re-
sponses over time
.
With respect to structure, there are no cut-and-dried adaptive so-
lutions. Every mix of organizational and environmental factors is dif-
ferent and requires its own structural arrangement. Plus, a variety of
structures can usually be effective in the same environment, depending
upon how they are implemented by their respective top executives. Some
basic principles can be kept in mind, however. For example, it appears
that the organization must find an optimum degree of differentiation and
integration with respect to the environment so that competing and often-
times conflicting demands of different groups can be managed. The or-
ganization also needs mechanisms and "slack" which can buffer it against
the shock of environmental disturbance, facilitate appropriate informa-
tion processing, and allow it to function as stably as possible in situ-
ations of uncertainty. Some organizations in highly turbulent environ-
ments have opted for "matrix" designs to help them maintain flexibility
within a relatively stable, buffered organization.
It also appears that growth in size can help organizations be more
adaptive. Larger organizations generally have more market power, great-
er visibility, larger constituencies for support, and longer successful
histories of learning how to deal with their environments than do small-
er ones. Also, through diversification, they can lessen their resource
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dependence on any one particular group. Thus, by growing in size, the
organization can have more leverage and control over external contingen-
cies. However, growth and diversification can cause major internal co-
ordination problems if they are not carefully controlled and planned.
Organizations grow through different stages, each of which creates its
own set of tensions. Increased size requires internal structural
changes to accommodate the increased load, particularly in the areas of
information flow and delegation of authority. Managers need to be aware
of their stage of growth, the type of problems most associated with it,
and the ways they can facilitate movement towards greater organizational
maturity in tune with the environment.
Given their structure, organizations have a number of options avail-
able for managing external demands. In response to immediate situa-
tions, managers must be able to sort through demands as they arise, de-
termining which ones the organization should comply with, and which ones
should be managed without necessarily being satisfied. Such responses
depend upon the organization's overall strategy and style, the import-
ance of the outside group and its demands, and the effect a response
will have on the organization and its overall environment.
While managing environmental demands as they occur will forestall
some problems, executives will be more effective in the long run if they
act on the environment so as to avoid the conditions which demand com-
pliance in the first place. As described earlier, a number of tactics
are available to executives. These include among others the following:
1) manipulating factors which influence the expression of demands, 2)
controlling the definition of how a demand is to be satisfied, 3) mani-
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pulating factors which control the formation of demands, 4) using dis-
cretion in defining the organization's capabilities of meeting demands,
and 5) making the organization's behavior difficult to observe and in-
terpret without help from the organization itself. Also available are
a number of overall strategies for gaining more control over the envir-
onment. These include such activities as the following: 1) purchasing
(or merging with) other organizations which control or compete for im-
portant resources, 2) developing coordination agreements, contracts, and
formalized coalitions with other significant actors in the environment,
3) coopting outsiders by placing their representatives on advisory com-
mittees or boards of directors, 4) manipulating social legitimacy and
support through such means as advertising and showing allegiance with
already accepted groups, and 5) lobbying alone or with others for gov-
ernmental intervention and/or regulation.
Over time, as the organization responds to its environment, it is
important for executives to reflect upon and learn about their organiza-
tion's adaptive behaviors. At one level, they need to learn what organ-
izational responses are most effective for managing demands from key
groups in their networks. At a more complex level, they need to reflect
upon and improve their overall adaptive and learning postures, taking
into consideration their stylistic strengths and weaknesses within the
environments in which they are embedded. External consultants and out-
side board members can be extremely helpful in this self-evaluation pro-
cess as they are removed from day-to-day activities of the organization.
As a final note, executives should be aware that such analyses may
reveal that changes in executive leadership are required to alter the
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adaptive style and public image of the firm. Unless they can remain
flexible in their positions and open to needed stylistic changes, they
should be prepared to move on for the long-range good of everyone in-




This chapter has included a review of the business management
literature on organizational adaptation to the environment from the per-
spective of the executive in the field. While the literature is largely
theoretical in nature, it does offer useful, practical information to
leaders concerned with the survival and effectiveness of their organiza-
tions. The literature suggests that organizational success depends upon
the effectiveness by which organizations adapt to the demands of outside
groups which control resources they need. Executives must develop mech-
anisms for accurately scanning their environments, and use the resulting
information to develop improved processes and structural arrangements
for managing external demands. A variety of options are available to
this end, depending upon the executives' styles, the nature of their
operations, and the environmental situations in which they find them-
selves. As much as possible, within the constraints imposed by environ-
mental contingencies, executives should attempt to proactively change
their environments to make them more munificent. A variety of strategy
options were presented for such long-range planning, as well as for re-
sponding to everyday demands and crises. It is believed that this theo-
retical perspective and the strategy options presented can be helpful to
the executives of CMHC's who are struggling with the problems of self-
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sufficiency. The remainder of this paper includes an application of
this work to their situation.
CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY:
A MANAGERIAL APPROACH TO CMHC ADAPTATION TO THE ENVIRONMENT
The preceding chapter presented a conceptual approach to adaptation
for executives concerned with the survival and effectiveness of their
organizations. Although this approach is based largely upon work with
businesses, it is highly applicable to the problems facing today's com-
munity mental health center. As larger numbers of CMHC's graduate into
self-sufficiency, their survival increasingly depends upon effective
management of the complex environment which controls their resources.
While the CMHC's environment and the demands it presents are different
than those of businesses, they must be understood and coped with just
the same. All organizations must acquire needed resources and process
them for export, whether they are concerned with making a profit or per-
forming a public service. Differences in environment, task, technology,
and style affect the manner in which organizational survival and effec-
tiveness are engineered, but the process of adaptation should be quite
similar.
Thus, CMHC's are enough like businesses that we can learn from the
experiences of writers in this area. CMHC's are different, though, and
as we apply the literature, we must recognize their unique characteris-
tics. Through careful application of the concepts, and close examina-
tion of the issues which emerge, much can be learned by CMHC administra-
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tors and theoreticians alike.
The literature on organizational adaptation suggests a process
whereby center directors look outward to their environments to improve
their organization's survival capabilities. Mechanisms should be devel-
oped to scan the environment for opportunities and threats, and under-
stand the complex interdependencies which affect resource acquisition
and organizational performance. The resulting data should be integrated
into centers' decision-making and decision-implementing mechanisms for
use as needed to alter organizational structures and processes. The
system must allow for short-range responding and crisis-coping within
the framework of long-range plans and objectives. Given their particu-
lar environments and styles of operation, center directors have a varie-
ty of proactive and reactive alternatives for improving their centers'
adaptive positions. Over time, to be truly effective, they should also
develop methods for their centers to reflect upon and learn about their
adaptive styles and behaviors.
More work is needed to understand the specific ways center direc-
tors, as the executives of this distinct type of organization, should
approach the process of adaptation. In particular, research is needed
to identify various strategy options from within this framework which
are used by successful center directors, and may be employed in one
fashion or another by other centers approaching graduation. Research of
this nature should be based on an understanding of the unique organiza-
tional characteristics of CMHC's. The remainder of this chapter in-
cludes an analysis of such characteristics as they influence the process
of CMHC adaptation to the environment. Using this analysis, it is possi-
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ble to anticipate how center directors might best carry out the process
of adaptation in their particular settings. From this beginning, a
study of CMHC adaptation can be developed to give center directors more
specific ideas as to how to develop their organizations.
The Exte rnal Envi ronment of CMHC '
s
:
An Exploration of Key Dependencies
As discussed by Steiner (1977), a major difference between busi-
nesses and human services such as CMHC's is the manner in which re-
sources are obtained. Businesses get support directly from the people
who receive their products or services, while agencies such as CMHC's
receive their money primarily from a secondary or public source. Thus,
an indirect relationship exists between the consumer and provider, where
a third party pays for the service. Survival does not depend directly
upon who is serviced as it does in businesses, but rather upon the third
party who pays the bills. If there is no ready consumer market for the
agency's services, they still may be purchased if the third party per-
ceives them to be important. In businesses, on the other hand, services
for which there is no need are eliminated more directly. Thus, resource
acquisition is a more complicated process in human services and it is
more difficult for agencies to get precise feedback on the usefulness
and viability of their services.
In addition to funding sources, other groups asually become in-
volved in CMHC funding decisions, adding to the environmental complexity
already there. Coimiunity participation in decision-making is encouraged
in human services, and a variety of outside interest groups often become
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involved in the process. Funding source perceptions of service needs
and quality of care are open to considerable influence because of the
ambiguity and unsophistication of human service work. Thus, outsiders
can have significant impact on decisions which are made. While outside
input probably leads to better services in the long run, it creates in-
creased interdependencies for the center director to manage in the mean-
time. Resource acquisition often becomes a highly politicized process
involving several environmental actors which must be taken into consid-
eration .
During the early years of operation, CMHC's are somewhat protected
from this environment, as the majority of their funding comes from the
federal government. At this time, their primary concern is satisfying
NIMH requirements. Secondarily, they must satisfy the demands of state
and local officials, and interest groups which sign off or influence
federal funding decisions. Also, they must monitor general public opin-
ion and legislative activity which ultimately affect allocations to NIMH
and their area. In particular, it is important for center directors to
understand how federal funding decisions are made and what interest
groups are involved in the process.
As the center lessens its dependence on federal support and expands
its funding base, other environmental groups increase in importance.
The exact nature of these groups and their interrelationships depend
upon the specific CMHC and its area. However, many general groups seem
to be important to most CMHC's. As discussed in Chapter I, these in-
clude: 1) state mental health and human service departments, 2) local
and county government offices, 3) third-party payors such as medicaire/
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medicaid, health maintenance organizations, and private insurance com-
panies, 4) other federal granting offices, 5) philanthropic organiza-
tions, and 6) private industries and labor unions. Center directors
must be aware of the availability of money from such groups and the de-
mands which will be placed upon the CMHC in exchange for funds. These
demands are influenced by factors such as the groups' perceptions of the
CMHC and their interrelationships with other influential environmental
actors. Unfortunately, the interrelationships of funding groups are
complex and uncoordinated, such that they often impose conflicting de-
mands on the CMHC. For example, medicaid may impose different qualifi-
cations for outpatient services than does NIMH. Often these groups are
not integrated properly in the government bureaucracy, and because of
this, lack information about each other's activities.
A key interrelationship for the CMHC to monitor and understand is
that involving federal, state, and local mental health authorities. As
described earlier, CMHC success and survival was intended to be insured
through a partnership of these three influential groups. The exact man-
ner in which this partnership is, or is not, implemented is crucial to
the center's long-range survival. These groups control substantial re-
sources for the CMHC's themselves, and indirectly are instrumental to
the acquisition of resources from other groups.
Because of the CMHC's public service mandate and increased depen-
dence on fee-paying and third-party reimbursable clients, citizens are
also an important environmental component. The center must be visible
and respected if it is to receive referrals, generate client income, and
remain in the graces of funding sources. Citizens exert influence at
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all environmental levels, from the legislature to the individual pro-
gram. In California, for example, citizen reaction against high taxes
and costly human services led to legislative budget cuts which have sig-
nificantly affected service delivery (i.e., "Proposition 13"). At a
local level, neighborhood groups have influenced decision-making to
close poorly run or controversial programs.
Public opinion can be expressed in a variety of ways through a num-
ber of different groups. Of particular concern is the interplay of such
groups with the media. Newspapers, radio, and television exert more and
more influence on decision-making in our culture, and because of this,
are an important environmental component of public service agencies such
as CMHC's.
Also important are other agencies with which the center must work
on an everyday basis. Through the federal regulations, CMHC's are man-
dated to be a coordinating influence on mental health services in the
community. Thus, to receive federal sanction and funding, they must co-
operate and work with other agencies. As side benefits, they can re-
ceive help in providing needed services to their clients and can develop
potential allies to secure additional service money for their area. On
the other hand, local agencies serve as potential competitors for scarce
mental health resources. They can take away current clients or funding,
and can compete for new money coming into the area. It is important for
center directors to understand the cooperative and competitive dynamics
of their relationships with other community agencies, both as they af-
fect the CMHC goal of service coordination and as they affect their cen-
ter's movement towards self-sufficiency.
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Several other environmental groups can be important to the long-
range success and survival of CMHC's. Included among others are indi-
viduals and groups which affect the acquisition of needed resources such
as staff and technological expertise (e.g., educational institutions,
professional and trade organizations, volunteer groups, and consulting
firms). At least some attention should be paid to these groups in addi-
tion to funding sources if the CMHC is to be successful and innovative.
In sum, CMHC's have a complex, highly politicized environment of
interdependent groups which directly or indirectly affect their resource
acquisition and service provision. Center directors need to develop an
accurate understanding of key environmental contingencies in their area,
taking into consideration the actual and potential impact of various
groups on the CMHC. In doing so, it is important to understand the
forces which influence outsiders' behavior towards the center. By under-
standing the forces which shape contingencies they will be better able
to change them to the CMHC's advantage. As discussed in Chapter II, a
longitudinal perspective can be helpful in such an analysis. It is ex-
pected that successful center directors develop such a perspective to
understand their organizations' environments.
Environmental scanning . Data from the environment can be collected in a
variety of formal and informal ways. As discussed in Chapter II, infor-
mation collected informally is generally more valuable to organizations,
particularly in crucial situations. Formal mechanisms do have some
utility, however, and are probably not used as much as they might be in
CMHC's. For example, structured needs assessments and trend analyses
can be used to determine which services are needed currently and in
the future in a particular area. Data can be collected about the ac-
ceptability of services and the availability of funds for them. From
this, long-range plans can be devised for program development and
potential funding sources can be made aware of the community's needs.
Also, "marketing surveys" can be conducted for developing contracts
with local industry and other potential direct-pay consumer groups.
For example, consultation and education workshops can be designed
and priced to meet the needs of local industry who will purchase them.
Informal scanning is probably best conducted by the center direc-
tor and a few other selected key boundary personnel. Through personal
contacts with influential members in important environmental groups,
the center director and his/her associates keep abreast of environ-
mental trends and reactions, and funding possibilities. Accuracy of
information can be maintained by knowing the characteristics of key
contact people (through the familiarity of personal contact), and by
using multiple sources of information at different levels in the en-
vironment. The experience of center directors seems crucial to this
process. The more exposure they have had to the intricate processes
of environmental decision-making, and the more knowledge they have
of key environmental actors, the greater likelihood they will engine-
er quick and accurate assessments of outside opportunities and
threats
.
A variety of gatekeepers can be used for environmental scanning
by the executive director, depending upon their position, environ-
mental contacts, experience, and expertise, and depending upon the
situation. Interactions with such outsiders are very important and
must be controlled and coordinated closely, particularly under times
of environmental stress. Thus, center directors need to choose gate-
keepers carefully and coordinate their efforts so that miscommunica-
tions are avoided.
As a final note, there are several key sources of information
in the environment of which the center director and his/her staff
should be aware. Some are "key informants" who provide information
on the inside operations of other organizations. Others include indi-
viduals whose formal job is to scan the environirent, and consolidate
information for people such as center directors. For example, cer-
tain federal and state officials serve as clearinghouses of informa-
tion about grants or training opportunities. It is expected that
successful center directors learn how to use a variety of such sources
to enhance their agencies' survival capabilities.
Integrating scaj2nin£ resu^ decision-making
. As discussed in
Chapter II, it is important that environmental data get used by the
organization to develop plans for proactively and reactively inter-
acting with the environment. The business literature suggests that
center directors and their executive staff play a crucial role in the
use of such data. They must provide the initiative for its use and
develop ways to integrate it appropriately into their planning for
self-sufficiency. Such plans should include long-range objectives
and strategies, from within which short-range objectives and crisis
situations can be managed. Planning should be flexible so that data
from a variety of formal and informal sources can be used as needed,
and so that plans can be adjusted to adapt to changing environmental
conditions. Potentially harmful events should always be anticipated
so that they can be recognized quickly, and be avoided or acted upon
with contingency plans before their effects are too damaging. The
literature suggests that in turbulent environments such as those of
CMHC's, planning should contain contingency plans based on anticipa-
tion of changing environmental conditions. The best planning option
can be taken at the crucial time depending upon how the environment
has shifted since the original plan was developed. Thus, the CMHC
can be more proactive in responding to crises by having a structured,
deci si on -making process that allows for planned, yet flexible re-
sponses to changing conditions.
The literature also suggests that decision-making will be most
effective if the resulting strategies provide operational guidance
to the organization, and foster the personal commitment of those who
must carry them out. Thus, the CMHC needs a well thought-out manage-
ment system that fosters the inclusion of decision-implementors in
the decision-making process so that internal organizational matters
can be taken into consideration as needed.
Decision-making in organizations such as CMHC's is complicated
by at least three important factors (see Hasenfeld and English, 1975;
Steiner, 1977). First of all, workers in such organizations are gen-
erally not oriented to structured decision-making and future plan-
ning, particularly where financial matters are an issue. Human serv-
ice concerns are often vague, and it is difficult to make clear-cut,
analytic decisions. Decision-making requres extensive input, takes
time, and is often frustrating. Secondly, the fact that CMHC's are
comprised mostly of professionals leads to further problems. Profes-
sionals generally expect greater autonomy than non-professionals and
hold allegiance to the ideals of their profession as well as the or-
ganization and its clients. Professionals' loyalties can easily be-
come divided, and it can be difficult to solicit their full support
and commitment to group decisions which have been made. Finally,
because of the humanistic ideals of human service work, and the fact
that funds are generally available regardless of production, most
human service workers are not oriented to money matters and planning
for financial viability. Such affairs are viewed at best as a neces-
sary evil which should be left to the administration.
Because of such matters, the center director's job can be quite
difficult. Decision-making and management structures which build co-
hesiveness and orient the organization toward the future, yet respect
human service and professional ideals are difficult to build. The
"management by objectives" (MBO) approach discussed in Chapter II is
one attractive alternative for structuring CMHC decision-making. It
is expected that successful center directors use some form of this
to orient their organizations and plan for self-sufficiency. Such
a system allows the integration of environmental scanning data into
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a structured, yet flexible decision process, and allows room for pro-
fessional development and autonomy (see Gabbert, 1978, for a more
complete explanation of MBO in CMHC's).
While the use of analytic decision-making tools is generally
avoided in human services, it is expected that successful center
directors use modifications of available techniques to orient their
planning efforts. For example, in Chapter II, it was mentioned that
some organizational specialists have developed methods for helping
executives plot the impact of organizational actions on environmental
constituents (e.g. Neubauer and Solomon, 1977). The use of such
grids and weighted ratings of environmental constituents and organi-
zational actions can be useful in sorting through the systemic com-
plexity surrounding important decisions.
As a final note, the center must balance environmental demands
with internal needs during the process of making plans for self-
sufficiency. To this end, the center director must insure that accur-
ate information about internal operations is available as well as data
from the environment. While the opinions of staff can be valuable,
formal Management Information Systems (MIS) which can concretely
chart utilization of center resources are generally the most impor-
tant source of information. A computerized MIS allows the CMHC to
analyze and compare its expenditures in different program areas so
as to determine current and future needs. These needs can then be
balanced against funding source total dollar amounts, allowable ex-
penditures, and administrative and service demands. With this know-
ledge, the center can more easily soli it funds which are in line
with its service goals and administrative needs (see National Insti-
tute of Mental Health, 1978a, for a number of references on the de-
sign and use of MIS in CMHC's).
Managing demands : Organizational structure options
. Center direc-
tors have a number of organizational structure options available to
help them manage environmental demands, depending upon their styles,
the nature of their operations, and the environments in which they
are embedded. The business literature suggests that structures should
be designed to provide an optimum degree of differentiation and inte-
gration with respect to the environment, so that competing demands
can be more easily managed. Organizational mechanisms and "slack"
are also needed which can buffer the center against the shock of en-
vironmental disturbance. Growth in size and diversification of re-
source dependence can help provide this cushion if such expansion
is managed carefully. Above all, centers need structures which can
be flexible to changing environmental trends. The CMHC environment
is highly turbulent with different specialized programs needed to
adapt to changing conmunity needs and available funding. The litera-
ture suggests that innovative forms such as the "matrix organization"
can be used to help CMHC's maintain such flexibility within a rela-
tively stable, buffered organization. The MBO system discussed ear-
lier can also be used within this structure as further help with the
task of integrating diverse elements of the CMHC.
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CMHC's have developed with a variety of organizational structures
because of the flexibility allowed by NIMH for them to adapt to the
unique characteristics of their community (see Levinson, 1969; Ozarin &
Spaner, 1974). Included are centers which are 1) based within a general
hospital, 2) organized as a conglomerate of "affiliate" agencies with
separate identities, 3) based within a state hospital or other state
mental health authority, 4) based within a county or city mental health
system, or 5) established as a "free-standing" separate corporation.
All such arrangements and variations have served useful purposes for
centers depending upon their historical development and management
needs
.
As discussed by Naierman et_ aT_. (1978), centers which are organized
as part of a larger system such as a general hospital, or state or local
mental health authority probably have the best adaptive advantage.
These centers can use their parent system as a buffer to help absorb the
shock of losing federal support. Cutbacks can be shared with other
parts of the system, and non-CMHC financial reserves can be used to pro-
tect cash flow from slow paying government contracts. Free-standing
centers, on the other hand, experience much more difficulty when they
lose their NIMH funds (which often serve as a buffer because of their
operational flexibility). While free-standing status allows centers
more autonomy in selecting service orientations it leaves them more on
their own against the environment (both financially and politically).
Multiple-agency conglomerates are another group with survival problems,
but more because of internal than external manageruent concerns. Coor-
dination of individual agencies which maintain their separate identity
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is difficult, time-consuming, and costly. Success can only be engineer-
ed if these problems can be solved, and the different participating
groups can be integrated into a functional team. A close working con-
glomerate can be flexible, however, and can use its diverse constituency
to lobby powerfully and share financial losses. While this model need
not be abandoned, its benefits should be weighed carefully against its
inherent problems of internal management.
The CMHC literature suggests that within these overall structural
models, centers can adopt various innovative designs. For example, re-
cent articles have explored applications of the matrix organization to
CMHC's (White, 1978), and the establishment of foundations and trusts to
process certain funds, and hold property (Curran, 1970). Both offer in-
teresting possibilities for centers which should be explored in greater
detail in future research.
Growth and diversification pose interesting issues for CMHC's which
should also be explored. The federal legislation over the years has
mandated that centers expand their role in the community and operate a
number of diverse, multi -funded programs (i.e., "twelve essential serv-
ices"). While such growth has increased the visibility and power of
CMHC's in the community, it has not necessarily improved their chances
for survival (see Sharfstein, 1978). Because their growth and expansion
into different service areas have been mandated, and because alternative
resources for these different services are extremely limited, centers
have not been able to benefit from their increased size as much as would
be expected ordinarily. Businesses choose to enter new market areas and
maintain different suppliers to diversify their resource dependence and
in
enhance their flexibility. CMHC's, on the other hand, are restricted to
certain "markets" because of NIMH regulations, and must deal with limit-
ed suppliers of funds for each of these. Thus, while growth and diversi-
fication enhance service delivery to the public, they create additional
management problems and few, if any, survival benefits to the CMHC it-
self.
In sum, center directors have a number of structural options which
they can employ in their unique environmental situations. Several dif-
ferent arrangements can usually be adaptive in the same environment de-
pending upon how they are implemented. In order to be most effective,
it appears that center directors should keep in mind the needs for 1)
differentiation and integration, 2) buffering mechanisms against the
loss of federal funds, and 3) structural arrangements which can be flex-
ible to shifting environmental needs (e.g., the matrix organization).
They should also be aware of the benefits and substantial limitations of
growth and diversification of their organizations. More research is
needed, however, to explore how these factors are or are not taken into
consideration by successful center directors.
Managing demands : Strategic action alternatives . Given their struc-
ture, center directors have a number of strategy options available for
managing external demands related to their survival. In the short-run,
many demands emerge which must be sorted through to determine their im-
portance. Center directors must develop ways for themselves and their
staff to manage these as best possible within the context of their long-
range goals. All demands can be presented as crises in need of immedi-
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ate attention. Thus, a determination must be made as to their import-
ance to the CMHC's mission and survival, and as to whether they should
be complied with immediately or later, or managed without necessarily
being satisfied. Compliance with all demands is impossible and can lead
to immense frustration. It is expected that with experience, center di-
rectors learn appropriate discretion with "crisis" demands so that such
demands are managed within the context of long-range plans and center
ideals.
Because of their environments, CMHC's are often faced with compet-
ing demands from a number of funding sources and interest groups. Bal-
ancing such demands can be very difficult and requires a special exper-
tise. It is probable that successful center directors employ tactics
similar to those observed in businesses by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
These include such activities as dealing with demands sequentially or
facilitating the conflicting groups to resolve their differences them-
selves rather than use the CMHC as a "middle man." For example, a CMHC
may experience conflicting regulatory demands on outpatient services
from NIMH, the state, and medicaire/medicaid. One strategy would be to
reach agreement first with NIMH and use their influence to help the
others fall in line later. Another strategy would involve calling a
meeting of representatives from the three offices so that any differ-
ences could be resolved in a group setting rather than individually
through the center. The particular strategy employed would depend upon
the situation and politics involved. More research is needed to deter-
mine how best such strategies can be used.
While managing demands as they occur is important, the adaptation
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literature suggests that center directors will be more effective in the
long run if they attempt to change the environmental conditions which
create problems in the first place. As discussed in Chapter II, a vari-
ety of strategic actions are available. These include the following:
1) merging with other organizations; 2) developing coordination agree-
ments, contracts, and formalized coalitions with other significant ac-
tors in the environment; 3) using the board of directors as a positive
link to the community and source of support; 4) increasing the legiti-
macy of the CMHC and mental health services through advertising; 5) lob-
bying alone or with others for governmental intervention and regulatory
changes; and 6) using executive succession to affect positive adapta-
tion.
1. Merging with other organizations . As discussed in Chapter II,
organizations merge with or purchase other organizations to gain more
control over their environment, and thus increase their chances for suc-
cess and survival. Merger can take place vertically (backwards or for-
wards in the production process), horizontally (in order to acquire com-
petitors and enhance coordination), or by diversification (to diversify
resource dependence or adopt an attractive organization). It is ex-
pected that successful CMHC's use this strategy during their development
to solidify their organization and prepare for self-sufficiency.
Vertical mergers can be used to enhance service delivery to dein-
stitutionalized clients and increase the financial viability of a cen-
ter. For example, the center can acquire all necessary program elements
in the deinstitutionalization process such as inpatient services, tran-
sitional housing, day treatment and day activity services, case manage-
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ment and outpatient services. Through increased control on the "produc-
tion process," the center can improve the system of transitional serv-
ices for clients. At the same time, it can improve its stature in the
community as the major provider of services to this population. Thus,
if it does a good job, the center enhances its chances of receiving fur-
therfunds in this "production" area because of its visibility, experi-
ence, and informal monopolistic market control.
Horizontal mergers are likely when the CMHC finds itself in a com-
petitive situation with another agency, or when coordination is diffi-
cult. For example, the center may try to merge with or take over a com-
petitive outpatient clinic. Such a move (if it works) can reduce compe-
tition, improve service to clients, and improve the financial viability
of all involved. In some cases, mergers of this nature are necessitated
by the environment. For example, a third-party payor may only give one
license to a catchment area, persuading competing clinics to merge if
they both want to receive third-party reimbursements.
As mentioned earlier, diversification has major limitations as a
strategy for diversifying resource dependence in CMHC's. Resources for
different programs are limited and entry into different markets is re-
stricted by NIMH. However, centers may use diversification to enhance
their legitimacy in the community. For example, the CMHC may affiliate
with an established, popular family service agency to increase its sta-
ture through association (as well as to coordinate services more closely
with an important non-mental health agency).
As a final note, merger may also be done to join a larger, more fi-
nancially secure parent organization such as a hospital or state agency.
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As described earlier, such a move can buffer and protect less financial-
ly secure CMHC's against the loss of federal funds.
2 . Developing coordination agreements
,
contracts ^ and coalitions .
V/hen environmental control through merger is impossible or unattractive,
CMHC's can opt for the more flexible strategy of interagency coordina-
tion. At least four alternatives are possible here. 1) For example,
centers can develop formal or informal coordination agreements with
other agencies in the community. These can be used to improve services
and decrease dysfunctional interorganizational competition. 2) In addi-
tion, long-term contracts or letters of agreement can be developed with
funding sources such as the state, to insure continued and predictable
support for the center. 3) Centers can also join local coalitions such
as inter-agency task forces or the United Way. Such coalitions can be
used to improve coordination, decrease uncertainty in the environment,
and more systematically distribute scarce community resources. 4) Fin-
ally, CMHC's can join larger coalitions which have access to state and
federal funding information and can effectively lobby to influence poli-
cy development. Included are such groups as the National Council of
Conmunity Mental Health Centers, state councils of CMHC's, state consor-
tiums and task forces, and trade associations such as the American Psy-
chological Association. All such linkages improve communication with
the environment and can lead to more trusting, stable, and predictable
environmental relationships. More research is needed to determine ex-
actly how CMHC's use or do not use these to enhance their self-suffici-
ency capability,
3. [king the board of directors . Central to the CMHC concept of
116
community participation is the board of directors. All centers are re-
quired to have a board of community representatives which oversees poli-
cy development and hires and fires the executive director. In this way,
the board is supposed to insure that CMHC services meet the unique needs
of their community. The board is also charged with helping the execu-
tive director insure the center's survival as a key service provider in
the area. To this end, board members should serve as an important link
to the community and decision-makers
. The adaptation literature sug-
gests a manipulative use of boards, whereby organizational executives
such as center directors select board members who can 1) provide free
adnini strati ve talent (e.g. finances, investment, legal advice), 2) win
over antagonistic outsiders, 3) serve as links to key sources of funds,
and 4) not interfere with organizational activity. In human services
this approach can run contrary to the organization's basic task of serv-
ing the community. My impression is that more of a balance is needed
whereby board members can be involved appropriately in policy setting,
but can also be used to link-up with key elements of the community, and
advocate responsibly outside the organization for mental health affairs.
Rather than formally coopting board members, as the adaptation litera-
ture suggests, I would argue that center directors should work with them
to help the CMHC service its community and survive over time using what-
ever skills and talents are available at both a board and staff level.
CMHC boards have been instituted primarily to insure public accountabil-
ity. This function should not be lost as we try to expand their role in
corporate leadership. More research is needed to understand how best
this can be accomplished, and what roles the CMHC board should adopt
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over time (also see Kane, 1975).
4 . Increasing legitimacy and use of services through advertising
.
In businesses, advertising is widely used as a tool to 1) increase pub-
lic awareness of the firm's products or services, 2) shape public per-
ceptions and needs so that people will buy more from the firm, and 3)
improve the legitimacy of the firm in general so that it will receive
increased support. Certain aspects of this approach can be helpful to
center directors in their efforts to increase the viability of their or-
ganizations
.
For many years mental illness and mental health services have been
stigmatized in communities such that people are reluctant to ask for
help, and to financially support needed services. CMHC's have suffered
additional resistance in some communities because of their association
with "big government" and the federal bureaucracy. Many advertising
techniques can be used to increase public awareness of the positive as-
pects of CMHC services and the CMHC philosophy, and subsequently to im-
prove the legitimacy, effectiveness, and financial viability of CMHC's
in their community. Such advertising is particularly needed for inno-
vative services such as consultation and education, and politically vo-
latile ones such as transitional housing.
Advertising can be handled in a variety of ways, depending upon the
community and situation. Often "word of mouth" is the best advertising
a center can have. Positive statements from satisfied clients and in-
fluential cotmiunity members can have tremendous effects as they spread
through community networks. (Note: Negative rumors can have dramatic
devastating effects. The CMHC should keep on the alert for these and
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understand how to deal with them.) Formal advertising can also be ef-
fective, and is probably not used as much as it should be by CMHC's.
Use of the media is crucial here, and can include anything from news-
paper articles on a new service to commercial /public service spots on
television. Often such advertising can be used to educate the community
about mental health as well as persuade them to support the CMHC. For
example, a center in the Columbus, Ohio, area has recently developed
creative television commercials using noted celebrities to explain the
first signs of mental disorder so that people can receive help early
from their local CMHC before problems get out of hand (Franklin County
Mental Health and Retardation Board, 223 South High Street, Columbus,
Ohio 43215). Use of the media is an exciting new area for human serv-
ices and it will be interesting to see how CMHC's take advantage of it
to improve both their services and adaptive capabilities.
5 . Lobbying for governmental intervention and regulation . Because
CMHC's exist in an environment composed almost entirely of government
or government-related agencies, lobbying to affect changes in this realm
is one of the most potentially useful strategies available to center di-
rectors. Not only are the government agencies important because of
their resources and regulatory power, but they are extremely receptive
to lobbying because of their highly politicized nature. Also, lobbying
can be used to solicit government intervention at lower levels to insure
that policies are carried out as they were intended. If local agencies,
local officials, or state officials are uncooperative, and other efforts
to work with them fail, the CMHC can lobby at higher political levels to
bring pressures upon them which force change. Such lobbying can include
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the center alone, or the center in association with larger coalitions.
For example, CMHC's as a whole have been lobbying for legislative
changes at a federal level through the National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers. Their hope is that such effort will lead to
positive changes in funding and regulations which will enhance service
delivery through the CMHC ideology, and improve the financial viability
of centers nationwide. It is probable that other such lobbying is done
at a state and local level by successful CMHC's. More work is needed to
understand how lobbying of this nature can be used by center directors.
To engage successfully in lobbying activity, the adaptation litera-
ture suggests that center directors need to understand the complex in-
terrelationships and power dynamics of government systems, and the ways
forces can be mobilized to affect positive change at different bureau-
cratic levels. Also, center directors should know when and when not to
engage in lobbying activity. As discussed in Chapter II, large scale
political action can be tedious and difficult. Efforts can easily back-
fire if they are not planned and timed carefully, and if other more ac-
ceptable means of problem-solving are not attempted first (i.e., use of
protocol). Finally, the literature suggests that center directors
should express concerns which are reasonable in appearance and are sup-
ported by acceptable data and interest groups. Credibility and social
legitimacy are important factors which must be kept in mind while soli-
citing support from others.
6. Executive succession . As a final strategy, center directors
must be aware of the adaptive impact of turnover in their position. Be-
cause CMHC's are mandated to have a single executive in charge of their
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operations, the individual in this position has significant impact on
the appearance and style of the total organization. As Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) note, executives such as center directors may have no
other option than to leave the organization so that its public image and
management style can be adjusted as needed. Power cannot be institu-
tionalized around a particular leader and his or her style, if they have
outlived their usefulness.
In sum, center directors have a number of strategy options for man-
aging environmental demands. The literature suggests that in the short-
run, it is important to sift through demands as they occur to determine
the appropriate response. Some demands may require immediate attention
and compliance, while others should be deferred, avoided, or satisfied
without necessarily complying with them. Such decisions should be based
on a determination of the importance of the group and its demands to the
CMHC's mission and survival, and on the long-range plans of the organi-
zation. In the long-run, the literature suggests that centers will be
much better off if they attempt to change the environment so that its
demands are more predictable and less problematic. A variety of long-
range strategies are possible such as 1) merging with other organiza-
tions, 2) coordinating with other organizations, 3) using the board of
directors as an external link, 4) advertising, 5) lobbying for govern-
ment intervention and regulation, and 6) changing executive leadership.
Much more work is needed to understand how such long-range and short-




. Over time, as the CMHC responds to its envir-
onment, the management literature suggests that center directors should
develop means for their organizations to reflect upon and learn about
their adaptive behaviors. At a simple level, they need to learn what
actions and events have led them closer to self-sufficiency and survival
within the ideals of the CMHC ideology. At a more complete level, they
need to learn how to improve their overall adaptive postures. It is im-
portant to understand the appropriateness of their structures and pro-
cesses given their past, present, and future environmental situations,
and their particular styles of operations. Different styles and struc-
tural arrangements have characteristic strengths and weaknesses in dif-
ferent environments. A variety of configurations can probably be effec-
tive over time, though, if they are managed thoughtfully with an under-
standing of the potential opportunities and pitfalls which usually ac-
company them. Also, different styles affect how the environment is per-
ceived. Center directors should try to understand how their perceptions
shape their adaptive behavior and subsequently influence their effec-
tiveness. Such perceptions have great influence on the maintenance of
functional and dysfunctional interactional patterns with outsiders.
A variety of techniques can be used to help center directors with
this learning process. Administrative evaluation data can be collected
along with service evaluation data to provide some help. Center direc-
tors can also do an internal historical analysis of their organization's
maturation by reviewing key developments over the years which have led
to greater financial security. Reviews of previous grants, site visit
reports, and MIS data can be particularly valuable in this process.
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Finally, center directors can solicit the outside feedback of organiza-
tional consultants, and where appropriate, their NIMH project officers.
Openness to the ideas of such outsiders can offer a much needed fresh
perspective on the organization and its patterns of adaptive behavior.
Future research should explore how successful center directors use the
input of outsiders and other techniques to reflect upon and improve
their organization's adaptive postures.
This approach and its usefulness . This chapter has presented a theore-
tical approach which center directors can use to help them manage their
organizations toward successful self-sufficiency. The approach stresses
that center directors should use an understanding of the complex demands
and interrelationships of their organizational environments, along with
an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of their adaptive
styles, to develop strategies, structures, and actions which will make
their operations more secure and effective over time. The approach
orients the center director toward the complex environmental factors
which ultimately influence CMHC survival, and provides suggestions for
how to successfully manage them over time. There are limitations to the
orientation, however, and more work is needed to explore specifically
how center directors can better engineer their organization's survival
within such a model.
The first most obvious limitation is that the model and approach
may be too optimistic. CMHC's exist in a particularly difficult envir-
onment which may be too imposing for any management approach. It would
be misleading to project the model as a "miracle worker." If CMHC's are
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to survive efforts are obviously needed at a larger systems level to
make CMHC's environments more predictable and munificent. For the pur-
poses here, though, the model does provide a potentially useful guide to
center directors for pushing the limits of their difficult situations
and hopefully improving them over time.
Another limitation involves the emphasis given to environmental
concerns. The organizational adaptation perspective stresses the man-
agement of external contingencies almost to the exclusion of internal
ones. While this is reasonable given the developmental context of adap-
tation theories within the business management literature, a broader
perspective is needed for CMHC's. Early management literature reversed
the emphasis such that internal affairs were concentrated on to the ex-
clusion of external ones. Thus, current writings can comfortably stress
external management concerns, assuming that executives are familiar with
internal matters. Center directors, however, are generally not skilled
in management, and desperately need training in such basic areas as fi-
nancial management, leadership, and motivation. CMHC's cannot survive
and be effective if their internal operations are problematic. Quality
of service declines, and too much administrative time must be spent on
internal crises such that important long-range environmental planning
suffers. Thus, while the perspective presented here provides a valuable
context for understanding survival management and suggests several im-
portant tools for center directors to use in the process, other, perhaps
more basic, management training is needed as well.
Also, because the approach presented here is based largely on re-
search with business organizations, more work is needed to understand
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how the process of adaptation occurs specifically in CMHC's, and how
this perspective can be useful to center directors and the problem of
self-sufficiency. More complete answers to questions in the following
areas are needed:
1. The external environment
. What are the key boundaries for
CMHC's and how do they change over the years as self-suffici-
ency approaches? What environmental interdependencies are most
important to understand? What are the most important conflict-
ing demands which affect survival and effectiveness for CMHC's?
What limits do CMHCs' particularly difficult environments place
upon thei r survival capabilities?
2. Environmental scanning. What are the most effective formal and
informal means of environmental scanning for center directors?
Which are more appropriate in different situations? How can
center directors best coordinate this process within the con-
text of their long-range plans and objectives?
3. Integrating scanning results in decision-making . What methods
can be used to integrate environmental data into an effective
internal decision-making and decision-implementing process?
How are such data balanced with internal data about organiza-
tional needs, goals, and ideals? Can a modified MBO system be
of use?
4. Managing demands : Organizational structure options . What
structural devices can be used to buffer CMHC's against the
loss of federal funds and allow it to creatively manage exter-
nal demands? How can such issues as differentiation and inte-
gration, growth, and diversification be handled effectively?
5
.
Managing demands : Strategic action alternatives
. How can
short-range and crisis demands be managed effectively within
the context of long-range plans and objectives? How can con-
flicting demands be managed successfully? What long-range
strategies can be used by center directors to alter environ-
mental demands and improve their chances for successful self-
sufficiency within the ideals of the CMHC ideology (e.g., mer-
ger, coordinating linkages and coalitions, use of the board of
directors, advertising, lobbying, and executive succession)?
How can such strategies be implemented effectively within the
context of specific environmental situations?
6. Organizational learning. What devices can center directors use
to improve their organizations' capacities for learning about
their adaptive behaviors and style (e.g., research, periodic
reviews, and outside consultation)?
As a final note, humanistic issues must be given greater consider-
ation. Because the literature on organizational adaptation is based on
work, with businesses, its approaches can seem out of line with human
service ideals (particularly to human service workers). Businesses are
based upon making a profit, and they are concerned with production pro-
cesses which usually involve the transformation of physical matter rath-
er than people. Thus, management processes and adaptive strategies can
appear exploitative, manipulative, and technological in nature. CMHC's,
on the other hand, place considerable emphasis on public responsibility
and they usually deal more with people and human values. Because of
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this, staff are particularly concerned with how organizational activ-
ities affect people and the human condition. Thus, for a variety of
reasons, adaptive behaviors in CMHC's must be particularly sensitive to
human concerns. Future research needs to consider this important dif-
ference between CMHC's and businesses and explore the nature of adaptive
behavior in CMHC's which brings their manipulative and technological as-
pects into a good integration with the ideals of human services.
To a certain extent, however, adaptive behavior always contains
manipulative qualities which cannot be denied. CMHC's cannot and, I
would argue, should not be considered an exception to the rule. Strate-
gic action toward a goal need not be bad if the goal is humanitarian and
the means are reasonable. CMHC's are part of an important social inter-
vention which has done much to improve the quality of mental health care
in our country. Because of continued political hardships and adminis-
trative shortcomings, centers have had a rough time and are in danger of
extinction before their benefits can be fully realized. Because of
their value and potential, we should not be afraid to give their leaders
the variety of tools necessary to help them survive and be effective.
This is not to say that we should circumvent the humanitarian ideals of
CMHC's, and teach center directors to be callous manipulators, orches-
trating survival for their own self-interests. Rather, we should give
them a realistic view of the difficulties of their situation (including
the manipulative qualities of others in their environments) and more
sophisticated tools for improving their position over time.
S^ummary
. This chapter has presented a conceptual approach for center
directors to help them struggle with the problem of CMHC self-suffici-
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ency and survival. The approach is based on work in the area of organi-
zational adaptation to the environment which was summarized in Chapter
II. The literature on organizational adaptation is based largely on
work with business. Thus, it has been important here to develop an un-
derstanding of the unique organizational characteristics of CMHC's as
they influence the process of CMHC adaptation to the environment. Using
this analysis, it has been possible to anticipate how center directors
might best carry out the process of adaptation to improve their organi-
zations' chances for survival. More research is needed, however, to un-
derstand how the process of adaptation occurs specifically in CMHC's, and
how this perspective can be useful to center directors in the field.
The chapter concluded with a discussion of the needs for future research
on CMHC adaptation, and the limitations of the conceptual approach pre-
sented here. The next chapter presents a study of CMHC adaptation which
was conducted to build on the conceptual approach developed here. It is
hoped that the study and its findings will help center directors further
with the problems of CMHC self-sufficiency.
CHAPTER IV
ACHIEVING SUCCESSFUL SELF-SUFFICIENCY:
A STUDY OF CMHC ADAPTATION TO THE ENVIRONMENT
Thus far, a conceptual approach based on work in the area of organ-
izational adaptation to the environment has been presented to help cen-
ter directors with the problems of CMHC self-sufficiency and survival.
This chapter presents an exploratory study of CMHC adaptation which was
conducted to build on this conceptual approach and provide more concrete
advice for center directors in the field. The study explores how a
small group of outstanding CMHC's in New England have worked to engineer
their survival and adhere to the basics of the CMHC ideology after their
initial federal funding is exhausted. An attempt was made to understand
the tactics used by the directors of these centers to establish their
organizations, prepare them for self-sufficiency, and continue to manage
the external demands which have affected their resource acquisition and
survival. In the process, the study examined to what extent and in what
manner the center directors used the management practices discussed in
the previous chapter. It is hoped that such exploratory work will 1)
clarify and enrich the model of environmental management discussed ear-
lier, 2) provide examples of successful survival strategies to other
center directors in the field, and 3) generate questions for future re-
search on CMHC adaptation.
Listed below are four propositions about CMHC adaptation that have
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guided this exploratory investigation. While the propositions do not
exhaust the range of research issues discussed in the previous chapter,
they do incorporate the most important in need of investigation. The
study was conducted to assess whether or not they have held true for the
sample of New England CMHC's, and to explicate how they were or were not
represented in the centers' operations. Developmental patterns in the
ways that the centers have approached survival over time were also ab-
stracted from the results. While developmental issues were not incor-
porated into a formal proposition, their presence in the report does im-
ply that a developmental perspective is important here, and that there
are patterns in the ways successful centers adapt to their situations
over time from which others can benefit.
Proposition One : Limitations . There are major limitations on
the survivability of CMHC's given the CMHC regulations and
their restricted funding opportunities. However, successful
CMHC's develop ways to circumvent the majority of these con-
straints, maximize their ability to move into the most lucra-
tive markets available, and intervene at a government level to
lessen whatever constraints they can. When limiting points
are reached, successful centers sacrifice the quantity rather
than the quality or range of services delivered.
As discussed earlier, CMHC's are in an extremely difficult survival
position and many in the field are questioning their future viability.
Funding options are limited for the comprehensive services, and the de-
mands imposed by funding sources are often problematic and conflicting.
Even if centers do survive the loss of federal funds, there is evidence
that they often sacrifice important CMHC ideals in the process.
The problem of survival is compounded because of CMHC's highly reg-
ulated nature. Current CMHC guidelines make it difficult for center di-
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rectors to employ the adaptive/survival tactics used by organizations in
the private sector. For example, businesses can often move into more
lucrative market areas and diversify their resource dependence if they
are having problems, CMHC's are limited more in this regard. Their
mandates require them to provide specific services to all people regard-
less of their ability to pay and they have limited funding options from
which to choose to support these services.
In spite of the problems some centers are more successful than
others in achieving self-sufficiency while maintaining the basics of the
CMHC ideology. From the discussion in Chapter III, it appears that to
do this, CMHC's must develop ways to minimize the major constraints on
their adaptability so that they can move into the most lucrative markets
available and lessen their dependencies on single sources of funds. It
remains an issue, however, as to what are the limits of centers' direc-
tors' abilities to improve their organizations' positions. While there
are certainly more options available to them than are currently consid-
ered possible, major limits are probably reached by even the most suc-
cessful center directors.
This study was based on the proposition that the most successful
center directors can and do work around most constraints facing their
organizations. An attempt was made to discover if indeed this was the
case in a sample of CMHC's representative of the most successful in New
England, and if so what were the key factors or behaviors that have al-
lowed the directors of such centers to minimize or eliminate obstacles
in their way. It was expected that the investigation would uncover ad-
ditional survival strategy options than are currently considered by most
131
center directors. It was also expected that certain obstacles would be
insurmountable, at least in the short-run. When limiting points were
reached by the centers, it was expected that successful center directors
would work as much as possible to sacrifice the quantity rather than the
quality or range of services their organization delivered. An important
part of the study was to identify such limiting points and understand
how they were dealt with by the sample of CMHC's under investigation.
Proposition Two : Proactivity . A key to successful survival
management in CMHC's is the center director's ability to main-
tain a proactive organizational stance in an ever-changing and
highly complex environment. Successful CMHC's develop long-
range planning processes that allow them to predict future
trends and make long-range contingency plans upon which short-
term actions can be based. Such plans include the development
of actions designed to change the environment itself as well
as those to respond to immediate or anticipated demands.
Perhaps the most important point from the preceding chapter is that
to be successful, center directors should be as proactive as possible in
managing environmental demands. A proactive stance allows the organiza-
tion to operate on the basis of its own long-range, relatively more sta-
ble goals rather than on the ever-changing demands of its environment.
To maintain such a stance, the preceding chapter argued that a center
director should institute planning mechanisms that allow the organiza-
tion to 1) understand the present and future environment and 2) develop
contingency plans for implementing its goals in the best possible way
given changing environmental conditions. Actions can be designed to re-
act to environmental demands or to change the environment itself so that
future demands are less problematic. As environmental conditions shift
over time, the organization can have strategy options prepared for meet-
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ing the different environmental states encountered.
The preceding chapter discussed possibilities for how center direc-
tors can orient their long-range planning processes. The present study
assessed to what extent and in what manner such processes were used for
survival management in the sample of CMHC's under investigation. It was
expected that effective long-range planning processes would play an im-
portant role in maintaining the centers' viability. It was also expect-
ed that there would be limitations to the abilities of the centers to be
proactive in their ever-changing environments. The study attempted to
understand these limitations and how the center directors worked with
them. Finally, the study also probed for the specific use of MBO-type
systems and computerized MIS in the centers' planning processes, as the
literature reviewed earlier indicates they should be especially impor-
tant in this regard.
Proposition Three : Long-Ran ge Strategies . In order to be pro-
active and gain more control over their environments, success-
ful CMHC's use various long-range adaptive strategies commonly
employed by organizations in the business world. Included to
a greater or lesser degree depending upon their situation are
the following activities:
1) .Marketing--Successful CMHC's read the needs and opportuni-
ties of the marketplace (both consumer and funding source) and
adjust their services to match these.
2) Advertising—Successful CMHC's "sell" their services to
consumers and funding sources through community education, use
of media, and other tactics which increase the center's social
legitimacy.
3) Buffering--Successful CMHC's buffer themselves against en-
vironmental instability by: 1) developing financial reserves,
2) diversifying their resource dependence, 3) joining a suc-
cessful parent organization, and/or 4) developing long-term
contracts with funding sources.
4) Mergers (growth)—Successful CMHC's grow through "horizon-
tal" mergers, vertical mergers, or diversification to gain




5) Interorganization Coordination--Successful CMHC's coordin-
ate their efforts with other organizations to gain a more pre-
dictable environment, reduce competition, share resources, and
gain lobbying power. Included are coordination agreements,
long-term contracts, and coalitions.
6) Boards of Directors and Cooptati on--Successful center di-
rectors work with their boards to achieve mutually agreeable
organizational objectives, and use board members as extra ad-
ministrative talent and links to key external groups.
7) Lobbying for Government Intervention--Successful CMHC's
"lobby" for governmental changes in funding, regulations, and
inter-governmental relations (especially the federal-state re-
lationship) to improve their survival stance.
8) Executive Successi on--Successful CMHC's orchestrate
changes in executive leadership when needed to improve the or-
ganization's adaptive posture.
In order to be proactive and successful, the business management
literature suggests that organizations need to act on the environment to
make it more controllable and munificent. In Chapter III the eight
strategies listed above were described as the most important long-range
options available to executives for managing environmental demands.
This study assessed whether or not such strategies were used by the sam-
ple of CMHC's under investigation, and if so, in what manner and with
what importance they were implemented. It was expected that all would
be used to a greater or lesser degree depending upon the centers' envir-
onment, style, and development. Because of the extreme difficulty of
CMHCs' current funding situation and their close ties to government
agencies, strategy number 7, "Lobbying for Government Intervention", was
expected to be of particular importance.
Proposition Four : Structures . Successful CMHC's have devel-
oped structural mechanisms (e.g. coordinating comrni ttees
,
matrix designs, etc.) to enhance the coordination and stabili-
zation of diverse and changing program types mandated by
changing regulations and funding priorities.
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The preceding chapter noted that center directors have a number of
organizational structure options to employ in their unique environmental
situations. Several different arrangements can usually be adaptive in
the same environment depending upon how they are implemented. In order
to be effective, center directors should keep certain organization de-
sign principles in mind while developing their specific structures (see
pages 66-71). One of the most important principles involves differenti-
ation and integration. CMHC's operate in a highly complex and turbulent
environment which necessitates their differentiating into a variety of
subgroups to deal with different aspects of the organization's task and
environment. These different functional units must then be coordinated
so that the organization's different resources can be maximally used for
problem-solving and goal attainment.
Because of ever-changing regulations, funding priorities, and en-
vironmental constituents, it was expected that issues related to differ-
entiation and integration would be very important to CMHC's. In order
to survive over time, it was expected that CMHC's would develop ways to
stabilize and coordinate their subunits. This study assessed whether or
not this was the case for the CMHC's under investigation, and if so,
what structural mechanisms were employed to improve their situation. It
was expected that the coordinating committees and matrix designs dis-
cussed earlier would be among the most important mechanisms used.
Overall design . With the above purposes in mind, case studies were con-
ducted of four New England CMHC's which were closely approaching or had
already reached the ends of their federal grants. The centers were se-
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lected on the basis of their success in approaching self-sufficiency
while maintaining the basics of the CMHC ideology as outlined in Chapter
I. A qualitative research design incorporating intensive interviews as
the principal investigative tool was then used to examine their organi-
zational evolution and adaptive behaviors (see Lofland, 1971; McCall and
Simmons, 1969).
The study was conducted in two stages. Initially, for each of the
four centers chosen for study, the principal investigator reviewed his-
torical center documents and interviewed the centers' executive direc-
tors and NIMH project officers. Through a review of center documents,
the investigator examined the centers' overall evolution, identified key
historical adaptive events, and examined issues related to the proposi-
tions discussed earlier. Shortly thereafter, interviews were conducted
to: 1) explore the centers' evolution and adaptive behaviors from the
respondents' perspectives to see if they generated the same set of is-
sues discussed in the propositions, 2) probe for specific data related
to the propositions, and 3) generate issues in need of further explora-
tion in the study.
At the end of the first stage, the investigator made a determina-
tion in conjunction with the dissertation committee as to whether addi-
tional data or additional centers were needed to test and explore the
propositions discussed earlier, or to explore specific key issues which
had emerged. As additional data were needed, they were collected by 1)
additional document reviews, 2) follow-up interviews with the initial
respondents, 3) interviews with other key individuals inside the organi-
zation, and 4) other measures determined at that time. As sufficient
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overlap in issues was raised to indicate complete data across centers,
additional centers were not chosen for investigation at that time.
Data from the document analysis and interviews were analyzed in a
qualitative fashion (see Lofland, 1971) to do the following: 1) assess
whether or not the propositions discussed earlier held true for the sam-
ple of CMHC's under investigation, 2) explicate how the techniques dis-
cussed in the propositions were or were not represented in the centers'
operations, and 3) determine whether or not there were developmental
patterns or issues in the ways the sample centers approached survival
over time. Notes were taken on all relevant documents, and audio-tape
recordings were made of each interview. Also, a diary was kept to re-
cord the investigator's involvement with the organization, and on-going
perceptions, feelings, and working hypotheses. Care was taken to insure
the validity of all data presented, and to insure the confidentiality of
the CMHC's and individual respondents included in the study.
Selection of a qualitative design . The selection of a qualitative de-
sign had several advantages in this investigation. The study explored
relatively uncharted territory in a sensitive and complicated area of
organizational life. Data were needed which were rich so that thinking
in the area could be expanded. The qualitative design used here gener-
ated such data, and was ideal for this type of problem-solving because
of its flexibility. Organizational processes which were covert and sen-
sitive could be teased out in an open process of personal interaction
with the data source. Historical events which shed light on complex or-
ganizational processes could be explored from a variety of perspectives
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by speaking to different actors in the organizational system. Ideas
could be reformulated as the investigation proceeded, and informants
could be selected as needed to throw additional light on confusing situ-
ations. Also, difficult-to-quantify variables such as those explored
here were probably less distorted by a qualitative approach than by a
premature effort to operational ize and quantify them for a survey or ex-
perimental study. Finally, as the project was intended to identify the
most effective ways for CMHC's to engineer their survival, it made sense
to begin by exploring the views of those who were doing a successful job
themselves. A qualitative design allowed such individuals to express
their views more on their own terms, rather than on those of the inves-
ti gator.
Qualitative research has limitations, however, which must be recog-
nized. The data generated from such efforts can be argued to be less
standardized and rigorous in their support of specific hypotheses and
more open to investigator bias. Especially if samples are small, re-
sults can have limited generalizability and may serve mainly as indica-
tions of relationships in need of further investigation. Given the ex-
ploratory nature of this study, such an analysis was expected and appro-
priate. Given a qualitative approach, accurate, precise, and complete
results can still be obtained if proper methods are used, and their
limitations are recognized. For example, in this study multiple
data sources were used to increase support for interpretations, and
minimize investigator bias. Also, the investigator incorporated eval-
uative checks into the research process, by soliciting the feedback
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of colleagues and informants.
The center selection process . The CMHC's selected for this study were
located in New England operating under the jurisdiction of the NIMH Re-
gion I Office. Included in Region I are Connecticut, Maine, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont. At the time of this
study at least seventeen centers in this region were in the advanced
stages of operation (i.e., centers in at least their seventh year of
federal funding). The Region I Office was staffed by a director and
seven project officers, who shared monitoring and consulting responsi-
bilities for the individual centers. Generally, the staff were assigned
centers in a specific state so that they could also be responsible for
working with the respective state mental health authorities.
For the purpose of this study, regional NIMH officials were asked
to assist in the selection of an initial sample of four centers for in-
vestigation. Because of their first-hand knowledge of the centers, and
overall experience in the field, it was assumed that their input would
be extremely valuable. Four centers were selected based on the follow-
ing criteria:
1) The centers should be in the advanced stages of operation
(year seven or higher in federal funding) such that the issues
of self-sufficiency and survival were an ever-present reality.
At least two centers should be graduates from the initial fed-
eral grants. If at all possible, the centers should be free
of federal funds
.
2) The centers should be the relatively most successful oper-
ations in New England in approaching self-sufficiency while
maintaining the basics of the CMHC ideology as outlined in
Chapter I. The centers should rate high in the seventeen pro-
gram quality areas discussed in the "CMHC Monitoring Package"
(DHEW Publication, ADM 534-1, August, 1977) used in NIMH site
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visit reviews of CMHC's across the country. These include:
1) organization/administration, 2) staffing, 3) facilities, 4)
utilization review, 5) provision of requested information, 6)
emergency services, 7) outpatient services, 8) partial hospit-
alization, 9) inpatient services, 10) individualized treatment
plan, 11) range of treatment modalities, 12) continuity of
care, 13) comnunity orientation, 14) visibility, 15) accessi-
bility, 16) preventive services/consultation and education
services, and 17) coordination with other agencies. The cen-
ter directors of these CMHC's should be considered competent
and innovative executives.
3) The centers should represent diversity in management
style, organizational form, environmental characteristics, and
historical development so that their experiences would be in-
teresting and general izable to a variety of center operations.
If possible, both hospital -based and free-standing centers
should be included.
4) The centers should be representative of different states
and different project officers. Also, if possible, they
should be from both rural and urban, and poverty and non-pov-
erty catchment areas.
Once a sample of centers was selected, they were asked to partici-
pate in all phases of the study. During the data collection process,
the centers were explored to determine their strengths and weaknesses in
achieving self-sufficiency while maintaining the CMHC ideology. Data
for determining their relative success came from 1) a review of histori-
cal documents at the center which outlined the domains in which they op-
erated and the strengths and deficiencies in their operations as noted
by the site visit review panels, 2) interviews with the centers' NIMH
project officers in which they were asked to discuss the centers'
strengths and weaknesses and distinguishing characteristics, and 3) in-
terviews with the center directors themselves in which they were asked
to discuss their operations' relative strengths and weaknesses. Such an
analysis based on these data was used to validate and "put into perspec-
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tive" the initial selection of centers based on the judgements of NIMH
officials. As discussed earlier, if this sample had proved to be too
limited to use in this exploratory investigation, additional centers
would have been included at a later point. (See next chapter for char-
acteristics of the centers selected.)
Review of documents
. A variety of documents were reviewed prior to in-
terviewing at the individual centers. Documents from past years and the
present were analyzed to develop a basic understanding of the center and
its evolution, and to identify potentially key adaptive events and or-
ganizational activities in need of further exploration during the inter-
views. At least the following types of documents were studied as avail-
able: 1) NIMH grant applications, 2) NIMH grant review commentary (from
both NIMH reviewers and the respective state officials, 3) annual NIMH
site visit reports, 5) audit reports, 6) CMHC annual reports, 7) CMHC
program descriptions, 8) CMHC policies and procedures manuals, 9) CMHC
long-range planning reports, 10) consultant reports, and 11) other rele-
vant reports, position papers, memos, letters, journal articles, etc.
Notes were taken on all relevant documents so that an initial or-
ganizational history could be constructed, and a listing of potentially
key adaptive events could be made for use in the interviews. Also, a
diary was initiated to record the investigator's involvement with the
organization, and on-going perceptions, feelings and working hypotheses.
This diary was used to develop additional questions for investigation
during stage two, to contribute additional data for the final analysis,
and to develop a greater perspective on the research process used to
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generate data. The diary was continued throughout the investigator's
contact with the individual centers.
Initial interviews
. Once a basic understanding of the center and its
evolution was obtained, semi -structured interviews were conducted indi-
vidually with its 1) center director and 2) NIMH project officer to as-
sess how the center had directed its efforts at achieving self-suffici-
ency while maintaining the basics of the CMHC ideology, and to begin
probing for information related to the propositions discussed earlier.
The process was facilitated by an interview guide (see Appendix A), and
audio-tape recordings and notes were taken to preserve the interaction
for analysis. The interviews took from two to three hours and were
split into separate sessions as needed to accommodate the informants'
schedules. Prior to the interviews, the informants had the purpose of
the study and data collection process explained to them.
The initial interview was fairly open-ended so that the informants'
perceptions of the CMHC's evolution and adaptive behavior could be soli-
cited with as little investigator bias as possible. The informants were
asked to discuss the historical development of the center (past, pres-
ent, future) in relation to its evolving goals, and to recount the most
important actions the organization had taken to improve its chances for
successful self-sufficiency. This approach was taken so that the model
developed in Chapter III could be put in greater perspective and so that
other important activity directed towards successful self-sufficiency
could be uncovered.
As time permitted, a variety of probes were used to tease out
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adaptive behavior related to key historical events which emerged from
the document review or from the interview itself. Also, probes were
used to explore data related to the propositions discussed earlier. At
the close of the session(s) the interview was briefly summarized, and
the informants were asked for feedback so that investigator mispercep-
tions and biases could be identified and corrected.
Follow-up investigation
.
Following the reviews of documents and inter-
views, additional data were collected to explore specific issues which
had emerged from the initial contacts, and to further test and explore
the four propositions. This work varied somewhat from center to center,
but generally involved 1) follow-up interviews and conversations with
the executive director, 2) interviews with key executive staff, 3) fol-
low-up conversations with NIMH personnel, and 4) additional document re-
views. In addition, during the two-month period of data collection, the
investigator attended the Region I Annual Meeting of the National Coun-
cil of CMHC's (October 18-19, 1979, at the Biltmore Plaza Hotel in Pro-
vidence, Rhode Island) during which a major discussion point was the
survival problems of CMHC's, and two of the centers under investigation
gave related presentations. Notes were taken on all relevant discus-
sions and were included in the analysis.
During the follow-up investigation, the investigator presented pre-
liminary results to the dissertation committee for the purpose of deter-
mining what additional data were needed, and whether additional centers
should be examined. The subsequent analysis supported and extended the
research directions under process, and indicated that additional centers
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were not needed for the purposes of this exploratory study.
Data presentation
.
Care has been taken to protect the identities of the
individual centers and NIMH project officers in the data presentation so
that sensitive issues would not emerge to jeopardize the standing of
those involved. For this reason, informant quotations and the discus-
sion of specific events have been kept to a minimum, and at all times
been disguised in the final presentation.
As with any qualitative study some information has been deleted
from the final analysis, and decisions were made as to how this should
be done and how the remaining data should be organized. Information was
included only if it had the clear support of the informants (e.g.
checked out with a number of individuals from different perspectives)
and did not appear to be biased by the investigator. To this end, the
critical comments of all those associated with the study were solicited
for help. Possible areas of bias and data with weak support have been
mentioned where appropriate in the text. The investigator also used the
research diary and feedback of the research advisor to help understand
the decision-making processes which shaped the data collected and data
analysis processes. The influence of these decisions on the study's re-
sults have been explained where appropriate in the text.
Summary . This chapter has presented the design of an exploratory study
of CMHC adaptation which was conducted to build on the conceptual ap-
proach developed in Chapter III and to provide more concrete advice for
center directors struggling with the problems of self-sufficiency. The
study was intended to explore how a sample of four outstanding New En-
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gland CMHC's have attempted to survive and adhere to the basics of the
CMHC ideology after their initial federal funding becomes exhausted.
Four propositions about CMHC survival and adaptation that guided the in-
vestigation were described. These were based on the most important
principles from Chapter III, and include 1) the limitations of CMHC
adaptability, 2) proactivity and the long-range planning process, 3)
long-range strategies commonly used by business organizations, and 4)
organizational structure and stability.
A qualitative research design incorporating intensive interviews as
the principal investigative tool was used to examine the centers' or-
ganizational evolution and adaptive behaviors over time. Questioning
was done with center directors, NIMH project officers, and others which
emerged as critical to the investigation. Data from the interviews and
other investigative tools have been analyzed to clarify and expand upon
the research areas outlined earlier. Care has been taken throughout the
process of investigation and analysis to insure that the results would
be as useful and unbiased as possible.
The study presented here was limited in that the issues covered
were selective and no one issue was explored in depth. Also, the study
was designed to investigate the operations of only a small sample of
centers from one region of the country. In spite of its limitations,
the study does represent an exciting first step in the exploration of
adaptation issues in CMHC's, and it touches upon the most important is-
sues raised in the preceding chapters. The next chapter presents the
findings of this study. This is followed by a final chapter which dis-
cusses the implications of these findings for center directors an
others in the field, and suggests directions for future research.
CHAPTER V
ACHIEVING SUCCESSFUL SELF-SUFFICIENCY:
THE ADAPTIVE ACTIVITIES OF FOUR OUTSTANDING CMHC'S
The preceding chapter described the design of a study of four out-
standing CMHC'S in New England which was conducted to 1) clarify and en-
rich the model of environmental management discussed earlier, 2) provide
examples of successful survival strategies to other center directors in
the field, and 3) generate questions for future research on CMHC adapta-
tion. This chapter presents the major findings of this project. The
first section includes an overview of the four centers that were se-
lected for investigation. The brief description of their organizational
characteristics and achievements is intended to provide a context for
the results which follow, and to show that the centers were indeed out-
standing organizations worthy of investigation. This is followed by a
review of the major findings of the study within a discussion of the
four research propositions outlined earlier. The chapter concludes with
a discussion of the common developmental themes which emerged from an
analysis of the centers' adaptive efforts over time.
Overview of the CMHC ' s selected for investigation . The four centers se-
lected for the study were diverse, representing four different states
and three different NIMH project officers. Both free-standing and hos-
pital-based centers were included, and the centers were from both rural
and urban areas. Unfortunately none of the centers were located in of-
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ficially designated poverty areas under current NIMH guidelines. How-
ever, all were from poor areas, and some qualified as poverty centers
under previous guidelines. Catchment areas serviced by the four centers
varied in size, and were relatively small overall (mean population just
under 100,000 people). Ethnic groups served were predominantly white,
yet included several different minority groups (including Blacks, Span-
ish-speaking, and French-speaking) that required the use of specialized
programs. One of the centers in particular was known for its innovative
efforts in reaching the minority community. Thus, even though the sam-
ple selected was small, the group did include a relatively diverse group
with most NIMH organizational priorities represented.
In order to serve their residents, the centers had developed fairly
extensive budgets over the years. At the time of the study annual bud-
gets averaged approximately 1.8 million dollars per center. Support was
broad, with federal, state, and third-party sources combining for eighty
to ninety percent of each organization's budget. Other grants, local
funds, foundations, donations, and other sources (e.g. consulting con-
tracts) made up the difference, with the contribution of each varying
widely from center to center. As is typical. in most CMHC's today, state
and third-party sources were steadily increasing in importance, with
other funds being sought to fill in gaps and provide support for innova-
tive and marginal programs. Because of the rapidly decreasing federal
share, state and third-party sources were seen as the most viable and
stable means of support, in spite of their obvious limitations for main-
taining a well-rounded CMHC program.
As was required for the study, all of the centers were in the ad-
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vanced stages of operation such that self-sufficiency was a major pri-
ority. Two of the centers were graduates of their initial CMHC grants
and the others were in their seventh or eighth year. Unfortunately,
none of the centers were "true graduates," completely free of federal
money at the time of the study. As was expected based on the results of
studies by Weiner ejt al_. (1979) and Wasserman et al_. (1980), it was dif-
ficult to find centers completely free of federal funds that were still
upholding the virtues of the comprehensive CMHC program. Rather than
compromise the criterion of programmatic success, a decision was made to
compromise the desire for center fiscal autonomy. ATI of the centers
selected were aware that their CMHC dollars were short-lived, however,
and considered self-sufficiency an important priority. All were cur-
rently struggling to achieve self-sufficiency and maintain the CMHC ide-
ology and by all reports would be relatively successful at both when
their federal funds expired. This was substantiated to some degree for
at least one of the centers. Six months following data collection it
lost the remainder of its initial CMHC grants and was able to secure
stable funds to replace them.
This choice-point reached in the study is. indicative of a major
problem in the CMHC program and represents an important finding in and
of itself. The sad fact is that current funding systems impose severe
limitations on the survivability of comprehensive CMHC's. Without the
buffer of flexible federal funds, many centers must compromise the CMHC
ideology in order to survive. As will be seen, though, the centers in
this study have been able to push the limits imposed by their difficult
funding environments. Through a combination of tenacity and the use of
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sound management practices, these centers have been able to at least ap-
proximate the ideals of self-sufficiency as it was originally intended.
Thus, in spite of difficulties and frequent struggling, at least a few
CMHC's seem to be able to survive. Much can be learned from their ef-
forts, even though improvements at a broader systems level are obviously
needed.
In spite of their current dependence on some federal support (i.e.
not completely self-sufficient), the centers in this study were clearly
among the most successful overall operations in New England. All main-
tained the comprehensive services and had contingency plans to keep them
in place when their federal funds expired (even though cutbacks and com-
promises might be necessary in some cases). Any minor deficiencies in
their operations were under scrutiny, and with the assistance of NIMH
officials, were being improved. Success was also indicated by their
consistent expansion and budget growth over the years.
The center directors and staff interviewed were all bright, compet-
ent, and well-credentialed individuals. All had distinguished them-
selves locally, statewide, regionally, and in most cases nationally as
leaders in community mental health matters. All were involved in a va-
riety of significant planning groups and task forces, and were asked to
present their ideas from time to time at conferences. Additionally, all
had been asked to consult regularly to their peers on CMHC management
concerns. Two had also published in mental health journals, and most
were involved in other teaching and training activities.
While all of the centers studied were similar in terms of their
overall goals, tasks, and accomplishments, each was unique in its situa-
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tion (i.e. environment and history)
and the ways in which it had
achieved success. Some had grown from
established organizations with
long reputable histories. Others had
grown from shakier beginnings,
marked by changing leadership in the mental
health community and early
failures to satisfy the public. Of the
center directors interviewed,
most had joined their agencies during problematic
periods within the
past few years. Only one had been in a
position to provide steady lead-
ership over a long period of time. In
spite of this, all of the center
directors had been able to bring maturity,
strength, and steadiness to
their organizations, allowing them to develop
and succeed in a number of
ways in recent years
.
Within the small sample of CMHC's, all three
of the successful
adaptive styles discussed by Miles and Snow (1978)
were represented to
at least some extent. One of the centers
was clearly "prospector"-like
,
being a major innovator, particularly in management areas.
The director
and staff were constantly searching out new
markets to enter and new
methods for improving the quality and efficiency
of service delivery.
Many other centers had adopted its innovations,
and it was often refer-
red to by others as the "prototype New
England CMHC." Two other centers
were clearly "analyzer" -like. While these
centers were not innovators
themselves, they were very flexible to new
ideas and were quick to adopt
those which they felt would be helpful to
their causes. Each maintained
a carefulness in its approach to innovation
and strived for a well-
rounded, quality operation. The remaining
center had "defender"-like
characteristics but was more of a hybrid of
styles, containing both
prospector and defender qualities. On the
one hand, this center had
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maintained stable state funding for services, and was able to operate
more routinely than most, striving for efficiency and quality. However,
the center was also an active experimenter, advancing many new ap-
proaches to service delivery and organization, and actively involved in
trying to alter its external environment.
All in all, the centers in this sample did show strengths as out-
standing CMHC's and were relatively successful in approaching self-suf-
ficiency while maintaining the basics of the CMHC ideology. Further-
more, they showed diversity in situation and organizational style which
was helpful for the purposes of this study. As well be seen in the re-
mainder of this chapter, a number of adaptive strategies and activities
have been used by the centers which should be helpful to a broad range
of CMHC's elsewhere. The next section discusses findings related to the
first, and most general, proposition of the study. As was mentioned
earlier, analysis has shown that because of environmental difficulties,
there have been real limits to the center directors' abilities to im-
prove their organizations' programmatic and fiscal viability. However,
through a combination of tenacity and the use of sound management prac-
tices, these individuals have pushed such. limits and made significant
accomplishments. The next section discusses the limits they have
reached, and in general terms, the methods they have used to try to
overcome them.
Proposition One : Limitations . There are major limitations on
the survivability of CMHC's given the CMHC regulations and
their restricted funding opportunities. However, successful
CMHC's develop ways to circumvent the majority of these con-
straints, maximizing their ability to move into the most luc-
rative markets available, and intervene at a government level
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to lessen whatever constraints they can. When limiting points
are reached, successful centers sacrifice the quantity rather
than the quality or range of services delivered.
As indicated above, everyone associated with this study agreed
overwhelmingly that CMHC's were in a very difficult survival position.
Government regulations, lack of funding system coordination, reimburse-
ments not linked to actual costs, unrealistic funding demands, market
restrictions, and environmental unpredictability were all discussed as
part of the problem. The following quotations from participants helped
illustrate their concerns and frustration.
One of the things you have to realize is that most of what
we're doing we have to do. We don't have the freedom at the
present time to do many other things. We operate now under
all sorts of constraints by the feds and state. We have a
sense of strategies, but we also have a sense of tremendous
constraints under which we're working. It makes it very dif-
ficult to maximize the kinds of efforts that I think we're
capable of. If we were in private business I'd do a lot of
things differently. There are a lot of activities which are
just bad deals financially. We'd do them differently if we
could. At some point they are going to have to let up. They
can't keep saying you have to serve everyone who can't pay,
unless they will pick up those costs. They aren't doing it
now, but still require us to serve everybody, and too often
we get guilt-tripped into doing it (Center Director).
Stability is very difficult in CMHC's because the suppliers of
funds are governed by year-to-year arrangements. Even with
the state, it's on a year-to-year basis because of political
changes in governors, mental health officials and legislators.
Unfortunately it's difficult for them to engage in long-range
planning and contracts. Every legislature seems to start at
ground-zero. They are not at all committed to anything parti-
cularly with zero-based budgeting becoming popular. I've got-
ten on state mental health planning committees so that I can
influence that aspect of our environment. The problem is that
we come up with a plan that puts CMHC's as the top funding com-
mitment, and a new governor or legislature can say, "Forget
the mental health plan." Because they don't have to buy the




In spite of the frustrations, the centers in this sample were able
to circumvent the majority of these constraints, and at least cover the
basic services required by NIMH (although cutbacks might be needed in
the future). As mentioned earlier, one was able to cover all of its
lost CMHC money with other stable funds by the time of this writing.
While several factors were involved in their relative success, a few
general issues emerged as particularly important. These included the
following matters:
1 ) A comnitment to the CMHC ideology . Perhaps the most obvious
funding in the study involved the strength of character and ideals of
those associated with the centers. All were knowledgeable of the CMHC
program, committed to its basic principles, and persistent in their pur-
suit of excellence in their work. All had a tenacious quality that
helped them fight through challenges and suffer through setbacks in or-
der to further the causes of their agencies. Such spirit is expressed
in the quotation below.
To stay in this business you've got to be on the hustle and
have a commitment to the task of CMHC's. The successful di-
rectors are always out there working their angle. You've also
got to be strong-willed and thick-skinned. In community de-
velopment work your proposals are always going to be rejected
when you first bring them up. Later, if you're persistent
they'll probably be accepted. It was pretty frustrating until
I figured out that it's just the way things work (Center Di-
rector)
.
This is not to say that the center directors were overzealous
idealists, championing causes at the drop of a hat. They were all com-
plex individuals with a highly pragmatic attitude about their work.
Sometimes their actions were unpopular, and appeared compromising, self-
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centered, or calculated to others around them. For example, funds may
be used for additional purposes other than that specifically stated by
funding sources to fill an important service gap. While such an approach
might appear dishonest and manipulative to some, the center director
viewed such action as a necessary and pragmatic approach to further CMHC
ideals until other, more appropriate means could be found. In the end,
they hoped that others would see the consistency of their actions, their
strength of character, and obvious commitment to CMHC's. For without
this corrmitment, each could have left their jobs long ago for equally








bute of the respondents involved their thoroughness and maturity as
leaders. Each recognized that developing a successful organization
takes time and must be looked upon as a carefully 1 aid-out, continually
fine-tuned developmental effort. All had established personal and or-
ganizational goals to accomplish during their tenure, and had been in
the process of carefully working through them over time. As will be
discussed later, all were thorough planners and implementors
,
insuring
that every possible issue was explored around a particular problem. As
one of the center directors stated, "managing a successful organization
requires proactivity, not impulsi vity.
"
3) Realism . A closely related attribute of those interviewed in-
cluded their constant awareness of the limitations of their situation
and the problems of current funding systems. Thus, they worked hard
within those markets (i.e. funding sources) they could exercise some
control and generate steady income, and practiced restraint in those
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which were problematic. The centers would fight to open up funds
for services they felt were important to the community, however, and
would subtly manipulate the use of funds they did have so that needed
services could be covered. At some point, though, they knew when to
stop beating their heads against the wall. In addition, they were
reluctant to greedily take on new service programs and additional
federal money unless they could realistically assure that pick-up
would be available, or that the programs could easily be phased in
and out of existence. Some aspects of this important orientation
are reflected in the following quotation:
Some centers make the mistake of continuing to provide
services (because of their perceptions of community needs)
even when they lose money on it. The successful ones,
like the ones in your study, say here's the need, here's
the service, here's what I can do for you--Is there a mar-
ket? If not, then they say fine and take it elsewhere to
try to sell it, or give it up until the market is better.
Many centers keep it going long after it doesn't work.
Then they have problems because there's no money to sup-
port it and they can't do a good enough job to sell it
to others (NIMH Project Officer).
4) A professional approach to management . As mentioned earli-
er, the CMHC staff interviewed here were able to push the .limits of
their problematic environments mainly through a combination of tena-
city and the use of sound management practices. While their spirited
nature kept them going, it was often their professional orientation
and management wisdom that pulled them through. Although none of
the center directors were originally educated as mental health ad-
ministrators, each regarded the field as a specialty requiring train-
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ing, on-going learning, and a professional attitude. All had done
extensive individual work to learn their profession and had found
ways to continually upgrade their skills. Such efforts included the
use of independent readings, external training, discussions with
colleagues, conferences, and occasional sessions with organization
development consultants. To a greater or lesser degree, all incor-
porated their thoughts into self-guiding conceptual frameworks. In
sum, they took their managerial work seriously, thought about it as
a specialty, and tried to learn from their efforts to improve them
over time.
5. The CMHC as a large corporation . An important part of the
professional orientation discussed above concerns how the center
directors chose to view their organizations. Particularly for the
free-standing centers, the organization was looked upon as a large
mental health corporation rather than as another public service
agency. This distinction was important in that it highlighted at
least two critical concerns for those involved. First of all, it
emphasized the reality of self-sufficiency and the need for the CMHC
to assume responsibility for charting its own course. Unlike in
most public service agencies, financial solvency needed to be devel-
oped at an agency and staff level . Success was dependent on the ef-
forts of everyone involved to develop quality services and cultivate
the necessary markets within which they could be supported.
Secondly, the corporate orientation emphasized the necessity
of developing a sophisticated management approach which used up-to-
date management technology. Thus, the center directors here had al-
ready begun to look to the corporate world for ideas to improve thei
operations. Of special interest were techniques in financial manage
ment and accounting. As will be discussed later in the section on
"buffering," the free-standing centers in particular had developed
considerable expertise in using acceptable accounting principles to
maintain surplus funds for cash flow, etc. Also of paramount impor-
tance was the use of computerized MIS to monitor the organization's
performance, fine-tune its operation, and provide valuable data to
support arguments in the political arena. At least these two tech-
nical areas were noted by all as crucial to the viability of center
operations
.
6) Fine-tuning internal operations . Along similar lines, the
centers in this sample were very concerned with developing a finely-
tuned internal operation that was free of "fat", energetic, and
characterized by solid teamwork. While the remainder of this paper
will concentrate on external management concerns, it should be noted
that the center directors have spent considerable time insuring that
their internal organization was top-notch. Competent staff were
hired and cultivated as responsible professionals, organizational
structures were reworked as needed, MIS was used to monitor perform-
ance, and procedures were standardized and reinforced to insure con-
sistency. As will be discussed later, the free-standing centers in
particular had developed sophisticated plans for monitoring and
maximizing their third-party reimbursements and fee collections.
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Those interviewed noted that too many center directors fail in the
long-run because they spend so much time on the "hustle" to build
their empire that they never develop a quality product which can
continue on its own. They attributed their success to an appropri-
ate balance and synchronization of internal and external activities.
7) The use of environmental management practices
.
Finally,
as expected, the findings have indicated that most of the adaptation
principles and strategies outlined in Chapter III were used at least
intuitively by the center directors, and thus were instrumental in
their success. Furthermore, the basic conceptual model as outlined
earlier appeared to have significant merit as a guiding framework
for those in the field. All tnose associated with the study who re-
viewed the model found it useful, if nothing else as putting into
perspective many of the activities they were already performing. Of
particular importance to them were issues concerning 1) diversifica-
tion and other buffering strategies, 2) environmental scanning and
long-range contingency planning, 3) the use of coalitions and boards
of directors in lobbying, and 4) as mentioned above, the synchroni-
zation of external and internal management activity. These and
other activities will be discussed in greater depth later in the
report.
In sum, the center directors in this study have been successful
in circumventing the majority of environmental constraints they have
faced, through a combination of tenacity and the use of sound man-
agement principles. Before moving on to the other three research
propositions and more specifics, it should be noted that each of the
center directors also described situations in which they were not
able to eliminate constraints and were forced to make compromises.
As was predicted, when such limiting points were reached, these suc-
cessful centers did whatever possible to sacrifice the quantity
rather than the quality or range of services delivered. And, as
would be expected from the previous discussion, they did whatever
possible to turn their immediate crises into opportunities to advance
the causes of their agencies and lobbying interests. The following
represent some of the important approaches used by these centers to
face uncontrollable funding losses and other limiting situations:
1) Implement a contingency plan . A crucial point, as will be
discussed later, is that the center directors here were rarely
caught by surprise in the difficult situations they faced. While
the situations were never looked forward to, they were anticipated
as realistic possibilities which must be thought through. Thus, in
the event of what felt like total disaster, the centers had a gen-
eral plan to implement. This plan provided at least some comfort
and control to the situation, and helped prevent it from deteriorat- .
ing further.
2) Retreat and protect the core services . Because of their
commitment to the CMHC ideology, the center directors have considered
the preservation of that ideology as a top priority. Cutbacks and
reorganization would keep at least the basic service elements and
orientations intact, until such point as more ideal ways of imple-
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meriting them could be developed with new funds. At least a few openings
were always kep for non-reimbursable clients.
3) Emphasize income-producing services and staff . Faced wi th the
reality of cutbacks, the centers were forced to emphasize those services
and staff which could generate income to support themselves. Thus, cer-
tain CMHC services for which there were no currently available funds
would have to be given short shrift until such funds could be generated.
As implied above, arrangements would be made to bury such services with-
in reimbursible ones, but their quantity and ideal quality would have to
be sacrificed. While the centers did not like to make such compromises,
they realized the reality of the situation, faced it head-on, and made
the best of it they could by emphasizing areas of fiscal strength. At
least by emphasizing their strengths, they had the opportunity to glean
support for other needed services. In such situations most relied heav-
ily upon more stable state or third-party sources of funds. As men-
tioned earlier, each had developed sophisticated mechanisms to monitor
and maximize third-party collections to help provide cushions for situa-
tions such as these. Furthermore, some had developed plans for reducing
services to those levels where income reached a certain acceptable per- .
centage of operating costs.
4) Turn the crisis into an opportunity . While no limiting situa-
tion was ever looked upon favorably, the center directors here tried to
look at each in as positive a way as possible. Generally they were able
to get at least public relations and lobbying mileage out of the situa-
tion. In some cases they even realized unforseen benefits. For exam-
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pie, one center director used the "opportunity" of funding losses to em-
phasize funding system problems to legislators and community members.
Because of his contingency planning, he remained in control of the situ-
ation internally, maintained credibility externally, and mounted a pub-
lic relations effort pointing out specific governmental problems that
were leading to specific service compromises. He also used the situa-
tion to improve and tighten internal operations in ways which he stated
were probably needed anyway (if not to that extent, however). Manage-
ment and staff were reduced and reoriented, and renewed vigor was placed
in such areas as maximizing reimbursements and diversifying resources.
As a side benefit, the center increased its respect and credibility in
the community and developed improved relations with other agencies who
had once regarded it as an elitist "empire builder." People were im-
pressed with the manner in which such a difficult and sensitive situa-
tion was handled, and were sympathetic to the center's plight. Also,
somewhat surprisingly, staff pulled together during the crisis and main-
tained a positive, forward-looking attitude. From all reports, it ap-
peared that earlier team-building efforts and the sensitive way in which
the situation was handled paid off with higher than expected staff mor-
ale.
5) Rely on others for assistance and support . A final, yet impor-
tant observation was that all of the center directors here sought out
the assistance and support of others during difficult situations. They
recognized that crises limited their vision and took a toll on their own
mental health. In order to improve their decisions and reduce their
chances for "executive burnout" they looked to individuals such as their
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NIMH project officers, peers, outside consultants, boards of directors,
and in particular, their middle management staff.
In concluding this discussion of the first research proposition, it
can be said that for these four CMHC's the following statements held
true: 1) major limitations on the CMHC's adaptive capabilities were^ ex-
perienced as debilitating; 2) through a combination of tenacity and the
use of sound management principles, most of these limitations were ci r-
cumvented; and 3) when uncontrollable limiting points were reached,
the center directors involved did their best to minimize their effect on
the CMHC ideology, and use them as an opportunity to further the cause
of their agencies and ideals. As mentioned earlier, an important con-
tribution to the center directors' success here was their use of the
management principles discussed in Chapter III. Of utmost importance
was their ability to be proactive and forward-thinking even in the face
of adversity, and to have developed contingency plans for handling
problems that would occasionally arise. Such is the topic of discussion
in the next section of this chapter.
Proposition Two ; Proactivity . A key to successful survival
management in CMHC's is the center director's ability to main-
tain a proactive organizational stance in an ever-changing and
highly complex environment. Successful CMHC's develop long-
range planning processes that allow them to predict future
trends and make long-range contingency plans upon which short-
term actions designed to change the environment itself as well
as those to respond to immediate or anticipated demands.
Everyone associated with the study agreed that one of the keys to
achieving continued success as a CMHC is the ability to be proactive and
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forward- thinking. All agreed that over time these centers had demon-
strated the ability to be proactive in at least an anticipatory sense.
They were able to keep abreast of funding opportunities and environment-
al changes that were materializing down the road, and gear their opera-
tions to adapt to and take advantage of them. Furthermore, because of
their credibility they were often included as policy advisors by state
and federal mental health officials. Thus, they were in a position to
influence if not shape future policy in ways that would further their
agencies and ideals. The following six quotations highlight several
different important aspects of proactivity as discussed in the inter-
views .
Maintaining a proactive approach is the major thing that has
gotten us through. We decided what we wanted, recognized the
realities that were around and established our position right
off. Credibility is one of the largest contributing factors.
We were never in a defensive posture. We never cried when we
were in trouble. We recognized the larger set of constraints
and asked for just our fair share, and showed that we could do
it. Also, we have known ourselves. The organization has to
know its finances and operations. It cannot let outsiders in-
terpret its data for it. It must be able to evaluate itself.
The minute you lose that control you're open to outsiders in-
terpreting it and using it in some way that can get you into
trouble. It's not to say you should be dishonest. That will
come back to haunt you quickly. You just have to be in con-
trol of it (Center Director).
You've got to have an early idea of what's coming down. We
were the first in this state to develop an MIS. I went to a
management training program where I picked up a number of
these things. Early in the game we learned that MIS was im-
portant and could pay off for you in many ways down the road.
It's not been because we're so smart and always know what to
do, but it's because we could pick up and use what others were
doing. You've got to know the context of what you're working
in. You've got"to have that sense that you'd better get mov-
ing, even if you can't really predict what's coming down. A
lot of center directors don't have that vision, that sense of
alertness to their periphery (Center Director).
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We're not as proactive as I'd like to be, but we're more pro-
active than others. On at least a year-to-year basis we set
goals for movement and as systematically as possible move
towards them. We do have a clear sense of where we want to
go. I guess it's middle-range to long-range planning. The
crisis stuff is fun from an ego point-of-view, but after
awhile if you're really committed to an organization it gets
in the way (Center Director).
Being proactive also involves taking some risks. We look at
them as investments. We'll sink some money into the develop-
ment of a program that can't pull its weight initially to de-
velop a market that we think will pay off down the line. Our
program was done that way. We got into that field early
because of community needs and so we could build a prototype
program to corner the market. Because of its success, we are
now able to use it to help back other marginal programs (Cen-
ter Director)
.
Proactivity, and long-range planning has been a key to this
center's success. Their director sees it as a high priority
and puts a lot of energy into it so that problems are antici-
pated and worked on proactively so that major difficulties
don't come up. This center does it far more than others.
Their director is very skilled in keeping abreast and ahead of
funding possibilities. He's out there planning actively with
us and the state, spending a lot of time looking to what might
be coming down the road. He's taken an active role lobbying
with respect to state and local appropriations (NIMH Project
Officer).
Both centers we've discussed are very proactive. is
proactive in a defensive kind of way. They can anticipate
problems down the road and deal with them, but they aren't
proactive like the other in saying: "How can we move out po-
sitively in this area, this area, and this area? What can we
do that would be fun and make money for the center?" They re-
spond by identifying roadblocks and finding ways to eliminate
them. Ideally centers should do both (NIMH Project Officer).
As the preceding quotations illustrate, proactivity was an impor-
tant issue for the centers in this sample. All those interviewed felt
it was important to take the time to look ahead, keep an eye out to the
periphery, plan carefully to direct and control the future, and invest
in some risks with pay-off potential. The ability to remain proactive
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was enhanced by the centers' abilities to 1) demonstrate credibility in
the environment, 2) maintain an attitude of confidence and forward-
thinking even during crises, and 3) develop internal security and sta-
bility, so that risks could be comfortably taken. Also important were
the professional experiences of the center directors.
A center with a healthier history has more time to explore
different areas and plan ahead. Up until just recently we've
had to spend time being purely reactive. Now we've cleaned up
our operation, developed some credibility, and gotten on firm-
er financial ground so we can be proactive and take some risks.
I think a center needs to get at least 50% of its operations
funded through stable sources. The rest it can generate from
softer areas. Less than 50%, and chasing bucks becomes such a
priority that the quality of services declines or you lose the
psychic energy to be creative and take risks. At this point,
most centers feel too insecure to take the necessary risks.
You've got to have the energy to keep exploring. Part of the
problem is the structure of funding and part is the quality of
leadership (Center Director).
The experiences a center director brings to the job are cri-
tical here. For example, has had a variety of experi-
ences with many aspects of mental health. He's done clinical
work, he's worked in CMHC's before, he's worked for the state,
he's gone to school to conceptualize what he's doing, and he's
spent a lot of time here with us and in Washington. Because
of his experience in several different roles he sees a much
bigger picture than most and he can sniff out issues. He
knows how things develop because he's been there (NIMH Project
Officer).
As predicted, the centers studied here maintained their proactivity
by using many of the environmental scanning and long-range planning
techniques discussed in Chapter III. Such techniques were highly for-
malized in only one of the centers, but were used at least in basic
principle in the other three. As predicted, scanning was performed pri-
marily by the center director with considerable assistance from key
staff and board members. For those within a hospital base, scanning was
166
often done in conjunction with key hospital personnel. Also as pre-
dicted, informal mechanisms were considered more valuable than formal
ones. However, as will be discussed later, one center director was ex-
perimenting with formal marketing approaches to data collection. Final-
ly, scanning data were collected with regard to improving services as
well as financial viability. The following quotations help illustrate
the points touched upon here.
I try to stay active on a variety of fronts, NIMH and the
state in particular. I have a lot of contacts in the state
and in Washington. I earned some credibility in the past and
I've tried to maintain my contacts. I get invited to a lot of
meetings and make every effort to go to things that keep me in
touch on a state and national level. I talk to people pri-
vately and get a private sense of what's happening because I'm
respected and trusted. I get a lot of things that don't get
in print--the behind-the-scenes view. I do the same at the
regional office (NIMH) with both our project officer and all
the others. The information I get you often can't do much
about because it's all perceptions and people really don't know
what's going to happen--even those within the system. The
best it can do is sensitize you to what may happen and what
options you have. It gets you thinking and lets you know how
the system works. I've been around so long that I develop a
sixth sense sometimes, I know what's going on and what's go-
ing to go on. I can bring some predictability into the situa-
tion so that everyone feels more at ease. You can see a whole
lot of things going on and you don't react to any one thing.
You don't chase rabbits! You see their interrelationships and
you focus your energy on those things that need to happen
first to reduce the confusion and get things on track. You
don't chase symptoms. You look beyond them to the roots of
the problem (Center Director).
Organizationally we have a lot of people doing this and we
meet often to communicate. Internal people are involved with
pieces of the environment depending upon their program and
constituencies. Some have more autonomy than others depending
upon the nature of their funding source and their maturity.
Some funding sources are fairly separate in the state and it
makes sense to have them handled separately (Center Director).
It's difficult to identify technical modes that we've used to
scout out information from the environment. It's more of an
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attitude, a set of expectations, a set that you ask the people
you're working with to have. We strive to be on planning com-
mittees or in any other position where the action is. It's
very important. We strive to be in positions where we have
access to information and can be influential. When we don't,
we usually pay the price. I was once in a position in the
state to put people on various planning committees. A crucial
comnittee on funding was to be formed and I put three others
on it--not myself. They were coming from different places and
we got in trouble with their recommendations. My generosity
killed me. It's very important to be where your interests are
being dealt with so you can influence them (Center Director).
Long-range contingency planning was a crucial activity for the cen-
ters here, particularly for the free-standing ones, and particularly in
preparation for the loss of federal funds. Planning techniques varied
in formality from center to center, but contained several general attri-
butes that appeared important to their success. These included at least
the following characteristics:
1 ) Plans were dri ven by programmati c needs , and tempered by fiscal
realities
. As implied earlier, center staff began the planning process
by looking at their programs and determining how best they should devel-
op. Such assessments were based on experience, needs assessments, and
the CMHC ideology. In close order, a budget assessment was conducted,
examining current and future incomes and expenditures. Options were ex-
plored for maintaining and improving internal efficiency and program
quality, and for generating additional revenue from a variety of poten-
tial sources. Probabilities of success were approximated for the op-
tions and contingency plans were drafted. Efforts were then directed
towards securing the most attractive and realistic options.
2) Planning decisions were based on sound data . As discussed ear-
lier, center directors in this study were extremely thorough in their
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approaches to problems. Thus, a variety of data from different sources
were used in making planning decisions. MIS data were crucial with re-
spect to matters of internal effectiveness and efficiency. Environment-
al scanning data and the input of board members and staff were also
used, particularly around political matters. Important issues were re-
searched and discussed over months before decisions were made. No for-
mal decision-making techniques or grids were employed, but decisions
were well thought-out just the same (as the following quotation de-
scribes).
We've laid out a plan for FY 82 in which we pull together and
examine all of the variables and options we can see right now,
rating them according to the extent to which they have a de-
gree of viability that we can be clear on. And that's neces-
sary at this time because for instance we don't know if there
will be a per capita formula from the feds. We have to lay
out the groundwork for, and set a number of alternative op-
tions so that a year from now we'll know pretty much from
among three or four different alternatives what we'll be do-
ing. Central to part of this will be to set up the options
we want to see happen. Initially I want to see what differ-
ent staff can come up with. For instance right now I want to
know how much it costs to operate each unit of service. I
want to know how many billable service units they provide-
how is time spent?--can we get more billable units or less?—
what are the problems? I want to look at collections, the
patterns of the patient population and their potential for
various reimbursement options.
Right now the problem is pulling together the best possible
information you can get—what we're faced with is a loss of a
lot of dollars which is an emotional kind of thing that's
scary. But to understand what can be done about it is going
to be a function of how much accurate information we can get
about a whole lot of things that we have to pull together, as-
semble and organize in a way that is of use to us. Approach-
ing that in an inductive system, you pull together a lot of
things, then hope something will begin to fall out of it.
First we've got to get what we know now, then examine each
area for information that we need to seek out. For example,
I know there's a lot going on in Congress now. I want to find
out what the latest positions are on key issues affecting men-
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tal health. It's nothing magical, just a process of checking
all kinds of options, influencing decisions where you can with
your board president, access to legislators, etc. But you
need data on where you stand so you can talk to issues and say
exactly how much money you need, and where exactly the critical
problems are with current legislation. I want to be able to
talk in specifics (Center Director).
3) Staff were invol ved in the planning process i n a^ structured
way
.
In order to improve the quality and implementation of planning de-
cisions, the center directors in this sanple relied heavily on group-
problem solving techniques. Staff were included in a variety of ways,
but all had clear roles and responsibilities delegated to them. One of
the center directors used formal Management by Objectives (MBO) tech-
niques, while the others used informal variations on its basic theme.
Extensive group problem-solving sessions were held by all, and one cen-
ter director had institutionalized regular management retreats where e;<-
tensive, uninterrupted planning could be done. While such planning took
time and risked keeping staff too informed, all agreed that it was worth
the effort. As one center director put it, "There's a delicate balance
of keeping people informed without letting them get too worried or de-
pressed. If you can show strength and keep the balance, you get a lot
of pay-off in effective teamwork."
4) Plans included clear goals and objectives . In all cases, the
center directors here developed plans with clear goals and objectives
and at least yearly milestones to monitor progress. Important goals
were often organized around grand themes that might extend over three-
to five-year periods of time. In one case goals and objectives were
documented in an MBO fashion so that they could be checked closely over
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a period of years. The importance of this approach is highlighted by
the comments of the following NIMH project officer.
The key thing did was to formalize things internally and
where they were headed. He wrote things down with his board
and staff. He had clear goals and objectives on paper from
the beginning. He began his tenure with a clear contract and
an agreed-upon five-year plan. More important than what was
written was the fact that it was written. It may look silly,
but it helps build a consensus in an organization. He got
them involved. He was able to manage crises, yet think ahead
to the future. He had plans in mind in which he could place
the crises and use them to his advantage--one, two, three
years down the road. Again, everything was documented. He
had a plan on paper and he checked himself to see where he was
going (NIMH Project Officer).
5) Plans contained goals with multiple pay-off possibility . Be-
cause of thorough data gathering and creative problem-solving, the cen-
ter directors here usually developed plans with multiple pay-off possi-
bility. For ejcample, very early in its history, one center invested in
an MIS knowing that later it would produce comprehensive data for improv-
ing efficiency, informing funding sources, and lobbying at a state level.
Also, if they were lucky they could sell their data system to other cen-
ters. Another center chose to look for a particular grant, not only for
the immediate revenue it would bring in, but because the accompanying
regulations would force needed reorganization and diversification that
would pay-off down the road. Another center chose to go after a re-
search grant, again not only for the immediate revenue, but for its po-
tential long-range benefits. If successful , the grant would also 1) im-
prove the agency's credibility in the research area (i.e., improve
chances for further research money), 2) help the center corner the mar-
ket on research and consulting money in an exciting new area for CMHC's,
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and 3) help the center test out and improve its own skills in an impor-
tant administrative area, thus improving its chances for continued sur-
vival. In sum, the centers here were planning for the immediate and
distant future simultaneously. They had long-range goals in mind, and
used their creative spirit to incorporate short-range opportunities
within tKem. Also, the more "birds" they could kill with one stone, the
better.
6) Plans contained contingency options . As described earlier, the
centers here prepared themselves for unexpected developments and prob-
lematic situations. Contingency plans were drawn up and in most cases
were written down. Extensive work was done to insure that preferred
goals would be accomplished, but less preferred outcomes and unexpected
calamities were always prepared for as possibilities. As one center di-
rector phrased it, "Contingency planning is crucial because with so many
environments that are always changing their stance, you never know
what's going to happen." The following quotation also serves to illus-
trate this issue.
With all our funding attempts we calculated a percentage of
success, and developed contingencies. During this time we had
four plans, all weighted, and we chose the best option to meet
our needs. We guessed within 5% of what the state finally
gave us. We decreased our obligation in another area which
left us only $75,000-80,000 to balance. All we wanted was
either of the two federal grants we had applied for, both and
we'd be golden. We gambled on the conservative side and built
our budget around the smaller grant. We ended up getting the
other so we were better than expected. Now we're going through
the same sort of ballgame again. We only expect to sacrifice
one important position and we're trying to reorganize and find
some new funding for that as well (Center Director).
7) Plans were implemented with good timing. The ways in which
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plans were implemented were crucial to their success. As implied earli-
er, the center directors here all had a sense of pace, restraint, and
political astuteness that helped them take advantage of difficult situa-
tions and move towards their long-range goals gradually over a period of
years. Actions were chosen carefully and movement was made when the
time was right. In this way, greater proactivity and direction were
maintained, and specific actions usually produced greater mileage.
In concluding the discussion of this second research proposition,
it is evident that the ability to remain proactive and engage in long-
range contingency planning was crucial to the continued viability of the
CMHC's in this sample. Such planning, based on a thorough knowledge of
the external environment and internal operations, helped the centers
prepare for the loss of federal funds and turn most crises into oppor-
tunities. In all cases, planning was a carefully structured team activ-
ity that improved the quality of planning decisions and the morale and
enthusiasm of those involved. The next section of this chapter explores
findings related to the third research proposition. Here the use of
specific adaptive strategies outlined in Chapter III is discussed.
Proposition Three : Long-Ran ge Strategies . In order to be
proactive and gain more control over their environments, suc-
cessful CMHC's use various long-range adaptive strategies com-
monly employed by organizations in the business world. In-
cluded to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon their
situation, are the following activities:
1) Marketing--Successful CMHC's read the needs and opportun-
ities of the marketplace (both consumer and funding source)
and adjust their services to match these.
2) Advertising--Successful CMHC's "sell" their services to
consumers and funding sources through community education,
use of the media, and other tactics which increase the
center's social legitimacy.
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3) Buffering— Successful CMHC's buffer themselves against en-
vironmental instability by: 1) developing financial re-
serves, 2) diversifying their resource dependence, 3)
joining a successful parent organization, and/or 4) devel-
oping long-term contracts with funding sources.
4) Mergers (growth )--Successful CMHC's grow through "horizon-
tal" mergers, vertical mergers, or diversification to gain
more control over their production processes and resource
exchanges.
5) Interorganization coordination--Successful CMHC's coordin-
ate their efforts with other organizations to gain a more
predictable environment, reduce competition, share re-
sources, and gain lobbying power. Included are coordina-
tion, agreements, long-term contracts, and coalitions.
6) Board of directors and cooptation--Successful center direc-
tors work with their boards to achieve mutually agreeable
organizational objectives, and use board members as extra
administrative talent and links to key external groups.
7) Lobbying for goverment intervention--Successful CMHC's
"lobby" for governmental changes in funding, regulations,
and intergovernmental relations (especially the federal-
state relationship) to improve their survival stance.
8) Executive succession— Successful CMHC's orchestrate changes
in executive leadership when needed to improve the organi-
zation's adaptive posture.
As implied earlier, most of the above strategies were used by all
four CMHC's to increase control over their environments and improve
their chances for successful self-sufficiency. Activities related to
buffering and lobbying were regarded as the most important and useful.
However, examples were provided by at least one center in all eight
categories.
1) Marketing . In a basic way, the centers here have all been very
astute in reading the needs of the marketplace (both current and future).
Through use of the environmental scanning techniques discussed earlier,
they have been able to keep in touch with mental health funders to as-
sess and predict their funding demands. Also, through contact with cli-
ents, their boards, and occasional formal needs assessments, they have
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been able to assess the needs of consumers and gear their services to
them as well. To a greater or lesser degree, all four centers had used
marketing principles to explore other potential sources of revenue (par-
ticularly for consultation and evaluation services). Furthermore, one
of the centers here had already explored the use of formal marketing
techniques, and was looking for research funds to more carefully assess
their usefulness.
By and large, the marketing techniques used here were informal,
with a heavy reliance on the scanning activities discussed earlier. Two
of the centers had experimented with surveys and more systematic assess-
ment tools. Once a potential market had been identified through such
activity, it was then tested for its viability. Initial resources were
invested with minimal risk to the organization, and their return was as-
sessed over time. New services were sometimes offered free initially so
that consumers would be more likely to try them. If after experimenta-
tion and advertising the markets did not pay-off they were discarded.
Care was taken, however, to not discard or otherwise alter programs that
were central to the CMHC ideology. In such cases, other, more comple-
mentary markets were sought to support them.
We are trying to market some C&E stuff. We've done such
things as go to different schools and agencies and offered
free services for six months, then said, "If you like it,
you'll have to buy it from now on. We'd like to offer it for
free, but because of our funding situation, we're going to
have to charge for it" (Center Director).
We do marketing in some very subtle ways. Our CMHC core is
not marketable. We are not willing to change those services
because of where the bucks are at any given time. We want to
assure the existence of those as key to community mental
health in our community. Other services can be geared to the
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marketplace, as long as they don't upset our core beliefs
(Center Director).
About five years ago we did some scouting around and antici-
pated that there would be a big market in this program area
about now. So we developed the program and sunk some money
into it with hopes that it would be paying off now when we
could use it. It hasn't. We thought we'd have a corner on
the market. But now resources are scarce and there's been a
tremendous influx of conpetition in the field. So we've been
in the process of seriously cutting back in this area, and in-
vesting in other areas that look more promising. The market-
ing principles are sound, though, and we think they can be
useful to others (Center Director).
2) Advertising . Formal advertising techniques were not used ex-
tensively by the centers here. However, all had been able to project a
positive image to funding sources and consumers that improved their sur-
vival capabilities. Their images were built upon a good track record of
providing quality services, and were conveyed to others primarily by
word-of-mouth and other grass-roots efforts. To a lesser extent, other
techniques such as the following were used: 1) public speaking (at pro-
fessional meetings and in the community); 2) public forums; 3) volunteer
programs which gave community people access to the center; 4) brochures,
posters, etc.; 5) storefront operations; 6) interaction with police, the
schools, and other key community agencies; and 6) the outside activity
of board members.
Unfortunately, none reported using the media as effectively as they
probably could. This was due in part to the difficulty of overcoming
the stigma associated with mental health, and to a lack of funds. Two
of the centers, though, had considered hiring media specialists to help
them work with newspapers, the radio, and local television.
The issue of stigma presented an interesting advertising problem.
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particularly for centers wanting to enter traditionally non-mental
health markets. For example, staff at one of the centers were inter-
ested in developing consultation and education services to business and
industry. Recognizing the difficulties of entering such a market with a
mental health label, they established a separate corporation billed as a
professional management consulting firm. The corporation was sponsored
by and affiliated with the CMHC, but not advertised as such. Initial
reports indicated that the unique structural arrangement and "sales
technique" was beginning to pay off with some small consulting con-
tracts.
Improving your legitimacy with funding sources requires sever-
al things. First you've got to provide good quality services.
If you do, they'll see it. Secondly you've got to show con-
sistency over the years, and always comply with funding guide-
lines. You've got to hire and develop good staff that will
gain respect, and you've got to give them (the good ones, that
is) high visibility. My behavior is important because I repre-
sent the organization. I've got to look good and come through
when it's important. For example, if the commissioner calls
and says, "Can you help me out with some information?" we do
it as quickly as possible (Center Director).
We have a consulting program to business and industry which is
partly on our time but sponsored by the CMHC. We sell our-
selve's under mental health concepts, but never talk of mental
health because of its stigma. We've used business people on
the board to help us market and advertise it. We're set up as
a separate corporation to not have mental health attached to
us per se. Also, this separate status has allowed the CMHC to
protect itself from embarrassment if we fail. We can both win
if it works, and we get some staff time to work on it now and
some seed money. It's been very important to not bill our-
selves as mental health. First we tell people how it will
save them money. Then we talk about how it will help people,
once we're beyond the initial bottom line. They like the idea
that it will help people and that it's a nice fringe benefit
to offer, but these days the bottom line of cutting costs is
really important (Key Staff Member).
177
3) Buffering . Perhaps the most important strategy used by the
centers in this sample was buffering. All had developed financial and
political cushions which decreased their vulnerability in the market-
place as their federal funds expired. The most powerful buffer, of
course, was a parent organization. One hospital -based center in the
study was able to survive handsomely using that strategy as its primary
weapon. The larger system 1) served as a powerful political base, 2)
allowed the center easy access to specialized and otherwise expensive
mental health services for its clients, and 3) helped cushion the center
against state cutbacks and other funding losses. On the negative side,
the arrangement did cause some of the problems usually associated with
hospital-based centers, but they were minimized given the hospital's
long-standing commitment to the CMHC movement and that center. In the
director's opinion, the benefits far outweighed the occasional problems
which were experienced.
We have the power of them behind us, but more flexibility be-
cause they have been committed to the CMHC movement and this
center. We are looked upon and supported as a model. They
have a political base that would be very difficult to erode.
As long as they're around, we will be assured of at least sur-
vival. We look good and make them look good, and thus have
legitimized ourselves in their eyes. . . . The [larger organi-
zation] allows us to provide a range of services through our
system rather than through a string of affiliates. It's much
easier to manage. . . . The minuses of the buffer. ... In
sum, I don't have the complete flexibility to hustle for re-
sources, I don't completely control my budget, and we're often
not seen enough in line with the rest of the organization to
really fight for the resources. Thus our positions are more
in jeopardy than those in the section. Also, we don't
have a separate identity from the larger organization. Our
positive focus in relation to community responsiveness, etc.
can get lost in other people's global negative impressions.
Don't let me give you the wrong impression, though. Our rela-
tionship is a good one, and the positives far outweigh the
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negatives (Center Director).
Without the luxury of a parent organization, the free-standing cen-
ters were forced to use more creative means of buffering. Of utmost im-
portance to them was the ability to develop stable funding commitments
from the state (e.g. long-term contracts) and to diversify their re-
sources in as many ways as possible. As discussed earlier, diversifica-
tion is difficult in mental health because of limited funding and regu-
lations which prohibit movement into different markets. However, the
free-standing centers here explored as many options as possible to di-
versify themselves, both within and outside the government funding com-
munity. Included were funding arrangements in mental retardation, LEAA,
health research and training, foundations, mental health demonstration
grants, the schools, and business and industry. Such funding arrange-
ments provided administrative overhead and other resources to help sup-
port center operations. Losses due to political changes in any one area
were less likely to disrupt the total organization.
An exciting development with future potential for other CMHC's was
the movement of at least one of the centers into "capital markets."
This center had established a separate holding company to buy property
that the center could then lease. Most of the property had been reno-
vated such that its value was dramatically increased in a short period
of time. Thus the center was able to develop equity and potential pro-
fits (if the property was sold) that could be used at a later date to
support needed programs. In the least, the center had permanent space
at a relatively fixed price. It is possible that in the future some of
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the space could be rented to outsiders, with whatever profit being
turned back into the CMHC. Thus, a profit-making activity could be used
to channel needed income into a non-profit, public-service endeavor.
While this concept is not completely new in human services (e.g., shel-
tered workshops for the mentally retarded), the potential scale of its
use to generate income and the movement into pure business activity
raises interesting possibilities and moral dilemmas for CMHC's. For
example, the author has heard of at least two CMHC's running fast food
franchises and another managing a fishery. The issue of whether such
activity bastardizes the CMHC ideology, or simply enhances the CMHC's
ability to serve the community, is one to be ultimately decided at the
community level. The author would argue, however, that profit-making
activity can be an exciting addition to increase the power and effec-
tiveness of CMHC's if it is structured and managed properly.
Centers have to reflect the value system of their comnunity.
We had problems buying property. Our board moved into it by
necessity. Their basic attitude (although they don't mean
harm) is that non-profits should get by, by the skin of their
teeth. If the value was played out we'd be working in store-
fronts for minimum wage. Our board went along because buying
property was the only reasonable way we could house our serv-
ices. I ' ve looked at it as a way we could win financially,
too. Now we own eight pieces of property. We probably won't
get more, but they are very profitable arrangements. The idea
of buying property or running businesses will come more in the
future. I think we'll see a lot of things in the community
mental health movement (Center Director).
I won't own a hamburger stand or allow our C&E program to run
programs just because they are lucrative. What are we if we
do that? Although if we got to a place where valued positions
were in jeopardy I don't know what I'd do. I guess there's a
critical issue here. How do you expand the things you do to
survive and yet not disturb the foundation upon which you ex-
ist? (Center Director)
180
As a final buffering strategy, the free-standing centers in parti-
cular were very concerned about developing financial reserves. Invest-
ing in property was one means, although mechanisms for developing more
liquid assets were used as well. As mentioned earlier, the use of spe-
cialized accounting techniques was extremely helpful in this regard.
Through manipulations of accounts receivable and other categories, ac-
ceptable surpluses were generated for paying bills and covering slow
contract reimbursements.
Cash flow is an issue because we're not allowed to book a re-
serve as you can in a hospital. For some reason it's regarded
as a surplus. We've worked to establish a reserve but it's
been tough. Mainly you work through your accounts receivable,
accrued vacation, stuff like that. We've improved cash flow
without borrowing yet and without showing a surplus we'd have
to give back. I don't know why we can't do it if hospitals
can. For example, two percent of our budget set aside for a
reserve is no big deal in my eyes (Center Director).
4) Mergers ( growth ). As predicted, centers in this sample had
grown over the years developing increased stature in the community,
greater control over their "production" processes, and diversified fund-
ing bases. Rarely, however, was growth accomplished by merging with
other organizations. Generally, growth occurred with new funds and pro-
gram ideas. Thus, this strategy was not considered particularly impor-
tant and was given little discussion time in the interviews.
5) Interorganization coordination . While other organizations were
rarely merged with in the traditional sense, they were often coordinated
with closely through affiliation agreements or within coalitions. Such
activity was strongly encouraged by the center directors here as a way
to 1) expand their service capabilities (by sharing resources), 2) re-
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duce competition for scarce resources, and 3) gain more lobbying power.
All four centers maintained at least one affiliation with a community
agency to expand their service capabilities. All were also integrally
involved in local planning and fund-raising groups (e.g. United Way),
and three of the four were intimately involved in state councils of
CMHC's and the National Council of CMHC's. The following quotations re-
flect some of the important issues raised around this important strate-
gic area.
We have some affiliations within our larger organization and
in the community that have relieved us of certain pressures.
We've been able to get around the delivery ourselves of cer-
tain specialized services such as emergency services. We'll
participate in this, but don't have the pressure of supporting
the whole thing and it's of much better quality than if we did
it ourselves. We've also gotten involved in some consortiums
in which several agencies go for the money and then contract
it out. There are a number of examples of that in our C&E
work. It's been done where there is an interest and a need to
bring things together across a number of organizations to re-
duce competition and to give the program enough breadth that
it has an increased chance of getting funded (Key Staff).
I think we'll see a lot more people falling back on the con-
glomerate model as self-sufficiency hits. You try to do it
all on your own and you'll lose money. You've got to pick out
what you can do best, and affiliate with others who can do
what else you need. You work together as much as possible to
provide the coordinated package to the community (Center Di-
rector) .
They recently just got a state council going up there. The
center director and I have been talking about it for a long
time. The council has been created as a funnel for technical
assistance money, a common legislative contact (they have a
huge legislature and a big need to keep up with what's going
on, to follow and propose bills), and as a statement of unity
to the department of mental health. Hopefully it'll pay off,
and they'll have a stronger base of grass roots support (NIMH
Project Officer).
The coalitions are crucial. We're involved in them locally,
statewide, and nationally. They give us greater power to af-
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feet changes we feel are needed. It forces others to deal
with us as a whole rather than as separate entities (Center
Di rector)
.
6) Boards of directors . Also important to the success of these
centers (particularly the free-standing ones) was the way in which they
worked with and used the talent of their boards of directors. Each was
skilled in seeing the positive aspects of a board and how it could be
used to enhance the agency's connection to the community. Each was also
skilled in selecting the right board people at the right time, depending
on the developmental needs of the agency. The following quotations
highlight some of these important issues.
We've had the right board president at the right time. A key
is how to use the right comnunity members at the right time.
Up until recently we've had board presidents who were part of
the conservative interests in the state. That's been very im-
portant. It's no trouble to get liberals on the board or to
get their support. But the conservatives don't like mental
health. They see it as something that Roosevelt brought in.
So you get them on the board and they'll push it along like
it's their own. When we were new, we had a president who was
a mover and a banger in town. When we were into fund raising,
we had a good fund-raiser. When we were expanding clinical
services we had a clinician. Now we've got some state politi-
cal problems so we've got a politican. We're also using our
bankers and lawyers on the finance committee to help us find
ways to save money and build security down the road (Center
Director).
Governance boards are very important. The board must be aware
of the CMHC as a raul ti -mil lion dollar corporation. You've got
to have the foresight, aggressiveness, flexibility and the
willingness to risk and take chances, and try new things.
Most mental health boards are predominated by traditional peo-
ple who don't risk. We don't have enough business people. We
have a few who are very articulate and who wield a lot of in-
fluence, though. The role of the board of a large corporation
is to develop long-range policy. It should be looking far far
ahead, setting very broad guidelines that the administration
can pick up on and do the work. It should evaluate the staff's
performance, but not look over their shoulders. If the board
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is not too involved internally, they can put effort into help-
ing manage the external environment. We used a board member
(the vice-president of a local bank) to establish a relation-
ship with a hospital board that's given us problems. A hospit-
al board member came into the bank and a conversation got
started about the hospital and mental health center. One
thing led to another and now we've got a joint board-to-board
committee meeting regularly to discuss and hopefully resolve
some of our issues. It's very healthy and something I never
could have done. They've got the clout to arm twist the leg-
islators and other boards. Not me. They've got to be the
visible advocates. I'm going to be shifting more boundary
maintenance work to them as they reconceptualize their role as
an overall leadership group. They're going to shift from an
internal focus to an external focus, just as we have. The
board has to change developmental ly with the center (Center
Di rector)
.
7) " Lobbying ." As predicted, another extremely important strategy
used by the centers in this sample was lobbying. All were highly in-
volved at a state and federal level attempting to influence changes in
funding and regulatory systems. Such work was closely allied with the
scanning activity described earlier, in that the center directors used
whatever means available to maintain contacts on a variety of fronts
where important policy matters were being discussed. Lobbying was
characterized by some subtle differences, however, including the fact
that it was never conducted as "lobbying" in the formal, legal sense.
Since there are federal restrictions on "lobbying," any such activity
conducted by the centers or coalitions had complex implications. Be-
cause of the extreme importance of policy and legislation to their long-
range viability, though, the center directors here found a variety of
ways to speak out publicly on issues, involve themselves as policy ad-




A number of important tactics, which are here referred to loosely
as lobbying, emerged from the investigation. The center directors' ef-
forts here were characterized by at least the following principles:
1) Activity was done as a multiple effort utilizing the teamwork, of a
number of key players from different access points into the system
to be changed. Included were staff, board members, key community
contacts, clients or former clients, legislators, coalitions (espe-
cially state councils of CMHC's), state or federal officials, and
any other political allies in positions of influence or power.
2) Efforts reflected a careful understanding of the system, including
its constraints, its actors, and its power bases. Change efforts
attempted to take these into consideration. Credibility was en-
hanced when this knowledge was reflected to others.
3) Individuals acted from a position of power, knowledge, and confid-
ence rather than one of weakness. The centers simply asked for
their fair share and stated their positions.
4) Efforts were long-range, focused efforts based on long-range plans
and any opportunities of which they could take advantage.
5) Efforts used extensive, wel 1 -documented data to back-up arguments.
The MIS was crucial in this regard.
6) Action was done with good timing and a proper sense of restraint.
All issues were not escalated pro forma. Issues were pushed at the
right time when forces could be rallied to get them through. Also,
battles were fought to be won, but not to humiliate opponents. Of
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utmost concern were the issues themselves, and the ability to re-
main politically viable for other issues in the future.
We are all involved in various ways with the state legislature
and with planning groups throughout the region. There are
many people involved. There's always been a kind of political
savy to key issues here. We serve in a quasi-advisory/lobby-
ing position and sometimes in a direct planning role. We get
benefits in two ways. First we influence the way services get
delivered, and secondly we get financial benefits for CMHC's
sometimes as a fallout. There is a real eye to local politics
and state politics. We keep close contact to state and feder-
al officials who run offices that provide us with funds. A
lot of time is also spent in developing relationships with
legislators (Key Staff).
There were a number of problems with inpatient, partial hos-
pitalization and outpatient services because of inadequate
third-party reimbursement mechanisms. As a result we got very
active in lobbying for better insurance coverage. We had con-
stant contact with the state insurance commissioner's office,
local insurance agents, members of the state legislature, lo-
cal municipal and business leaders, and our state mental health
association. We also worked with the state department of men-
tal health who was working with the state welfare office to
develop a reimbursement schedule for welfare clients in mental
health. Through our efforts we got some legislation intro-
duced. Then we did the technical stuff that was crucial. We
provided the legislators with the hard data they needed to
support their political stance, and we provided some testimony.
Also, we did a very important thing just before the bill was
voted on. All the staff took a list of ten clients and called
them to tell them what was happening so they would call their
legislators to get the bill passed. We had legislators who
took their phones off the hook. And it all paid off. They
passed the bill (Center Director).
In lobbying, data is crucial. The MIS really pays off here.
Your statistics and costs must be an accurate reflection of
both your operation and others'. You need to phrase yourself
within the big picture. That's why it's so important to get
everyone involved in a state council. They can have so much
more influence as a group (NIMH Project Officer).
8) Executive succession . The final strategy discussed in this
part of the study involved the manner in which the CMHC's here changed
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executive leadership in order to improve their adaptive capabilities.
Such was clearly the case in two of the CMHC's, whose current directors
were the products of such changes. Previous directors had failed to
successfully grow with their agencies, and thus were removed by the
boards of directors. The directors interviewed here were brought in
specifically for their professional management capabilities in an effort
to tighten fiscal and programmatic operations and to improve the agen-
cies' external images. In order to highlight the changes in leadership,
clear contracts with mutual expectations were negotiated.
The other two center directors were somewhat different in that they
were less the product of a conscious agency decision for change. How-
ever, both had contemplated retiring from their agencies, and because of
this were thinking of what kind of leadership was needed next, given
their leadership styles and the developmental stages of their agencies.
As a final point, all of the directors were aware of the need for
executives to change with the times or "be changed." Professional flex-
ibility was a crucial quality to maintain, as reflected in the following
quotation.
If a director is going to stay he has to have a flexible style.
This is very difficult, but he must be able to do it. How
long should center directors stay? I guess five to seven
years is max. If you don't leave and create change on your
own, you need to at least create the symptoms of change by
your leadership. It takes a lot of energy and self-examina-
tion. I think we need to keep up with the changing times like
in business. If you don't change to new products or more ef-
fective techniques, you're out (Center Director).
In sum, the research findings here indicated that, as expected, all
eight of the above adaptive strategies were used to a greater or lesser
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extent by the outstanding CMHC's in this sample. Buffering and lobbying
appeared to be the most important, but interesting examples of all were
provided by at least one of the centers. The next section of this chap-
ter discusses findings related to the fourth and final research proposi-
tion. Here, issues related to organization structure, internal coordin-
ation, and stability will be discussed. The chapter will then conclude
with a discussion of important developmental issues which emerged from
an analysis of the centers' adaptive efforts over time.
Proposition Four : Structures . Successful CMHC's have devel-
oped structural mechanisms (e.g., coordinating committees,
matrix designs, etc.) to enhance the coordination and stabil-
ization of diverse and changing program types mandated by
changing regulations and funding priorities.
As expected, the centers in this study were continually concerned
about the internal workings of their organizations. Great care was
taken to fine tune them, particularly during the late stages of the fed-
eral grants, so that they would be better able to stand the test of
self-sufficiency. All had used good organization design principles in
the past to strengthen their operations. Also, when changes were needed
they were implemented in planned, careful ways with structured lower .
level involvement to minimize their disruptive effects. As will be
seen, some principles of differentiation and integration were used by
the centers with emphasis on internal coordination mechanisms. None had
developed true matrix organizations, but some of their principles were
occasionally used (e.g. cross-functional committees). The following
represent some of the more important design principles and structural
mechanisms used by the four centers.
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1 ) Quality people with dear roles and delegated authority
. The
center directors here all knew that to be successful they would need the
help of others. Thus, they worked hard to bring to their CMHC's bright,
competent professional staff. Clear roles and structures were develop-
ed for them to work within, and they were delegated the necessary au-
thority over time to take responsibility and ownership over their pieces
of the organization. Thus, the center director became an orchestrator
and troubleshooter, and was given more time to do important fundraising,
lobbying, and other boundary-spanning activity.
A key thing to do is to hire competent people and then dele-
gate to them. Give them real responsibility. Most center di-
rectors rise through the ranks and get to the point where they
feel like they're the only ones who can do it. Thus, they end
up taking too much on that there's no way they can handle
(Center Di rector)
.
You've got to get good people and develop good people, espe-
cially at higher levels. The director cannot be threatened by
people below him who are as bright or brighter than he is. I
don't know if you know that, but it's very commonplace. You
must give your bright people a chance to develop. I try to
keep people on as long a leash as possible (Center Director).
2) A strqng management team . To many of those interviewed, the
developjiient of a strong management team that could spread the ownership
of self-sufficiency ^throughout the organization was critical to CMHC
success. All four center directors had strong allies at the tops of
their organizations to engage in group problem-solving and decision-mak-
ing. The management team shared the responsibility for organizational
success or failure, and served as an important coordination mechanism
and buffer to lower parts of the organization. Through the middle man-
agers, lower staff were kept informed of environmental trends and were
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made to feel a sense of ownership and control over concerns of financial
viability. They were informed and included, but not overwhelmed. The
center director also served as an important buffer here.
My support comes from the middle managers. They're crucial to
me and the organization (Center Director).
Unless the staff feels a sense of ownership and control over
the problem, they have neither the motivation nor the control
to deal with it. There are several things you can do to in-
crease the staff's ownership and control. We reorganized so
that the middle managers would be closer to the staff. We got
an MIS in shape with the right data on a timely basis so the
staff could see how they were doing. Also, we chose not to
filter down a lot of craziness. The middle management hears
most of it. I rely on them a lot. We all try to help the
staff understand bottom lines and the options we're exploring
and our sense of probabilities of outcomes. They know that
their best efforts may not be good enough. But the day-to-day
craziness that serves no purpose, we keep from them. A lot of
it doesn't leave my office until I'm sure that decisions have
actually been made (Center Director).
You must have good people and keep up morale during the tran-
sition process. They must be informed and included, but not
depressed. During the period of uncertainty I took a lot of
grief. I think a primary reason was so that staff could vent
and stay productive. We had to give people an understanding
of honest security
.
They knew our contingencies and were
forewarned, and knew that if they had to go they'd get six
months' notice. We had a full year going over plans, over and
over. Our middle management met weekly and would go to the
staff offices together. A critical factor was that we kept
lines of communication open and used a team approach. It was
very natural (Center Director).
3) Stabilized , survival-oriented program units. Over time, the
center directors here had gradually tightened the structures of their
organizations, making them easier to support during the potential lean
years of self-sufficiency. Specialized programs were generally organ-
ized under broad functional categories that would be easier to staff
with middle management and coordinate and hopefully would provide great-
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er stability as individual programs were phased in and out. The major,
broad functional units were organized taking into consideration such
factors as the following: 1) the unit made sense from a service point
of view; 2) the unit would provide an important power base for its con-
stituents, or would help strengthen an important, yet marginal program;
3) the unit would provide for greater efficiency (e.g. reduce duplica-
tion); 4) the unit could more easily explore and manage a key market
area; and 5) staff in the unit could work together and complement each
other. Quite often, the functional units and key programs within them
were organized using a "profit center" notion (especially the free-
standing centers). Each unit was made responsible for securing its re-
sources and managing its budget. Income production goals were set for
the unit, and top management support was given to help it reach its
goals.
We chose to go with a regional structure because it would be
easier to support than one based on twelve discrete services.
That gives you too much duplication and it's too expensive.
The one we have is cleaner and it allows for greater coordina-
tion and continuity of care. Also, local community visibility
is increased. We began to look at what kind of structure was
needed for survival, three and one-half years before the ends
of our grants (Center Director).
Our organization structure has had to be looked at a lot be-
cause of our rapid growth and movement into the corporate
realm. The old systems just don't work. They're too inequit-
able and too cumbersome. We're looking at functions, putting
them where they need to go, setting up coordinating links,
etc. Our programs develop because of their natural linkages
to the community and then we need to think later where they
best fit in the long run and how they should evolve. For ex-
ample our program started here (pointing to organization
chart) because of its links to the schools. Now it needs to
move away from drop-in and become less of a second-class citi-
zen. We shifted it here to increase its stature. We could
have put it here, but it would have gotten lost because of its
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current second-class nature (Center Director).
We wanted to establish a structure that would support both
clinical and consultative services. We needed people within
each that were responsible for each important area. These
people were then in a position to argue for these services.
A power base for each service area was then in place to fight
for funds, staff, etc. to keep them going. Without someone
responsible for a service area, it's difficult to fight for it
to keep it alive. The base expands both in numbers and in
terms of expertise and knowledge of the area (Key Staff).
Yes, we use a profit center notion. Each division must have
a balanced budget. Programs within them should strive for it,
but some will be able to do better than others. For example
we recognized that C&E would receive some extra allocated mon-
ey because the funding for it is just not there now (Center
Director)
.
4) Internal coordination mechanisms . As implied earlier, internal
coordination was an important priority of the center directors here.
However, no highly sophisticated coordination techniques were used (nor
did they appear to be needed). Attempts were made to keep lines of com-
munication open so that teamwork and agency ownership could be main-
tained at all organizational levels. Regular staff meetings were held
and at least one center director organized regular staff retreats for
group problem-solving and planning sessions. Written policies and pro-
cedures, and goals and objectives were also used to enhance teamwork.
Finally, cross-functional committees were used occasionally for planning
or policy development purposes when it appeared that such coordination
was necessary.
5) Effective use of affiliations . As a final note, the centers
here had effectively used affiliations with outside groups to improve
their survival capability and enhance internal stability. Overall, af-
filiations were used sparingly so that needed services could be pro-
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vided, but without the confusion and management problems of multiple
affiliates. One or two affiliates could be coordinated with closely,
but several semi -autonomous agencies struggling to work together with
the CMHC could demand too much valuable management time. As mentioned
earlier, affiliations were also used in at least two other important
ways. One involved affiliation with a holding corporation for property
management (and other potential income-generating endeavors), and the
other sponsorship of a consulting program to business and industry.
Both arrangements allowed the CMHC to take financial risks, while mini-
mizing damage to its core structure if the endeavors failed. The
CMHC's could gain substantially in otherwise impossible ways, however,
if the efforts succeeded.
In sum, the research findings here indicated that these outstanding
CMHC's had developed structural mechanisms to enhance the coordination
and stabilization of their internal operations. All were aware of, and
had experimented with, basic organization design principles to prepare
for the test of self-sufficiency.
This section concludes the discussion of findings related to the
four propositions upon which the research study was based. As expected,
the general hypotheses have held true for this sample of outstanding or-
ganizations, lending support to the model of CMHC adaptation presented
in Chapter III. It is hoped that the examples presented here have
helped clarify and enrich the model, and have provided some interesting
ideas for other center directors in the field. The next and final sec-
tion of this chapter is intended to provide additional clarifying infor-
mation. Included is a discussion of developmental issues related to
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CMHC adaptation, which should help other center directors improve their
selection and use of the adaptation strategies during their own organi-
zations' evolutions.
Developmental issues
. Throughout this chapter it has been clear that
the center directors in this sample guided their organizations with
proper timing, good judgment, and an eye to the future. Thus, it should
be no surprise that all carried a developmental perspective with them in
their work, and understood that to be successful their organizations
needed to mature steadily over time. In basic terms, the early years of
development needed to be focused primarily on internal operations, gen-
erating staff ownership and understanding of the CMHC model and putting
into place a quality operation that could stand the test of self-suffi-
ciency. Ideally, the later years of federal grants would then be fo-
cused more externally, firming up community relations which had been de-
veloped earlier and securing proper funding for the near and distant fu-
ture. Of course, overlap in activities were needed throughout the
CMHC's life-cycle, with attention paid to environmental scanning and
long-range strategizing in early years and continued internal fine-tun-
ing in later ones. However, the center directors were all aware of the
importance of spending their early, more financially secure years to de-
velop a quality product, which would then be easier to "sell" to others
in the future (as exemplified in the following quotation).
He hustled on the outside, but not_ before he had a product to
sell. The timing of this was crucial. First, he profession-
alized the staff, he worked on interorganizational relation-
ships in the community, he got the board structured and in-
volved. In short, he developed a solid product. Then he
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tried to change the community image around with the solid pro-
duct he could sell. He spent a lot of time out there talking
to folks. Then, and only then, did he really try to hustle on
the outside for money. Everything was now in order to sell
the center and its services. He had the product and the com-
munity backing. You don't sell something you don't have and
you don't sell your ideas. You've got to have it, and have it
documented. If it's worth doing, it's worth documenting. If
it's worth documenting, it's worth charging for. But you can't
charge unless you have a product and are proud of it. The MIS
becomes not a control mechanism but something to be proud of
and to use to sell yourself (NIMH Project Officer).
One center director in the sample had carefully thought through the
issue of CMHC development, and had developed a four-stage model which he
felt was of potential use to others in the field, particularly those in
free-standing centers. Again, he stressed that there was overlap in
stages, but that their basic linear progression served as a useful
guiding framework for center directors' efforts over time. The model
is summarized as follows.
1) Stage one --" organizational establishment ." This is the easiest
stage, referred to as a "honeymoon" period. The CMHC is new in the com-
munity and everyone involved has high hopes and expectations. Staff and
board members may be unsure of their role and that of the agency, but
spirits are high and everyone feels confident about the future. The
center director's role here is to build on the positive energy to begin
laying important foundations in the community and within the agency.
Care must be taken to avoid overselling.
2) Stage two--
"
internal reorganization and crisis." During this
stage, most centers have a difficult time. Those with overly high and
unrealistic expectations from the first stage are disappointed. Any
overselling which the center director has done comes back to haunt him.
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The staff are settling in to work with each other now that the glitter
has worn off, and the board is beginning to feel stress from the commu-
nity's higher demands and expectations. This is an extremely challen-
ging time for most center directors as they must lower expectations,
while continuing to build agency strength in beginning preparation for
termination of their federal grants. Many center directors cannot stand
the pressure and must move on, yielding to the strategy of executive
succession to pull their agencies through the crisis. Regardless of
whether the center director stays, turnover in other staff and board
members is an issue to be addressed. In order to successfully move
through this stage, strong professionals must be courted to the agency,
and extensive management energy must be focused on building teamwork and
quality service. Unfortunately, because of poor management, too many
centers waste precious years of federal money struggling within this
stage of development.
3) Stage three- -" relati ve stability ." After moving through the
potential crisis period of years three and four into the later years of
federal support, extensive work must be focused internally to prepare
the agency for self-sufficiency. Flexible federal funding must be used
while it is available to firm up policies and procedures, develop an
MIS, explore issues of cost effectiveness and income production, and de-
velop financial buffering mechanisms. High quality and committed staff
must be recruited, and those with managerial skill and financial exper-
tise must be found or developed. At this point the center director must
look to the internal needs of his staff and begin to develop ways of
satisfying them over time. Stability, comni tment, and teamwork must be
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worked on carefully. The center director should also keep an eye cut
to the environment and begin laying the groundwork for extensive market-
ing, advertising, and lobbying work which will follow. (Of course, the
center director should always focus some attention on the environment
to anticipate crises, plan for the future, and influence needed changes
in funding and regulations.)
4) Stage four— " survival period." During the seventh and eighth
years and into the future, the center director must maintain a quality
operation and work extensively in the marketplace to secure alternative
funds. At this point, the agency must have internal stability with
quality, committed staff who are reimbursable and cost-effective. The
center must have a clear sense of how it works, the resources it needs
to do its job, and its ability to generate income from existing re-
sources. It must have a solid, resourceful board and a solid executive
who can provide steady, careful leadership during what could be very un-
certain times. External work (which should be extensive at this time)
must be buffered from, yet synchronized with internal operations through
contingency planning and management team meetings. Agency staff should
know where they are, where they are headed, what is needed to get there,
and what they can realistically expect as outcomes. Diversification of
resources is crucial at this time, although the groundwork must have
been laid earlier.
In sum, the preceding model shows clearly the kinds of development-
al issues that are important to CMHC self-sufficiency. While the model
may not be the best or most accurate one available, it does provide some
interesting insights into the use of adaptation strategies. For exam-
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pie, it points out that the advertising and marketing strategies work
best when proceeded by the development of sound internal operations and
adaptive structures. Too many centers probably err by using them too
soon before they have a quality product to sell, or too late because of
their need for regular crisis management. Also, the model points out
the need for careful long-range planning to avoid crisis and chaos. In
the early years of federal grants, such planning should be focused on
laying the groundwork for external relations and on putting in place a
quality internal operation (e.g. professional staff, policies and pro-
cedures, MIS). In the mid to late years of the granting cycle, efforts
should be focused on fine-tuning efficiency and structure, and securing
a diversified funding base. Throughout the eight years, but particular-
ly in later ones, energy should be placed in environmental scanning, an-
ticipatory crisis management, and lobbying for needed governmental
changes.
Summary . This chapter has presented the findings of a research study of
four outstanding CMHC's in New England which was conducted to clarify
and enrich the model of environmental management presented in Chapter
III, and provide examples of successful survival strategies to other
center directors in the field. As expected, the findings supported the
basic model and its usefulness, and pointed out several interesting is-
sues related to CMHC self-sufficiency. It was shown that self-suffici-
ency was extremely difficult for centers regardless of their abilities,
because of the many limitations imposed upon them by their funding en-
vironments. However, through a combination of tenacity and the use of
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sound management practices, the center directors here were able to rise
above most limitations they faced. When limiting points were reached,
they approached them directly, attempting to minimize their effects on
the CMHC ideology and their long-range goals. Wherever possible they
tried to look at the positive sides of such problems and used them as
opportunities for lobbying and making needed internal changes. As
stated previously, the adaptation model presented here was seen as valu-
able to the respondents, and several examples of its usefulness were re-
ported. Of utmost importance were issues related to environmental
scanning, long-range contingency planning, buffering, and lobbying. De-
velopmentally it appeared that the externally-oriented strategies were
most effective after quality internal operations and adaptive structures
were established. It was hypothesized that most center directors have
problems because they either use them too early or too late in their or-
ganizations' development. The following chapter concludes this report
with a discussion of the implications of these findings for center di-
rectors and others associated with community mental health. Areas for
future research on CMHC adaptation and self-sufficiency are also rec-
commended.
CHAPTER VI
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE FUTURE:
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THEIR ADAPTIVE CAPABILITIES
The Community Mental Health Centers Program was established in the
early 1960 's as a major innovation in mental health care. The program
was designed to improve treatment by offering comprehensive and preven-
tative services in the local community as an alternative and deterent to
institutional care. The program has developed and expanded over the
years, but unfortunately has been jeopardized recently by problems in
the CMHC seed-funding concept. For a variety of reasons many centers
graduating from federal funds today have difficulty being able to both
survive and protect the CMHC ideology.
This project has attempted to explore the problems of CMHC self-
sufficiency and provide assistance to center directors in the field. As
a result of this study, a number of important points have been clarified.
First of all, it is obvious that CMHC's are complex organizations, exist-
ing within an even more complex and problematic environment. Survival
in lines with the CMHC ideology is difficult to say the least. Because
of this, the role of center director is extremely challenging and frus-
trating. Center directors are in a particularly bad position because
they are at the nexus of several, often conflicting internal and exter-
nal forces. Even with conceptual strength, technological skills, and
charismatic personal qualities, they have a difficult time successfully
199
200
managing their organizations. Clearly, major efforts are needed by fed-
eral and state officials to improve the plight of CMHC's if they are to
survive as a national program.
In spite of these difficulties, this study has also shown that much
can be done by centers themselves to improve their positions. The CMHC's
in this sample experienced difficulties, but they were surviving and by
all indications would continue to survive, keeping intact most if not
all aspects of the CMHC ideology. Clearly, at least some CMHC's will
forge ahead during these difficult times and establish an important
niche for the CMHC model. The successes of today will be able to serve
as important models to build on in better environmental times.
Perhaps most importantly, this study has provided valuable ideas
for helping center directors make their organizations more successful.
The conceptual framework developed earlier has been initially validated
as a useful tool for those in the field, and much has been learned about
its potential application throughout the life-cycle of CMHC's. Several
examples of successful survival strategies within this orientation were
provided for center directors to use in their own situations. This
study has supported the notion that successful management is a skill as
well as an art. There are many qualities of successful organization
that are directly related to managerial skill areas which can be taught
and developed. This report has delineated several such skill areas for
center directors.
Many of the suggestions developed here are not new, as they have
been proposed in one fashion or another by others associated with the
federal program. In many ways this report simply supports their obser-
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vations and recommendations. More importantly, though, it extends their
work by placing their ideas within a sound conceptual framework and
clarifying them with specific examples from the field. In addition the
report suggests needed developments in social policy and organization
theory. In the pages which follow I would like to comment briefly on at
least some of these areas.
Assistance for center directors . In its most basic form, the work pre-
sented here suggests that center directors look outwards to their envir-
onments to improve their organizations' survival capabilities. Mechan-
isms should be developed to scan the environment for opportunities and
threats, and understand the complex interdependencies which affect re-
source acquisition and organizational performance. The resulting data
should be interpreted into the centers' decision-making and decision-
implementing mechanisms (along with data on internal matters) to be used
for altering structures and processes as needed. Long-range contingency
plans based on CMHC needs and environmental realities should be devel-
oped to guide the organization in as proactive a way as possible.
Short-range opportunities and crises should be managed from within the
plans to maintain this forward-moving position. Given their specific
environments and personal styles, center directors have a variety of
strategic options available to incorporate into their plans and hopeful-
ly improve their centers' adaptive positions. Some of the most impor-
tant ones identified here included the use of marketing and advertising
techniques, the development of financial and structural buffers, and the
use of boards of directors and coalitions for governmental lobbying. To
202
be truly effective, center directors should gear their specific strate-
gies to the developmental stages and needs of their organizations. Ac-
tions should be taken which will help the CMHC stabilize and mature, and
increase its adaptive flexibility over time to prepare for the eventual
loss of federal funds. Center directors themselves should also increase
their own flexibility if they are to survive in the long run as success-
ful chief executives. They need to develop ways to reflect upon and
learn about their adaptive styles and behaviors. They should also learn
to recognize when it is best for them to move on to other positions for
the good of themselves and their organizations.
In order to be effective, center directors clearly need to incor-
porate at least some of the management principles from this report into
their current modes of operation. In order to bolster the federal pro-
gram, NIMH officials and others in positions of influence should take
steps to insure that those at the community level have the knowledge,
skills, and motivation necessary to carry them out. Some of the areas
discussed are related to intangible, personal qualities of leadership
that are generally possessed by center directors or not. Included here
are such qualities as tenacity, patience, carefulness, flexibility, a
commitment to excellence within the CMHC ideology, and a desire to learn
and grow as a professional manager. Improvements in these areas can
generally be influenced only through hiring decisions. Care should be
taken to hire center directors with these qualities, and those without
them probably should not be in such positions. The job of center direc-
tor is a difficult and stressful one. Those who are not suited to the
role will be of much greater service to themselves and their communities
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if they select other work.
In addition to these intangible leadership qualities center direc-
tors should also possess knowledge and skills in several key management
areas. Included are at least the following major categories:
1) Environmental scanning . Center directors should have extensive
knowledge of their specific organizational environment, including its a)
demands on the CMHC, b) key actors and their interdependencies , and c)
historical evolution and future trends. Specific skills should be de-
veloped and mechanisms learned for continually keeping up with changing
conditions and screening out those developments that are important.
2) Long-range planning . Center directors should know the tech-
niques of proper long-range planning, including the use of contingency
plans, financial plans, and MIS data. Somewhat related, they should un-
derstand the techniques of management team-building and group problem-
solving as they can be used to improve the planning process.
3) Marketing and advertising . Center directors should be able to
effectively read the needs of their marketplace (both funders and con-
sumers) and make their services more attractive within them. Attention
should be given to both traditionally mental health and non-mental health
markets
.
4) Buffering . Particular skills should be possessed in areas re-
lated to buffering the CMHC. Center directors should be aware of poten-
tial markets for their agencies and how they can diversify their re-
sources within them. Property and other potential equity-building or
profit-making markets should be explored from a practical and ethical
point-of-view. Center directors should also have a practical knowledge
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of financial management and accounting, and the rules of private non-
profit corporations.
5) Lobbying . Center directors should have knowledge and skills in
lobbying and other pol i ti cal -change strategies. They should be particu-
larly familiar with how to use coalitions and their boards of directors
in the process.
6) Organization design . Finally, center directors should be fami-
liar with basic organization design principles as they can be used to
structure and fine-tune their organizations in preparation for self-suf-
ficiency. They should be familiar also with a variety of internal man-
agement skills such as team-building, leadership, motivation, and com-
munication.
Because of their substantive nature, the above management areas can
easily be taught and learned from experience. All are potentially
available in advanced degree programs in human service administration,
organizational and community psychology, and business management. All
could be offered in specific training courses or technical assistance
consultations offered through NIMH. Specific packages could be develop-
ed with readings, didactic presentations, and experiential exercises
building on the background and previous training of those involved.
Such knowledge could then be built upon with occasional private consul-
tations by NIMH project officers or outside consultants. Through con-
sultations, center directors could receive feedback and guidance to
fine-tune their skills, increase their objectivity, and learn about
their stylistic strengths and weaknesses as managers. Finally, center
directors could increase their systemic awareness and political sensi-
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tivity by gaining experiences in a variety of positions within the fed-
eral and state mental health system. Such experience would help them
gain much needed maturity and objectivity in their roles as managers.
Social policy implications
. This report has several implications for
social policy affecting the CMHC federal program. In addition to the
needs for improved technical assistance as discussed above, the report
supports the already obvious needs for changes in funding and regula-
tion. The CMHC environment is extremely restrictive, and limits the use
of most adaptive strategies commonly found in the private sector. For
example, in businesses, diversification is a principal strategy for buf-
fering the organization against environmental instability. By their
very nature, however, CMHC's have very few funding markets available to
support their wide range of services. Programs are usually supported at
best by one or two different sources of funds. Thus, resource depend-
ence is high, and major pieces of the organization are thrown into up-
heaval when external problems arise. Clearly, efforts are needed to de-
velop additional and more flexible funding alternatives for center serv-
ices. Creativity in diversification efforts (such as those witnessed in
this study) should be encouraged at all levels. In the meantime, before
new funding options are fully developed, the federal government should
strongly consider continued floor funding for CMHC's. Such an arrange-
ment would contribute greatly to the funding stability and flexibility
needs of centers in the field.
With respect to funding, the report also suggests refinement in the
"contracting for services" model v/hich has increased in popularity in
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recent years (in contrast to earlier models which offered only the
placement of staff positions). The concept appears to be a good one in
that it allows centers at least some flexibility to use allocated re-
sources for their various needs. However, in most cases, contracts are
renegotiated (and often altered significantly) on an annual basis.
Thus, it can be difficult for CMHC's to develop important long-range
plans and bring stability to their staff and clients. The problem is
compounded in that many grants and contracts specify that the funds must
be used to establish a distinct and separate program. Thus, when funds
are cut or lost, an entire organizational entity is jeopardized, com-
pounding the problem of instability.
Based on the findings here, I would recommend that funding sources
themselves engage in long-range planning, and distribute funds with
longer contractual timelines. In addition, agencies should be allowed,
if not encouraged, to combine programs and funds into broader service
areas with diversified funds and more stable staff. Desired program re-
sults could still be ensured through more sophisticated monitoring. In
addition, more stable, survivable program units could be established in
the CMHC to more effectively deliver services in the community.
As a brief, final point here, the report also suggests that modifi-
cations in policies concerning lobbying be explored. This study re-
vealed that lobbying is a potentially extremely valuable strategy for
CMHC's. Unfortunately, current federal regulations place major restric-
tions on the ways in which activities referred to here loosely as "lob-
bying" can be done. Even though there are many justifiable reasons for
these restrictions, CMHC's need to find legitimate and acceptable means
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to influence decisions affecting funding and regulatory policy. Al-
though many mechanisms are already available in different areas, more
work is needed to open up appropriate channels of communication.
Implications for organizational theorists
. While the major focus of
this report has been directed to CMHC personnel, the findings here also
are useful to theoreticians concerned with organizational adaptation to
the environment. An important point is that the study provides support
for the literature reviewed earlier. First of all, it was clear that
this literature provided a very useful framework for the analysis of
CMHC organizations. Furthermore, the participants themselves found the
concepts useful and general i zable to their real-life situations.
Even though the theory does appear useful and generalizable, work
with CMHC's presents some interesting differences from other organiza-
tions that should be explored further in the future. For example, CMHC's
exist in an environment that is more highly restricted and limited in
marketing opportunities than most business organizations. Thus, while
diversification is an important survival strategy in CMHC's, it is a
much more complicated issue than is depicted in the literature. For ex-
ample, it appears from this study that it might be necessary for diver-
sification to be preceded by a strategy of legitimization in such set-
tings. Markets must be opened up before they can be entered. Also,
marketing and advertising take on much more complex dimensions in CMHC's
because of the third-party involvement of funding sources and the public
in the economic, supply-and-demand relationship. Factors affecting re-
source acquisition are much more difficult to understand and influence
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in CMHC's than they are in most businesses. The study here broke new
ground by beginning to examine such complexities. However, more work is
clearly needed to explore the subtle aspects of survival strategies such
as diversification, marketing and advertising in more restrictive set-
tings
.
As a final point, the study was also valuable in beginning to ex-
plore the application of adaptation strategies within a developmental
perspective. The study pointed out the importance of such a perspec-
tive, but did not go into much depth on the matter. Future efforts
should look closer at the sequential use of strategies and the fine-
points of their implementation at different stages of organizational
development.
Suggestions for future research . Before concluding, it should be noted
that this report represents only another beginning step in work on the
problems of CMHC self-sufficiency and the field of organizational adap-
tation to the environment. More research is needed into the numerous
issues raised here. With respect to CMHC's, this report indicates fur-
ther research is needed in at least two major directions.
First of all, continued research such as that being done by NIMH
now (e.g. Wasserman et^ al_,
,
1980) is needed to explore the limits of
self-sufficiency as imposed by current funding structures. Environment-
al limits are a major problem, even for outstanding CMHC's, and proper
documentation of their severity is needed to argue for fundamental
changes in funding and regulatory systems. Without such changes, the
CMHC ideology and in particular the notion of comprehensive services
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will at least be compromised by centers when their federal funds are ex-
hausted.
Secondly, further research is needed to explore the usefulness and
applicability of the conceptual approach and adaptive strategies pre-
sented here. The research in this report was limited by its broad ap-
proach and restrictive sample. Many important issues were addressed,
but only in a general way, and the sample was small and biased towards
the free-standing CMHC just approaching graduation. More research is
needed to validate the general approach advocated here, and to explore
its applicability in different CMHC's at different points in their de-
velopment. Comparative studies would be very helpful in this regard,
including those looking at the differences between centers from differ-
ent organizational categories (e.g. rural vs. urban, free-standing vs.
hospital -based, etc.), centers from different states or regions with
different funding systems, and centers whose quality of operations dif-
fer along specific variables central to the CMHC ideology (i.e., suc-
cessful vs. unsuccessful centers). Also, it would be interesting to ex-
plore the use of this general approach in tackling specific limiting
problems such as the maintenance of consultation and education or out-
reach-oriented services. Finally, work should be done to explore use of
the individual strategies contained within this general management ap-
proach. Most importantly, work should be done to look at characteris-
tics of effective long-range contingency planning, marketing, resource
diversification (including use of equity-developing or profit-making
markets), and lobbying.
With respect to organizational theory, more research is needed (as
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discussed earlier) to explore the fine points of organizational adapta-
tion in settings such as CMHC's. Much can be learned about the useful-
ness of different strategies by exploring their application in highly
restricted and regulated economies. In addition more research is needed
to understand the application of adaptation strategies over time, within
a developmental perspective. CMHC's are good organizations to study in
this regard because of their more clearly defined life-cycle and simi-
larity of focus and design.
Finally, one last point should be made. While organization design
was not a major focus of this research, the interviews made it clear
that adaptation and organizational structure are intimately linked.
These linkages clearly need further exploration, particularly in CMHC's
where their treatment to date has been only superficial. It will be in-
teresting to learn how these organizations which are so open to external
influence can best be structurally stabilized.
In conclusion, this report has examined the survival problems of
community mental health centers, and recommended that their executive
directors look to the principles of organizational adaptation for help.
The work here is significant in that it has developed a conceptual
framework to help orient center directors' survival efforts, and has
provided examples of specific survival strategies used by outstanding
executives in the field. It is hoped that other center directors will
incorporate these principles into their work, and that NIMH officials
will support training programs and research in their usefulness and ap-
plication. Whether or not this specific approach proves to be useful
in the long run, though, we must all work to improve the adaptive capa-
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bilities of CMHC's. With continued effort and creative leadership, the
goals of the early 1960's program can still be realized as we move into
the 1980's.
Summary . This chapter has concluded an exploration of CMHC adaptation
and the problems of self-sufficiency. Important points from previous
chapters were sunmarized and implications of the research findings were
discussed with respect to center directors, NIMH personnel, and organi-
zational theorists. Suggestions were made for training and other tech-
nical assistance interventions, policy development and future research
on CMHC adaptation to the environment.
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D. Confi denti al i ty
E. Feedback
F. Clarify amount of time together
II. strengths and weaknesses of CMHC.
A. Why was this center chosen as one of the most successful in
New England? What are its distinguishing characteristics?
B. What are its strengths and weaknesses in achieving self-suffi-
ciency while maintaining the basics of the CMHC ideology?
III. Explore CMHC's evolution and survival activity.
A. How has the center evolved year by year? Major goals? Major
accomplishments? Major survi val issues?
B. How has the center acted year by year to improve its survival
stance in the community and prepare for self-sufficiency while
maintaining the CMHC philosophy?
C. How have funds been generated? What markets entered and left?
D. What constraiints Dn survi val and self-sufficiency have been
faced? How have they been tackled? Limitations to such tac-
tics?




1. Proactivity vs. reactivity . How do centers act on their en-
vironment to make it more controllable and munificent? Proac-
tivity in an ever-changing and highly complex environment.
224
Limits of proactivity.
2. Long-range planning. Contingency plans? Short-term actions




(Are they used? How? Priority?)
a. Marketing (both consumer and funding source).
b. Advertising (both consumer and funding source)/
c. Buffering against environmental instability.
1) Financial reserves (NIMH regulations and surplus, non-
profit rules).
2) Diversifying resource dependence.
3) Parent organization.
4) Long-term contracts with funding sources.




3) Coalitions (NCCMHC, state, and local).
f. Use of board of directors (administrative resources, link-
ing).
g. Lobbying for governmental changes and intervention.
1) Federal-state interface.
2) Use of upper levels to affect lower levels.
3) Conflicting demands.
h. Executive succession.
4. Structure and stability . Is stability an issue? What struc-
tural mechanisms have been developed to enhance stability and
internal coordination?
Summary
A. Summarize most important principles of survival management.
Have we left out anything important?
B. Feedback.
C. Next steps
.


